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CHAPTER I
"CONTROL OF LOCAL RADIO."
The legislator in constructing a system of control is faced 
with the problems of selection - which system should be enforced?
The choice is often narrowed down to the most prevalent systems of 
control which exist in the given society; so in a democratic society 
the controls are in keeping with a democratic system. Quite often 
an "independent" body is established by the elected government and 
through legislation is given the authority to exercise specific 
controls. However the choice remains with the legislator, should the 
prevalent systems of control, (which apparently have been acceptable 
to the majority in society), be adhered to, or instead should an 
attempt be made to impose an alternate system which may allow 
freedom for a more radical growth?
1.1 INTRODUCTORY ARGUMENT: In terms of designing controls for
media systems this choice is usually stated; "Do you give the people 
what they want or what you think they ought to have?" In the early 
days of BBC public service broadcasting Lord Reith was often accused 
of imposing a service of standards and output which divorced the 
working class population from the high culture that Reith hoped to 
encourage. Similarly one of the major public arguments favouring 
an independent television service was that its output would cater 
exclusively for the tastes of the mass audience and would not impose 
standards of high culture and intellectual discourse. Thus the 
argument, "give the people what they want" implies a popular mass 
audience output and the legislation which best allows this is the 
"independent" media system which has been established in Britain.
In Ireland television and radio services are both provided
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by a monopoly organisation RTE which in structure appears to be a 
bridge between the British BBC public service and the private 
commercial independent stations. RTE is obliged by law to provide 
a public service of "high standard" whilst maintaining "commercial 
viability". RTE then is obliged to adhere to content controls 
whilst also depending on audience ratings to sell advertising time.
In attempting to bridge the gap between the demands of public 
service broadcasting and those of a commercial concern RTE falls 
into the trap of trying to give the people both what is wanted 
from popular culture and what the legislators feel is needed 
from minority cultures. Despite the dominance of a majority popular 
culture the difference between a public service system which 
attempts to preserve minority cultures and an independent commercial 
system which satisfies those majority wants alone is a gap which 
cannot be bridged. The dominant culture will eventually force a 
tendency towards popular output. Thus the BBC in Britain and RTE in 
Ireland have both shown a drift towards popular entertainment 
programming and away from minority interests. In a society with a 
dominant culture such a trend is inevitable unless some form of control 
prevents it by enforcing content restrictions.
The legislator's question still remains; "Do you give the 
people what they want, (popular programming) or what you think they 
ought to have, (minority programming)?" In answering this question 
which is crucial to the priorities in the design of a system for 
control there exists two presuppositions: first, what is your 
criticism of the dominant culture and secondly, do you have a right 
to enforce your system over that of the majority?
1.2 PRESENT CONDITIONS: The present conditions for local radio
relate to the dominant pluralistic society in Ireland. The present
2
"pirate" radio stations reflect conditions similar to those in Britain 
under the Independent Local Radio (ILR) system. The Irish "pirates" 
and the British ILR stations compete in an open market in which 
advertising sales account for financial success or loss. Under the 
present "pirate" system and also under the ILR system each individual 
stands an equal chance of establishing a successful station. Thus the 
ownership is plurally dispersed in so far as each individual 
has an equal opportunity to set up a station and thus competition is 
open to all. Under the ILR system application for a local radio licence 
is open to all. The force that determines success or failure is 
audience opinion. If a sufficient amount of listeners enjoy the 
station output and thereby listen regularly then the station can 
sell that audience to advertisers and so provide the necessary 
financial income to run the station as a commercial enterprise. 
Supporters of commercial local radio argue that the stations could 
not exist without audience support and since they obviously have 
audience support they are justified in their output. This is the 
commercial argument behind the ILR system and behind the prospective 
ILR system for Ireland.
Opposing arguments criticise the commercial output as 
"wall-to-wall pop music which minimises content and maximises 
audiences", usually at the expense of minority interests. This 
criticism is based on public service ideals of satisfying all 
minority interests and raising entertainment and intellectual 
standards to the levels of high culture. The criticisms offered 
in this thesis are not based on those public service ideals 
which are equally found wanting, but instead are based on a 
criticism of the present conditions which have shaped society 
and which perpetuate a social system through the use of control.
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growth of control. There are two general forms of control which are 
universally applied; control of ownership and control of content.
The need for ownership restrictions arises from the 
experiences of early radio in America. Prior to the introduction of 
legislation in 1926 it was open to any with the necessary knowledge 
and equipment to broadcast. The interests of radio set manufacturers 
and record companies provided financial backing for some of the larger 
commercial stations but there were also many enthusiasts who broadcast 
occasionally at irregular times and during weekends. These stations 
were largely uncommercial and may not have had large audiences but 
added to the eventual chaos that resulted from this totally 
unrestricted access to radio broadcast. Programming is broadcast from 
a station on a radio frequency airwave. Radio frequencies are limited 
in numbers and strength. Thus two or more stations in the one locality 
broadcasting on the same frequency will cause signal interference 
preventing the listeners from receiving any clear signal. Indeed 
so much interference resulted from stations competing for airwave 
frequencies that listenership figures dropped. The need for legislation 
became urgent when station broadcasts began causing interference 
with emergency and defence services. The first Communications Act 
was introduced in 1926 establishing the Federal Communications 
Committee, (FCC), which was given the responsibility for administering 
the allocation of radio frequencies for all manner of communications 
including radio broadcasts. Completely unregulated open competition 
proved only to produce the chaos from irresponsible use of the 
limited airwaves available for radio usage. It was decided that 
the frequencies for radio broadcast should be limited and that 
those to whom the frequencies be made available should be similarly 
limited. If only a certain amount of stations are allowed it
1.3 A HISTORY OF CONTROL: The history of radio illustrates the
follows that a choice must be made as to whom the station franchise 
be allocated. Thus ownership is controlled since the frequencies are 
necessarily limited.
Secondly, control of content resulted largely from the 
use of the radio medium for propaganda purposes. Following the 
second world war the use of broadcast to influence opinion was 
seriously considered. The use of radio advertising led to an 
increase of interest in the power of radio media and its effects 
on the public. Effects research and research on propaganda suggested 
that content of radio broadcast should be monitored and controlled 
against undesirable material. Resulting from this opinion were 
legislative clauses prohibiting material likely to promote violence 
or injurious to the state, and indecent or blasphemous material.
The print laws concerning libel were applied to broadcast and libelous 
material was opened to legal prosecution. Coupled with these negative 
prohibitions was the realisation that radio could be used to 
encourage and recommend. Positive propaganda could be used to the 
benefit of underprivileged and minority groups; to encourage law 
and order; social morals; campaigns for safety, hygiene or charity.
In Ireland positive propaganda was adopted in regard to the use of 
the Irish language and traditional culture and music.
1.4 CRITERIA FOR CONTROL: The notion that radio and other
media are powerful and the implication that those who own stations 
and who broadcast are in a position of potential power over the public 
and should therefore be controlled, tends to overshadow the point 
that those who implement those controls are themselves in a 
position of power for which they are accountable to the same public. 
Given that ownership and content have historically been subjected to 
control, (and not without justifiable reasons), the question follows:
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"Under what criteria are ownership and content controlled?" The 
legislator seeks constantly for the best possible system for control, 
one which will satisfy as many opposing opinions as possible whilst 
remaining true to the legislator's own political beliefs and those of 
the political party to which s/he belongs. Yet in Ireland there 
exists no overall media policy nor indeed any detailed specific 
party policy for local radio. A number of proposed pieces of 
legislation exist for examination, but no underlying political 
policy. The various pieces of proposed legislation seem only 
to be alternative ways of satisfying the interested contenders 
with a difference in emphasis. They do not reflect opposing political 
aims and objectives. There exists no fundamental differences 
between the two major Irish political party proposals for control 
of local radio. The present proposed legislation and the various 
previous proposals are merely ad hoc proposals based on the British 
Independent Local Radio system with a few amendments to satisfy 
the Irish audience. This ad hoc legislation seems to be designed 
for the sake of expediency and not for^ '^any political party reasons. 
The situation is similar to that which existed in the debate to 
establish the semi-state broadcast company Radio Telefis Eireann.
In the establishment of both RTE and local radio, advisory 
committees were set up. In the case of local radio also the 
legislative result will have little regard to the issues discussed 
by those committees but will instead reflect the governmental 
desire for financial solvency and political expediency.
The criteria for restricting ownership and content in 
Ireland do not appear to be political, and certainly not ideological. 
The criteria that shape the controls are based on dominant value 
judgments representing an outlook on life, a "way of thinking" that
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permeates all the major political parties. These criteria have become 
the accepted norms and through a period of socialisation these 
norms are reflected unquestioningly in the legislative procedure.
That the norms and criteria behind the status quo of broadcasting 
happen to favour the interests of a power elite is conveniently 
overlooked by most politicians and is certainly not questioned by 
the commercial interests favoured. It is not suggested that the 
criteria for legislation and in particular for controlling content 
and ownership of local radio are deliberately favouring any elite.
The process of socialisation works instead by unconsciously 
enforcing a "way of thinking" so that certain norms exist and are 
legitimised. Thus a local radio system that will be financially 
self-supportive, will satisfy the majority public taste and will 
be generally open to free competition, is politically acceptable; 
and is seen by the public to be in keeping with democratic norms.
A government appointed authority will be established to ensure 
"the public good" and the content of "wall-to-wall" pop music will 
be only occasionally criticised with the annual support of minority 
groups complaining of lack of airtime. That ownership has been 
in any way restricted is largely unknown to the public and stories 
of multi-national financial investments are easily ignored by the 
mostly uninterested public. The democratic norm is seen to be 
observed and through the democratic process the public needs are 
satisfied; what the people want the people will get.
1.5 CRITICISM OF SOCIETY: The criticism of this view is based
on criticisms of the society which encourages such a view, and which 
uses the term "democracy" to control and perpetuate the status quo 
which gives power to a political and commercial elite, either through 
direct and deliberate means, or through indirect and subconscious
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means. The "democracy" of such a society is a myth since it stifles 
any true alternatives which might challenge that status quo and bring 
about a change in the power structure. The process of "democracy" 
which exists is controlled by power groups exerting pressure to 
influence legislation in their favour in the cause of giving the 
people what they want and satisfying public demand.
Even a brief study of "pirate" local radio in Ireland 
challenges this view. "Pirate" radio originated solely as a 
commercial venture trading airtime to advertisers for private profit 
and depending on the services of enthusiasts to provide and maintain 
broadcast output. Started for commercial gain, but learning quickly 
from the British experience the "pirates" justified their existence 
by arguing that they had public support from listeners and advertisers, 
and that they were entitled to use of the airwaves as a public 
resource which had hitherto been dominated by a government sponsored 
monopoly, RTE. Thus the argument that commercial radio satisfies 
public needs, is open to free competition, and exercises a democratic 
right to freedom of expression. Valid sounding arguments. However the 
only stations that are truly established to satisfy public needs and 
demands are those set up by a community group and not a commercially 
minded individual who creates the audience and then argues that the 
demand exists. If the public truly feels the need for a local radio 
station could it not organise a co-operative and establish its own 
station with a listenership group to ensure programming does indeed 
satisfy listeners' tastes and interests? Such community stations 
originated by the community itself and run in accordance with demands 
are the only stations which can claim to satisfy public wishes. These 
stations which are not run for any profit motives, being strictly 
non-profit-making in design, do not depend on majority tastes and 
advertising ratings to provide financial returns. They are free from
competition and thus truly "independent" in nature. Being unencumbered 
with profit motives and the strait-jacket of "popular" programming, 
community stations allow for freedom of speech in a way no commercial 
station with advertisers to please can afford. The growing trend among 
community stations of encouraging the "right of reply" protects the 
station and if used honestly avoids the seeming hypocrisy of the 
journalistic professional terms, impartiality, objectivity and balance. 
The independence of community radio from the societal powers and the 
status quo acknowledges a potential for freedom of expression in a 
manner that commercial radio can never hope to equal. Community radio 
offers a democracy that is free from elitist control and it is for 
this reason that it is feared by both politicians and business 
interests.
1.5.1 If public demand exists for commercial local radio then 
it could only have grown from the experience of commercial "pirate" 
stations. Previous to the growth of "pirate" stations which were 
primarily set up for private gain, the public was largely ignorant 
of local radio. News of "pirate" radio in Britain, the introduction 
of the Independent Local Radio, and the BBC local radio, and 
experience of broadcasts from foreign commercial stations along the 
East coast comprised the total knowledge of the Irish public on local 
radio: the only model of local radio known to the majority of the 
Irish public was that of commercial local radio. Local radio 
therefore has come to mean for many commercial "independent" radio 
which is limited in its service area. With this connotation of 
local radio fixed in the minds of the public majority, it is hard 
to expect public demand for any new innovative local radio system.
What the public are ignorant of they cannot want. The argument 
"give the people what they want" is empty when the public has no
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choice as to what it wants and knows only one form of local radio 
- all other models being unimaginable. Those who may dislike the 
form of commercial local radio cannot imagine an alternative: 
most are limited to criticising the present conditions without 
being able to offer practical suggestions for an alternative 
system. Knowledge of alternative local radio systems and experiences 
of countries other than Britain should be circulated at the time of 
media discussions of local radio. In the minds of the Irish public 
local radio is a choice between public service output by RTE on a 
local scale, and output from a commercial station similar to that 
broadcast by the biggest "pirates", Nova and Sunshine in Dublin,
ERI in Cork and Carousel in the North-East. For the majority 
the choice between these two forms favours the less demanding and 
challenging output of the commercial stations. Music is pleasant to 
listen to and demands no listener involvement.
1.5.2 Given this presentation of public choice in the issues 
of local radio the question follows, "Why have the wider issues not 
been explained to the public?" The issues of control of local 
radio, and their reflection on the control of society, are not seen 
or heard in the media and so remain unknown to the public, who 
possibly care little in any case. It is in an examination of 
control, (in the following chapter), that the underlying reasons 
for the superficial treatment of local radio and similar issues 
which could potentially question the centralised control of 
society are to be found. Stephan Lukes, (1974), argues that it 
is the "most insidious" form of control to shape the very desires 
and wants of the public so that their outlook on life legitimises 
the status quo and sees it "as natural and unchangeable", and even 
"as ordained and beneficial". The mere surface treatment of the
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issues of control of local radio suggests an example of Lukes' 
"insidious" form of control, where the deeper issues of centralised 
power over society are ignored, and tentative opposition to it is 
smothered. Such an instance of what Lukes terms "manipulated 
consensus by definitional fiat" gives rise to the crucial question, 
"Who benefits from the resolution of the local radio issues?" From 
knowing who is likely to benefit from the outcome of ILR in 
Ireland, Lukes' argument of "manipulated consensus" is either 
supported or denied. The likely results of the proposed local radio 
system are best predicted from an examination of the controls imposed 
upon the system.
1.6 TWO FORMS OF CONTROL: Control of local radio takes two
forms, a direct and obvious control through legislation and secondly, 
an indirect and more subtle control through market forces and societal 
norms. Both these forms of control will shape the outcome of local 
radio and both illustrate the purposes of the controllers.
Legislative controls are imposed on local radio by the 
government. These represent a direct and obvious control. Their 
implementation is deliberate and conscious. They are an explicit 
example of state intervention for the "public good" or for whatever 
reasons. However by regarding this form of control in Marxist 
terminology, (following the work of Lukes and R. Miliband), it can 
be seen that in most instances government legislation favours the 
business interests by encouraging the open market and industrial 
competitiveness in the open market. The profit motive supports the 
maximisation of audiences by local radio stations through popular 
programming which fails to question the "reality" that is legitimised 
by society. Since those who ultimately benefit from legislative 
procedure, in this case those who support commercial local radio,
are most often the business interests, (that is, those who are already 
engaged in commercial enterprise), it follows that legislation is 
biased in favour of business interests to the detriment of those 
who might wish to promote a challenge to that societal structure. If 
this is so, as Lukes, Miliband and others argue it to be, then 
society, and also the economy, are indeed managed by both the 
government and business interests through legislative procedure.
The status quo is protected and perpetuated by those in power, 
preventing change and development. Legislation imposes its control 
by enforcement of authority; if not obeyed the station risks losing 
its licence to broadcast. In Britain this extreme has never been 
enforced though it has been documented that some ILR stations do 
infringe the law, (cf. LRW reports, 1983). The infringements however 
have always been on the side of commercial interests. If instead 
they had been in regard to speech content restrictions a larger case 
could immediately be made against the station. In Ireland it can be 
seen that RTE1s failure to provide Irish language, music and cultural 
programming can be overlooked by those in authority since RTE1s failure 
here is largely due to commercial reasons, but whenever RTE has come 
close to infringing content restrictions in relation to Section 31 
broadcasts, (forbidding interviews with members of proscribed 
organisations), then control is quickly enforced - in 1972 the RTE 
Authority was dismissed over an alleged breach of Section 31. The 
profit motive itself acts as a control by the vicious circle of 
stations' dependence on advertising, advertising's dependence on 
audience ratings and audience ratings' dependence on popular 
programming. Without the profit motive there exists no income for 
local radio under the commercial system. This circle itself is a 
control imposed by business interests ensuring both programming
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content and ownership remains in "safe" hands.
There also exists a more subtle, indirect form of control 
which acts alongside or often behind the economic and legislative 
control. This indirect control is subconscious in the minds of 
the authorities and is hereby chosen as illustrative of the term 
"influence". Influence involves the forces which socialise the 
individual into accepting the societal norms as "the way things are", 
unchangeable and for the "public good". Influence is the force behind 
Lukes' "most insidious" form of control. Being largely unconscious, 
since it involves attitudes and expectations, it remains difficult to 
detect. Bachrach and Baratz, (1970), write that influence is to be 
observed when the state of play, the status quo, consistently favours 
an elite. Thus when one group in society are consistently in a position 
of power; or are consistently benefitting from the exercise of power; 
or are supported consistently by the societal and economic norms, 
then it may be assumed that that group is an elite which is in a 
position of influence or potential power. No direct legislation 
is needed to enforce this control but legislation will be seen to 
be of benefit to this elite, protecting and perpetuating the process 
of socialisation and societal and economic norms that support the 
status quo. For example there will be few legal restrictions on 
ownership of local radio or on local radio content but the competitive 
market forces will eventually shape the local radio system into a 
commercial local radio system with non-challenging broadcasts and 
depending on a diet of popular programming. That influence is 
indirect consisting of subconscious attitudes and acceptance of the 
"haves and have-nots" means that this form of control is easily 
negated and denied. Influence is difficult to make explicit without 
external examples other than the investigation of a consistent elite 
and the recognition of the process of socialisation. The questions
which must be asked are: "Is there any one group which consistently 
benefits from a particular issue?" and "Is this group supported in 
its arguments by an appeal to the common sense reasoning and an 
expectation of acceptance by society?" In the issue of local radio 
in Ireland the group which stands to benefit most is the commercial 
interests which also benefit consistently from government legislative 
policy. These commercial interests, together with the majority 
political parties argue that their system of local radio is the 
most rational system possible and, while allowing room for more 
public service orientated stations, they point out that a station must 
be commercially viable to survive the competitive market forces.
That a station may choose to be non-profit-making in design and 
may be open to controversial broadcast content is considered 
impossible, irrational and not wanted by the public majority. By 
appealing to the public majority, and by having the support of 
societal norms, the social elite (the commercial interests and 
its governmental supporters) can claim their process of imposing 
an ILR system in Ireland is democratic and is giving "the public 
what they want". Influence when legitimised by society becomes 
authority and is at once accepted and unquestioned by those who 
belong to "normal society".
1.7 A RADICAL ALTERNATIVE: What is suggested here is that for
democracy to exist a choice must be made available to the public 
for a majority to decide upon. That choice should not be a difference 
between outward expressions of the same internal system; instead the 
choice should represent a "radical alternative", (borrowing Lukes' 
phraseology), to the status quo. If the claim is to be made that the 
people's wants have been democratically satisfied, the people should 
first have been presented with at least two radical alternatives from
which to choose. From the period of "pirate" radio in Ireland the 
public have experienced, to a greater or lesser degree, both 
commercial local radio and local community radio, and also on 
occasions RTE community radio. The alternatives open to the public 
are commercial local radio, RTE semi-state local radio and community 
radio. RTE have been providing an occasional local radio service for 
communities since 1974 and have requested permission for a permanent 
service in 1976 which was refused. RTE have stated that any local 
radio station which they might establish would follow an invitation 
from a community which would retain editorial control of the station 
in compliance with existing broadcasting legislation. RTE1s claim 
that editorial control would remain in the hands of a community 
committee has been greeted with scepticism by some "pirate" 
broadcasters and community groups. The output broadcast by RTE 
community stations is not of a nature that could be indefinitely 
sustained without drawing from RTE national radio or depending on 
a music format for support. RTE have outlined proposals for an 
"opt-out" system for local radio stations which would broadcast 
national programming and "opt-out" for a period of locally generated 
programming, similar to RTE Cork local radio. RTE would hope to 
provide technical expertise and equipment for their local radio 
stations and so maintain present staffing levels. Community radio 
offers a fully local service while retaining editorial and technical 
control for a locally elected committee. The "pirate" community 
stations have joined to form the National Association of Community 
Broadcasters, (NACB), with the support of the National Co-operative 
Movement, and other community associations. The NACB outline a 
structure for local radio that has elected representatives on a 
management board, a programmers' board and a listeners' board.
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These three structures together plan for the station policy and 
decide on the running of the station. The structure is open to 
community involvement encouraging participation and depends on local 
voluntary effort. The station is non-profit-making covering running 
costs only and investing any surplus from advertising revenue 
into station development or development of community projects.
The nature of community stations obviously depends on public 
interest and allows the community to decide for itself what should 
be broadcast on their local station and what type of station the 
community itself wants. Granting the community the power to 
control their local radio station, investing in the community 
the responsibility of control and making the community accountable 
only to itself demands a level of maturity which the government 
fails to recognise in the community. Such an investment in the 
community would offer a "radical alternative" to the commercial 
system; an alternative which RTE community radio does not provide.
1.8 TOLERATED ALTERNATIVE: Yet is community radio as exemplified
by those NACB "pirate" members a true model of alternative broadcasting 
or is it merely a tolerated accepted alternative model which fails to 
seriously challenge the dominant commercial system? The content of 
"pirate" community stations which subscribe to the NACB conditions 
for community radio is not radically different from RTE, nor from many 
of the commercial stations. There is a greater amount of minority 
music programming but few discussion programmes, documentaries or 
new format programming. The same style of presentation is often used. 
News programming is limited and "pirate" community stations depend 
on a music format to the same extent as the commercial stations. The 
excuse for "pirate" community stations is the same excuse used by 
commercial stations. The "pirates" have always stated that they will
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develop a news service when legalised but until then it is not 
worth investing in an expensive news service which demands time, 
personnel and money. Speech is expensive and "pirates" either claim 
it is unprofitable or that they have not the necessary finance and 
personnel. However for community stations even if legalised this 
situation is unlikely to change and it may not improve for commercial 
stations either. The excuse given for failure of "pirate" stations 
in Ireland to provide more speech programming are the answers 
given by British local radio stations when faced with similar 
criticisms. British legislation provides for the setting of a 
minimum speech control which is defined at a acceptable level 
by the Independent Broadcasting Authority, (IBA), in the case of 
the ILR and by the BBC for their local stations. The Annan Report 
of 1976 criticised minimum speech content controls since they 
tend to become the normal levels for speech output. This indeed 
is what has happened in Britain with DJ1s fulfilling speech content 
requirements with record introductions or with anecdotes from 
newspapers or other sources. Speech programming is broadcast at 
off-peak hours at weekends or late at night in order not to 
interfere with peak-hour listenership figures. News coverage is 
often limited to bulletin broadcasts on the hour with little 
background investigative reportage. A more detailed service,
(not necessarily an in-depth exploratory service), is again 
shelved for an off-peak hour of the evening or the traditional 
Sunday programming. If the British local radio service has failed 
to provide "meaningful speech content" broadcasts then there 
is no reason to expect Irish local radio stations to do any 
better, and with the history of the "pirate" stations, neither 
commercial nor community offer any hope that a "radical alternative" 
may grow from them.
1.8.1 Community radio offers a "radical alternative" in framework 
and structure yet the "pirate" community stations have shown that 
an alternative system does not immediately give rise to alternative 
broadcast output. Perhaps it is for this very reason that the 
community stations are tolerated and accepted by government and 
commercial interests and may even be encouraged as a graphic image 
of government decentralisation. Yet the fault of community radio's 
failure in respect to output can be explained in relation to 
context and not design. The structural potential of community 
radio's design allows for a "radical alternate" output but the 
social context in which it operates hinders its potential. The 
context in which commercial and community radio exist is the same. 
Both operate under the same conditions of control; the direct 
legal and economic controls, and the indirect conditioning controls 
of socialisation and legitimisation. If these conditions control 
both alternatives of local radio then it is not surprising that 
the broadcasting result is so similar despite structural differences. 
Community radio as exemplified by Irish "pirates" is subject 
to the commercial dependence on advertising to provide financial 
revenue, and therefore subject also to the pressures to maintain 
audience ratings. This pressure dictates broadcasting output 
necessitating popular programming for peak-hours. Thus the 
commercial context in which community radio exists is what forces 
broadcasting output, not the structural design of community radio.
The difference between community radio and commercial local radio 
is that the potential exists for community radio to provide a 
"radical alternative" in the terms of both structure and output, 
while commercial local radio is a product of the commercial society 
which dominates Ireland. The major question which arises is,
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"Is a 'radical alternative' system of local radio possible in an 
non-alternative society where it is subjected to a dominant 
ideological context?" The dominant context remains for both 
community radio and commercial local radio, exerting three forms 
of control: 1. direct control through legislative procedure,
2. commercial pressure through dependence on advertising revenue 
and audience ratings and, 3. the indirect influence of societal 
norms, demands from pressure groups, and the commercial expectations 
from business interests and others. With this "reality" facing any 
form of local radio system no "radical alternative" could hope to 
survive. Within a dominant context, the answer must be "no": 
a "radical alternative" to the dominant system of commercial local 
radio is impossible.
1.9 CONCLUSION: Returning to the opening questions:
"What is your criticism of the dominant culture?" and, "Do you 
have the right to enforce your system over that of the majority?" 
the arguments concerning these two points now appear in a new light. 
If a "radical alternative" to the prevalent form of "pirate" local 
radio was developed then perhaps "what the people want", (if it could 
be measured), would be different. However since no real choice is 
open to the public, in the absence of any "radical alternative", 
then the people cannot freely choose "what they want". Without 
choice, without a "radical alternative" no democracy can fully 
operate. In the society dominant in Ireland, although termed a 
pluralistic democratic society, the present conditions of commercial 
and social controls, pressures, and influences actively hinders open 
choice and actually forces "what the people want". Democracy cannot 
exist because choice is not available. Democracy can only exist where 
there is choice. Worse than the denial of choice is the shaping of
19
the desires and wants of the people by the dominant commercial forces, 
a process Lukes terms "the most insidious" form of control. By this 
process the public are led to believe that they do have a choice 
and that they do choose from alternatives. However they neglect to 
see that these alternatives are not "radically" different. Choice 
then is denied by the centralised controls of legislation and by the 
commercial dominance undermining true democracy. These controls, 
either direct or indirect influence, support and perpetuate the 
elite which is consistently favoured, (Bachrach and Baratz). The 
only democratic response to this situation is to control the very 
controls imposed by the dominant factors. (It was argued that 
ownership and content have been traditionally controlled since 
radio frequencies are necessarily limited.) These controls which 
are needed for the regulation of local radio must be publicly 
monitored and those with the monitoring authority must be fully 
accountable to the public, (cf. Caroline Heller, Broadcasting and 
Accountability, 1978.) It is through challenge only, by 
providing for "radical alternatives", that real choice can operate 
and through this operation alone can true democracy exist.
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CHAPTER II
"Control", "power", "authority", "influence", - what do 
each of these words mean and how are they different from each other?
Are there any significant differences at all, or do they merely refer 
to slight variations of the one concept? Perhaps more importantly, 
what is their relationship to the words "responsibility", 
"accountability", "freedom" and "open-access"? Writers on the theory 
of power and control tend to put forward their own definitions and 
argue on the extent, for instance, to which influence is separate 
from power and whether authority is merely legitimized control. The 
difference between direct and indirect control, the limitations of 
choice, the use of coercion, the democracy of control - these are 
all issues which have been treated by theorists of control. Later 
the major writers and their works will be discussed. First however, 
an attempt will be made to define the concept of control by reference 
to neutral dictionary definitions and also by analysing the various 
definitions put forward by other writers.
2.1 TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF CONTROL: The Oxford English Dictionary
implies that there is little difference between the words "control", 
"power", "authority" and "influence". It uses the words interchangeably 
in its definitions and also in its definitions of related words.
Thus under "command" can be found the words "authority", "influence", 
"control", "power" and "subjection". Likewise the definition for 
"power" contains the words "control", "command", "influence" and 
"authority" as well as a host of other minor words - "rule", "govern" 
and "sway". Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms hints that the only 
difference in the definition of these words lies in the context of
"ON THE NATURE OF CONTROL."
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their usage. Control tends to refer to restrictive practices: to 
regulate, restrain, curb, to hinder or prevent. The use of control 
restricts the free actions of another - for whatever intended reason. 
This definition suggests a degree of conscious will. However, control 
can easily be built into a system of government or business, removing 
control from an individual and instead making it part of a system.
Thus it becomes "the nature of things", unchangeable and accepted as 
normal. When control is deliberately invested in a person or a 
system it becomes legitimised and accepted as legal or lawful. An 
authority has the "right" to control. An individual has "natural" 
authority over his/her subordinates.
Influence is a form of control gained through indirect means. 
Authority is gained directly because it has been formally invested in 
a person, group or system. Influence is an informal use of control by 
one or more who are in a position to bring pressure on a decision or 
action. The use of influence may on occasions be direct, (although it 
is an indirect use of control), but is usually more discreet and often 
hard to detect. More often the knowledge that a control exists may 
influence the actions of an individual, as with the programme producer 
who refuses a programme item criticising government policy knowing 
the government has restrictions on free speech. The programme item 
may not itself be in breach of broadcast legislation but the knowledge 
of governmental attitudes behind the law and fear of reprisals may 
nonetheless influence the producer to drop the item. Self-censorship 
is a case where the existence of a control indirectly influences 
action.
Power is a more abstract concept encompassing the definitions 
of both control and influence, and it may be legitimised in terms of 
an authority. Power involves the ability to control either directly, 
or indirectly through influence. Power may be conferred, becoming
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authority, or may be imposed through coercion or manipulation.
The major difference between power and control, (often used 
interchangeably by many writers), is that control involves the 
restriction of another's free actions; power in addition involves 
compelling another to do some unintended action. One has control 
over another when preventing him/her from completing some possible 
action; but one exercises power when forcing another to do an 
action which would otherwise have offered a free choice.
The degree of consciousness involved in the use of power 
or control is a subject of some contention between writers. Can 
power or control be unconsciously used and can one be subjected to 
either without realising it - perhaps not recognising that a choice 
of action exists, not knowing that one is being influenced to think 
in a certain manner? Some writers strongly answer "Yes" while others 
argue "Impossible". Their very definitions of power and control 
reveal these oppositions.
2.2 A PHILOSOPHY OF POWER: Theories of power and control and
their application to society depends much on the approach taken 
towards society itself. A Marxist view of society generates a 
Marxist interpretation of power and a Pluralist will see power as 
being plurally dispersed throughout society. The Marxist-Pluralist 
division extends to the study of the nature of control in society. 
Before detailing the major writers on power from the sociological 
divisions, a brief background will be given on the writings of a 
leading philosopher of power who to a large extent transcends the 
sociological arguments.
Before the major Marxist-Pluralist divisions took place 
in the study of society, Bertrand Russell wrote on power from a 
viewpoint that remains outside the sociological divisions. Writing
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instead from a philosophical background, his insights have been 
useful and adapted by many of the more recent sociologists. The 
concepts devised by Russell appear in the more recent writings 
under a different terminology but the understanding of the nature 
of power and control form a basis to the later sociological 
writings.
Primarily Russell defines power:
"Power may be defined as the production of 
intended effects. It is thus a quantitative 
concept: given two men with similar desires, 
if one achieves all the desires that the other 
achieves, and also others,...that A has more 
power than B, if A achieves many intended 
effects and B only a few."
B. Russell, Power: A New Social Analysis,
London: Allen & Unwin Ltd.,
1938, p.35.
In accepting that an A can have more power than a B, Russell accepts 
the notion of power being a fixed-sum variable. There is only a 
certain amount of power available. The extent to which one has power 
limits the amount of power available to another. The problem with 
Russell's definition lies in the measurement of who has the greater 
power. Russell himself points this out giving the example of two 
painters. There are two painters who equally desire to paint good 
pictures and become rich. If only one succeeds in painting good 
pictures and the other only succeeds in becoming rich, how can their 
relative power be measured? Each have succeeded over the other to the 
same degree. Such a definition of power depends on measuring the 
importance of the desired factors. In the given case, which is the 
more important, becoming rich or painting good pictures? Any answer 
is entirely subjective unless the societal values and morals are taken 
into consideration. If society suggests that one who is'rich is more 
powerful than another who paints good pictures, the suggestion is only 
a reflection of the society. Useful perhaps but not informative on the
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nature of power. Russell's definition suggests that power could depend 
on the subjective values of society. What a given society deems as 
powerful is for that society powerful. However such a definition has 
no universal application, necessitating a prior consideration of 
societal values.
2.2.1 Some of Russell's other concepts on power, however, 
have been adapted for use by social scientists. Russell outlines 
three different types of power and offers cases to illustrate them. 
First there exists direct physical power; "When a pig with a rope 
tied around its middle is hoisted squealing onto a ship, it is 
subjected to direct physical power over its body." (Russell, 1930, 
p.36.) In the state system such power is examplified by the police 
and military control. Secondly, there is the use of rewards and 
punishments to induce control. Russell states that this form of 
control is used by many organisations but also by the state in 
the form of propaganda:
"...when the proverbial donkey follows the 
proverbial carrot, we induce him to act 
as we wish by persuading him that it is 
in his interests to do so." 
ibid., p.36.
The power to persuade others what is in their "interests" is an 
indirect form of control which may or may not be supported with 
rewards for compliance and punishments as a deterrent. The third 
form of power depends entirely on the use of rewards and 
punishments to induce an opinion or action. Through "education" 
and the whole process of socialisation, opinions, attitudes 
and moral values are instilled. Russell gives the example of 
how performing animals are taught "tricks" by continual reinforced 
repetition. Likewise, he explains, society frames the individual 
mind to "perform" in a manner acceptable to that particular society.
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"The case of the pig illustrates military 
and police power. The donkey with the carrot 
typifies the power of propaganda. The 
performing animals show the power of 
1 e d u c a t i o n T h e  army and the police exercise 
coercive power over the body; economic 
organisations, in the main, use rewards and 
punishments as incentives and deterrents; 
schools, churches, and political parties aim 
at influencing opinion." 
ibid., pp.36-37.
2.2.2 Each of these three forms of power and control have 
been studied by various sociologist and psychologists from many 
different perspectives: work; ownership and control; power theories; 
coercive control; social structures in organisations. Aspects 
raised in the application of some of these areas of study are 
outlined in the following section.
The state rarely has recourse to the use of physical 
power, unless in a military state. Russell terms this "naked 
power". Alternatively a fanatical belief or religion may lead 
to a society based on direct repressive control. This is 
"revolutionary power". The type of society concerning this study 
is founded on what Russell terms "traditional power". This 
represents a form of authority which is legitimised and accepted 
as natural. It is upon such a form of authoritative power and control 
that most Western societies are based. Russell concerns himself 
with the expression of traditional state control, the law. He 
asserts that the law depends on public opinion for support. (The 
public ultimately legitimises the authority of the law, hence the 
importance of propaganda and education.) The public must be 
convinced that the law "is in their interests". Control of opinion 
and attitudes through socialization is crucial to state power.
This realisation underlies Russell's statement:
Russell summarises:
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"Law, therefore, as an effective force, 
depends on opinion and sentiment even
more than upon the powers of the police."
ibid . , p .38 .
(This point is emphasised later by Clegg drawing from the writings 
of Gramsci.) Russell concludes his work by providing a framework 
for the Elitist arguments. Economic power, he generalises, is 
possessed by few individuals, those who own and control the economy.
Similarly, possession of power by one precludes its possession by
another. Power is a fixed-sum. Thus:
"The tendency for economic power to be 
concentrated in few hands is a commonplace,
...but this tendency applies to power in 
general, not only to economic power, ...It 
is obvious that the same causes which are 
leading to a coalescence of military and 
economic power are also tending towards a 
unification of both with propaganda power.
There is, in fact, a general tendency 
towards the combination of all forms of 
power in a single organisation, which 
must necessarily be the State." 
ibid. , p.135.
This understanding negates the purely economic deterministic 
nature of Marx and opts instead for Gramsci's theory of a ruling 
elite. Russell is one step away from recognising that the state 
itself is supported by a combination of technical, intellectual 
and economic elites. By assigning all power to the state Russell 
sides rather with Miliband. His insights, though, coming from 
a philosophical background, provide a generous grounding for 
many of the social scientists which followed.
2.3 PERSPECTIVES ON CONTROL: The very diversity in the definitions
of the terms power and control reflects an equal diversity in regard 
to their application to society. The stances different writers have 
taken have often given rise to much argument and counter-argument 
between the different "isms". It is not intended to become involved
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in the current detailed arguments between writers, (Polsby versus 
Miliband, Dahl versus Bachrach and Baratz, Lukes versus Poulantzas), 
but merely to illustrate how different theories may offer totally 
different and opposing perspectives on what each insist is "social
reality". The fundamental understanding a theory offers presents
a world-view, (Weber's weltenschaft), in complete contrast to that 
proposed by its opposing theory:
"Each perspective on power implies a view as
to the basic nature of the social relationship
between people, and how the exercise and use 
of power influences those relationships."
P. Hamilton, Power and Social Structure, rpt.,1977,
in Making Sense of Society-Block 2 8 ,  
Open University Press, 1975, p.91.
The choice of which perspective to adopt can only be made according
to subjective prejudices and a certain rational pragmatism:
"The outcome of this competition [between 
different perspectives] depends on the 
ability of one of the perspectives to 
put forward a theory which has the 
greatest ability and scope to describe 
and explain the range of social phenomena 
in both their generality and specificity.
You will have to judge..., on your reading, 
and on your personal experience which 
perspective offers the best prospects." 
ibid., p.94.
Thus none of the paradigms claim to have the "final solution".
None claim to be right or wrong, merely better than other theories.
This is the only justification for accepting one theory and rejecting 
another; that one is better than another. One may offer a more 
useful criticism of society, a more detailed understanding of 
societal structures and their inter-relationships. In presenting 
a summary of the more important trends in Marxism and its criticism 
of Liberal-Pluralism, the following arguments may clearly be seen 
to argue against the American Pluralists, but also against pure 
economic-determinism of Marx's theories. This bias is acknowledged 
and justified on the pragmatic grounds outlined above.
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I2.3.1 In a general overview of sociology, Peter Hamilton from 
the Open University, explains that sociologists basically use three 
units for analysis; Social Structure, Stratification and Social 
Order. Social Structure refers to the belief that society is indeed 
structured and possesses an organisation that may be determined 
and explained. Different ways of explaining that structure have 
been attempted resulting in different theories of society. Secondly, 
the relationship between the control of society, the existing power, 
and the political, economical and social divisions is stratified. 
There exist stratified levels of control of economic, political 
and social issues. Not everyone has the same opportunity of control. 
Finally, this Stratification is arranged on a hierarchy. The units 
are ranked to form a Social Order. This order is legitimised and 
accepted as normal. The hierarchy, Hamilton states, involves both 
class and status, (uniting both Weberian and Marxist terminology). 
Advancement on the hierarchy increases access to the scarce 
resources of wealth, knowledge, skill and expertise, which, in turn, 
are needed for advancement. The Social Order in society forms 
stable relationships and institutions, and the values that endorse 
them are encouraged. Hamilton argues that all social theories are 
merely different answers to the question of the arrangement of 
these three social units. He divides the theories into three groups; 
the Marxist conflict perspective, the elitist perspective, (that a 
minority elite holds ultimate control in society), and the 
Pluralist-Functionalist perspective. Rather than discuss Hamilton's 
divisions, writers representative of these views will be criticised. 
Each theory of power and control, however, represents a stand on the 
basic sociological issues, (Social Structure, Stratification and 
Social Order); and each of the three perspectives involves a stand
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on their arrangement. Thus theories of power coincide with 
sociological perspectives and form a sub-division of the study of 
society.
2.4 CONTROL AS OTHERS SEE IT: It is the argument on which
perspective is most useful which forms the basis of Stephan Lukes' 
criticism of the approaches put forward by Dahl and Bachrach and 
Baratz. These approaches together with his own "radical approach" 
are termed by Lukes as the "three dimensions" to any study of 
power. Lukes' attack on Dahl and his fellow Pluralists, Polsby and 
Wolfinger, is grounded on a criticism of Behaviourists' direct 
observation methods of study. The Behaviourist belief that only 
directly observable action may be scientifically verified for 
study is obvious in Dahl's very definition of power:
"A has power over B to the extent that he 
can get B to do something that B would 
not otherwise do."
R.A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power" in
Behavioral Science, vol.2,
1957, p.80.
This stand is also made clear by Polsby:
"one can conceive of 'power' - 'influence' 
and 'control' are servicable synonyms - 
as the capacity of one actor to do something 
affecting another actor, which changes the 
probable pattern of specified future events.
This can be envisaged most easily in a 
decision-making situation." (Italics added.)
N. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory,
New Haven: Yale U.P., 1963, p.13.
Both Dahl and Polsby suggest that power involves forcing another
towards some unintended action. Whether the force is openly used,
as with instances of coercion, or whether instead, indirect influence
is used, (and here it is argued that "influence" and "control" are
not interchangeable synonyms), the Pluralists insist that the use
of power is observable as a decision-making process or as instances
30
of open conflict. Lukes summarises:
"The Pluralists see their focus on behaviour 
in the making of decisions over key or 
important issues as involving actual, 
observable conflict."
S. Lukes, Power: A Radical View,
London: Macmillan, 1974, p.13.
2.4.1 The strongest criticism of this aspect of the Pluralists 
view of power is given by Bachrach and Baratz in what they describe 
as a theory of Non-Decision-Making. Simply stated, non-decisions 
are those issues which are excluded from the agenda of discussion 
and which, therefore, are excluded also from affecting the resulting 
decision. This form of "gate-keeping" by one party places that party 
in a position of power. However, it can be very difficult to detect 
occasions of non-decision-making and thus the determination of 
"who holds power" becomes impossible unless occasions of direct 
observation are chosen. Bachrach and Baratz define non-decision-making 
and then seem to say that it is impossible to observe empirically. 
Non-decision-making is:
"...a means by which demands for change in 
the existing allocation of benefits and 
privileges in the community can be 
suffocated before they are even voiced; 
or kept covert; or killed before they 
gain access to the relevant decision-making 
arena; or, failing all these things, maimed 
or destroyed in the decision implementing 
stage of the policy process."
Bachrach and Baratz, Power and Poverty:
Theory and Practice,
London: Oxford U.P., 1970, pp.18-19. 
This excellent description of one of the results of control becomes 
somewhat marred by the provision pointed out by Lukes quoting from 
Bachrach and Baratz:
"If 'there appears to be universal acquiescence 
in the status quo' then it will not be possible 
'to determine empirically whether the consensus 
is genuine or instead has been forced by 
non-decision-making' ."
Lukes, 1974, op.cit., p.49.
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Bachrach and Baratz are right in drawing attention to the fact 
that non-decisions can be embodied in the status quo, (ideological 
assumptions may also prevent "demands for change"), and thus the 
social order itself can encourage non-decisions. Yet the acceptance 
of such a superficial consensus merely because of the impossibility 
of empirically determining the underlying non-decision-making 
process can only be judged as an academic excuse for not developing 
a more detailed perspective of society. The importance of 
non-decision-making is too important to be set aside on account 
of its difficulties by direct observation. For these reasons Lukes 
attacks what he terms as Bachrach and Baratz' "two-dimensional" 
view of power:
"...is it not the supreme and most insidious 
exercise of power to prevent people, to 
whatever degree, from having grievances 
by shaping their perceptions, cognitions, 
and preferences in such a way that they 
accept their role in the existing order 
of things, either because they can see 
or imagine no alternative to it, or 
because they see it as natural and 
unchangeable, or because they value it 
as ordained and beneficial? To assume 
the absence of grievances equals genuine 
consensus is simply to rule out the 
possibility of false or manipulated 
consensus by definitional fiat." 
ibid. , p .24.
This rather strong criticism of Bachrach and Baratz is worth 
considering because it illustrates Bachrach and Baratz' major 
fault of having accepted the Pluralist argument in favour of 
the Behaviourist principles of direct observation. They thereby 
flaw their own theory of non-decision-making which is, in 
essence, a discreet and unobservable form of control. What Lukes 
describes as "the supreme and most insidious exercise of power" 
is based on a view of society hinted at by Bachrach and Baratz 
and made explicit in Gramsci's theory of society drawn from the
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2.4.2 Unlike Marx, Gramsci states that ideology is not 
confined to class consciousness but that it is also propagated 
through the state institutions. Ralph Miliband defines Gramsci's 
idea of the role of the state:
"These are the institutions - the government, 
the administration, the military and the 
police, the judicial branch, the sub-central 
government and parliamentary assemblies - which 
make up 'the state', and whose interrelationship 
shapes the form of the state system...These are 
the people who constitute what may be described 
as the state elite."
R. Miliband, The State In Capitalist Society,
London: Weidenfield & Nicholson, 
1969, p.50.
The state possesses a repressive apparatus and an ideological 
apparatus. The repressive institutions are the military, the police, 
legislation and judiciary. The ideological institutions are the 
Church, political parties, union, school, media and family structures, 
(cf. Westergaard and Resler, 1975, pp.250-251.) Gramsci's concept of 
hegemony is incorporated in the Elitist perspective of social order. 
The belief that a power elite exists in society and is perpetuated 
through the process of institutionalisation and socialisation 
underlies Lukes' arguments on power. Hegemony is that invisible 
structure which supports and reinforces the social position of 
the class elite - a class based not only on economic dominance,
(as in Marx's theory), but also on technical, intellectual and 
administrative dominance. Thus the elite class, according to Gramsci, 
is intellectually founded, not economically determined. In a detailed 
overview of the various theories of power and control, Stuart Clegg 
supports Lukes' assertion on the importance of non-decision-making 
as a most powerful form of control. In quoting an earlier commentator 
on Gramsci, (Williams, 1960, p.591), Clegg observes:
notion of hegemony.
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"...that Gramsci 'explicitly states' that 
hegemony is the 'normal form of control', 
and that 'force' and 'coercion' only become 
'dominant' at times of crisis."
S. Clegg, Theories of Power and Organization,
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1979, p.84.
The definitions of power and control broaden to cover the use
of administration and organisation in society to "determine
consciousness", a consciousness which is accepted as normal and
the very process which prohibits certain issues from being raised;
issues which would possibly question the whole social order on
which the hegemonic structure is based. This is the real importance
of Bachrach and Baratz' non-decision-making and Lukes ' "supreme
and most insidious exercise of power". Gramsci's hegemony is the
process by which the "perceptions, cognitions, and preferences"
of Lukes' subordinates are shared. Clegg asserts:
"It is only in moments of crisis, when control, 
which is ordinarily structured in and through 
hegemony, slips or fails, that power has to be 
directly exercised in order to attempt to restore 
this control. Such an exercise of power signals 
not the presence of a strong 'capacity' for 
power, but instead indicates that this exercise 
of power flows from a position of weakness.
This position is one in which hegemony has 
failed and so power is exerted in an attempt 
to reassert the 'normal' situation of control." 
ibid., p.86.
The Behaviourist tendency to study only directly observable 
instances of open conflict, mistakes what Clegg calls "a position 
of weakness". Bachrach and Baratz, although hinting at hegemonic 
control in their definition of non-decision-making, err in failing 
to recognise that non-decisions are often unconscious and therefore 
cannot always be verified. They are unaware that it is the "unobvious" 
nature of non-decisions and the hegemonic system that is crucial to 
an appreciation of the definitions of power and control. Clegg is 
in agreement with Lukes on the importance of the lack of open
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conflict involved in latent power:
"The absence of the exercise of power does 
not mean the absence of power. It signals 
the presence of a far more subtle and 
powerful power..." 
ibid. , p.86.
2.4.3 Lukes' answer to the use of power lies in the provision 
of information. If the alternatives were presented with all the 
facts necessary for a decision, and with no influence to sway a 
decision, then control remains in the hands of the individual 
decision-maker. Decisions could be taken in accordance with 
what Lukes terms, the individual's "real interests". Due to the 
process of socialisation and the acceptance of "the natural 
order of things", individuals are often unable to "express or 
even be conscious of their interests", (Lukes, 1974, p.25).
Education and the presentation of all relevant information is 
crucial to the making of a decision. The definition of the 
"real interest", however, is fraught with complications. Lukes 
himself illustrates some of the theories raised in through the 
different interpretation of "real interests". Liberals, he says, 
recognise that people possess wants and needs of which every variation 
should be allowed political expression in relation to the size of 
its supporters. This answer grows from the early Utilitarian 
writings of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mills. The realisation 
that not all people are given equal treatment in the political and 
social system gave rise to the Reformist writings of C. Wright 
Mills and the later statements on people's unconscious interests.
Lukes declares that a "radical view of society" implies that all
man's wants and needs are shaped by the power elite. An individual
can only make a free choice of what is in his/her "real interests"
after observing the results of each option involved in the choice.
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Each of Lukes' three perspectives, (dimensions), posit a different 
interpretation of what man's "real interests" are:
"In brief, my suggestion is that the 
one dimensional view of power presupposes 
a liberal conception of interests, the 
two-dimensional a reformist conception, 
and the three-dimensional view a radical 
conception."
Lukes, 1974, pp.34-35.
2.5 PLURALISM: The Utilitarian principles of Bentham and
Stuart Mills became adapted to the Republican and democratic 
systems of the late 19th century. The defence of the democratic 
system rests on the notion of "power by consent". In an explanation 
of the basis of a Republican state, Lukes quotes H. Arendt, (1970). 
The power of the state, argues Arendt, derives from the consensus 
of the x^ eople. Without this consensus no state system could exist. 
"Power is never the property of an individual" but is created by 
consensus and depends on it for support. This consensus is itself 
the power in society and the state merely acts on behalf of the 
people, in their interests. By having the power to withdraw 
consent and thus ending the state's role, the people retain control 
over the state. This is the ideal of the democratic system:
"...under conditions of representative 
government the people are supposed to 
rule those who govern them."
H. Ardent, On Violence, 1970, pp.23-29,
in Lukes, 1974, ibid..
Whilst supporting this stand on democratic state control, 
Talcott Parsons carries the notion of "power by consent" a stage 
further. Parsons focuses on what Duverger, (borrowing from Bachrach 
and Baratz), calls the "second face of power": power as integration, 
(Duverger, 1972). The power of the state granted through consensus 
becomes a necessary tool for the unity of society. The position of 
the state creates an ordered society based on a harmony of interests
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through co-operation and compromise between various opposing groups. 
This plurality of interests is monitored and governed by the state 
which acts as "honest broker" in the multiplicity of rivalling 
interests. The power of the state allows it to act in the furtherance 
of collective social goals, "in the interests of the people".
Thus by surrendering themselves to a certain degree of control 
individuals may eventually gain a goal which they could not 
independently achieve. This is the system upon which the welfare 
state exists. Power under Parsons' argument becomes:
"...a facility for the performance of 
function in and on behalf of the 
society as a system."
T. Parsons, "The Distribution of Power
in American Society", in 
World Politics, 1957, p.139.
Power under Parsons' definition is a variable-sum measurement.
The attainment of power by one party does not mean the exclusion
from power of another party. Parsons' arguments draw heavily
from the earlier work by Thomas Hobbes, (Leviathan, 1914). Using
Hobbes' metaphor of a Leviathan, Clegg illustrates the Pluralist
distribution of power:
"The characterization of power as pluralist 
theorizes order in the absence of Leviathan 
through making each person, as a group member, 
a sovereign entity over something, somewhere, 
on some occasion. As each group that exists 
has some sovereignty, no one group is wholly 
sovereign."
Clegg, 1979, op.cit., p.61.
In criticising C. Wright Mills' theory of the unequality of power 
and the presence of a power elite, Parsons argued that the Elitist 
view of power as a fixed-sum was wrong. In again defining power 
in his own terms, Parsons comes closer to recognising authority, 
the legitimisation of power, and fails to take into account the fact 
that power is exercised over others.
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1 [Power is]...the capacity to mobilize the 
resources of society for the attainment of 
goals for which a general public commitment 
has been made, or may be made. It is the 
mobilization above all, of the actions of 
persons and groups, which is binding on them 
by virtue of their position in society."
Parsons, 1957, op.cit., p.139.
2.5.1 The positioning in society of certain persons and 
groups is never questioned by Parsons. He accepts power as 
legitimate, (hence it becomes authority), and never questions 
these legitimising structures. Likewise, he fails to accept that 
a public commitment could be contrived either through influence 
or by not presenting all the alternatives. In a most exhaustive 
criticism of Parsons, Anthony Giddens argues against the above 
definition of power, pointing out:
"that 'collective goals', or even the 
values which lie behind them, may be 
the outcome of a 'negotiated order' 
built on conflicts between parties 
holding differential power is ignored."
A. Giddens, "'Power' in the Recent Writings
of Talcott Parsons", Sociology, 
vol.2, no.3, 1968, p.265.
Parsons can ignore this point since his description of conflict
only covers "legitimate conflict"; that which cannot upset the
status quo's favouring of the social elite. Giddens states:
"The most radical conflicts in society 
stem from struggles for power, are 
defined out of consideration." 
ibid., p.26 5.
The most blundering of Parsons' omissions is his failure to 
recognise the restrictive nature of power and control. Again 
Giddens puts this succinctly:
"what slips away almost completely in the 
Parsonian analysis is the very fact that 
power, even as Parsons defines it, is 
always exercised over someone! By treating 
power as necessarily (by definition) 
legitimate, and thus starting from the 
assumption of consensus of some kind between
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power-holders and those subordinate to them,
Parsons virtually ignores, quite consciously 
and deliberately, the necessarily hierarchical 
character of power, and the divisions of 
interest which are frequently consequent 
upon it." 
ibid., pp.264-265.
2.6 IN BRIEF: The major difference between Pluralist and
Marxist-Elitism is not merely in their opposing definitions of 
power but also in their notions as to where it is to be found 
and how it is exercised. The Pluralists argue that power can 
only exist in its direct exercise. The Marxists contend that 
power also exists in the ability to prevent action. The theory 
of a hegemonic society takes into account the support that the 
status quo and societal institutions give to the ruling elite 
making their position legitimate to society so that there exist 
basic premises and suppositions which remain unquestioned. Thus 
the elite is never seriously challenged, or can refuse any such 
challenges as "unconstitutional" and "dangerously hostile to the 
public interests". Yet it is precisely those challenges that should 
be considered by society in order for it to progress and grow. It 
is only through change that society can advance. In this study of 
the control of local radio, the very role of the media in society 
and the possible systems for political control must be examined 
realistically. Adopting the Marxist-Elitist view of society, which 
incorporates the theory of hegemony, implies a definition of control 
which is related to freedom and also to responsibility. In a summary 
of Oppenheim's definitions for "power", "control" and "influence", 
(Oppenheim, 1961), Clegg paraphrases:
"Control either consists in the determination 
of choice or operates through the management 
of possibilities in such a way that no choice 
is available...Oppenheim introduces a further 
way of relating 'power' to the concepts of 
'freedom' and 'possibility' implied in the
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notion of 1 c h o i c e I t  is this latter 
concept of 'control' which comes closest 
to a more structured conception of power."
Clegg, 1979, op.cit., pp.41-42.
The fact that control involves making decisions on behalf 
of another, or preventing a decision from being made, implies that 
freedom is being limited to some degree, and also that those 
exercising control have a responsibility to account for their use 
of control to those over whom they are exercising that control.
If control is to be used, then:
1. The determination of the interests being supported should be 
made explicit,
2. The whole process of control, (where possible decision-making 
and non-decision-making alike), should be made public.
3. An amount of responsibility and accountability to those over 
whom the control is being exercised should be accepted by those 
exercising the controls.
These three basic premises should be adopted by any individual 
or group having control and by any authority given legal control.
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CHAPTER III
Theoretical definitions of control take on new complexities 
when applied to a given society. Irish society is no exception to the 
complexities of power structures. There is a fine division between 
issues which are solved diplomatically involving influence and 
indirect control, and the public solution operating through open 
conflict and political authority. Behind many public issues there 
exists a situation involving non-direct use of power and influence 
among the various rivalling groups. Thus when studying any issue, 
account must be taken of both the public solution and the 
"behind-the-scenes" solution. This chapter will concern itself more 
specifically with control of local radio in Ireland; first, by 
covering the stand taken by the Irish political parties to local radio 
and secondly, by investigating the rival groups which are seeking 
government influence. Finally a more direct aspect of control will be 
treated, namely, the legislation concerning local radio. A number of 
attempts to introduce Bills controlling the broadcasts of "pirate" 
radio stations and to introduce a legal form of local radio have been 
attempted since 1979, and each of these Bills will be discussed.
3.1 POLITICS IN IRELAND: An understanding of Irish history and
of the history of the Irish political parties is crucial to an 
explanation of politics in Ireland. The political system is 
similar to most Western democracies. The parliament is elected 
by universal suffrage using a proportional representation system 
with a single vote transfer. There are two houses in parliament,
(the Oireachtas). The upper house is the Seanad. From its sixty 
members forty-three are elected by civil, cultural and economic
"SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN IRELAND."
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institutions; eleven are appointed by the Taoiseach, (Prime Minister), 
and the remaining six are elected by members of the national 
universities. The Seanad has the power to refuse legislation and to 
propose amendments to any piece of legislation coming before it. 
However, the Seanad can only delay legislation for a period just 
under a year after which it automatically becomes law. In fact 
the Seanad has relatively little power in Irish politics. The 
lower house, (Dail Eireann), holds the power to make law. It is 
composed of 148 seats and is elected for a period of five years.
There are three major political parties in Ireland and a 
number of smaller parties. The party with the continual majority 
is the Fianna Fail Party. Founded by Eamon de Valera in 1926 after 
the Irish Civil War, Fianna Fail has regularly been in government, 
(including a period of uninteruppted office from 1932 to 1944 and 
again from 1957 to 1969.) The second largest party is Fine Gael.
This party was founded from an earlier political grouping,
Cumann na Gaedheal, the party that took office following the 
War of Independence. Fine Gael has only ever formed a government 
in coalition with Ireland's third largest party, the Labour Party. 
Based on the socialist ideals of James Connolly the Labour Party 
is the oldest of Ireland's political parties. Yet it has never 
been strong enough to seriously threaten the other parties but 
has served in coalition with Fine Gael for a period from 1973 
to 1977, and later briefly in early 1981. Presently Ireland is 
governed by a Labour and Fine Gael coalition. The remaining 
Irish parties are the Communist Party with no seat in the 
present parliament, the Workers' Party with only two seats, 
and the Sinn Fein Party with no seat. A number of independent 
candidates were also elected and form part of the Dail.
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3.1.1 Ireland to a large extent inherited its political system 
from its previous British rulers. The Irish civil service closely 
reflects the British model. Its workers are chosen on merit in 
open competition from publically advertised jobs. Changes in 
government are not reflected in the make-up of the civil service 
and thus it has remained stable irrespective of the political 
climate. Tom Garvin commenting on Irish nationalist politics has 
observed that:
"Because of its political indispensability, 
the civil service was able to retain its 
corporate integrity and resist all except 
the more subtle pressures towards 
politisation."
Tom Garvin, The Evolution of Irish Nationalist 
Politics, Dublin: Gill and
Mac Millan, 1981, p.205.
The civil service execute the policies of the government and thus
government indirectly depends on its goodwill. There appears to be
an unspoken agreement between the civil service and the government
to remain independent of each other's affairs. However, government
controls the financing of the civil service and also advises on
the appointment of chief executives. Government ministers are still,
at least in theory, head of the civil service departments.
However, the civil service hold the threat of strike at
worst, or delay and even postponement of government policy. Partly
in order to avoid the civil service, repeated Irish governments
have opted instead to set up semi-state bodies and numerous
"independent authorities" to control areas rather than depend
entirely on the civil service. Thus together with the civil
service there exists a large public sector which is controlled
in the same way by government.
The power of the government extending into both the 
civil service and the public sector would seem to be an
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important factor in the control of the state. This power is 
tempered in Ireland somewhat by a desire on behalf of the 
politicians to appear not to be involved in controlling either 
the civil service or the public sector. The civil service and 
the semi-state bodies must be seen to be independent, and any 
politician caught involved in their affairs for personal benefit 
would create a public scandal. There appears to be a careful 
balance in how far a politician is allowed to influence the civil 
service or semi-state bodies. Politicians have ultimately become 
a stepping-stone for access to the attention of semi-state and 
civil service officials in operations involving the use of 
influence and the exchange of favours. This role of politicians 
and the civil service is implicitly accepted by the public, 
although breaking of the implicit rules does lead to public 
outcry and even to the wrecking of a political career. In a 
detailed study of what he terms "party and parish pump politics", 
R.K. Carthy describes this "behind-the-scenes" role of Irish 
politics:
"Deeply ingrained is the conviction that 
the government can be successfully 
tapped for needed goods and services, 
but only if approached through an 
intermediary of influence... Successful 
politicians operate as brokers because 
widely shared cultural norms predispose 
the electorate to expect it of them, 
but in doing so they reinforce these 
norms, perpetuating the pattern."
R.K. Carthy, Party and Parish Pump:
Electoral Politics in Ireland,
Canada: Winfrid Laurier U.P., 
1981, p.23.
Numerous suggestions from Irish history have been offered to 
explain what amounts to the almost "gangster-type" character of 
Irish politics. Perhaps it is due to the absentee landlords and 
the system of middlemen rent collectors, (Gombeen men); perhaps
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it is due to the successful political methods of Charles Stuart 
Parnell and the Irish Parliamentary Party's block-voting and 
interventionist tactics in the British House of Parliament from 
1860 to 1916. Many secret societies have existed throughout Irish 
history, some violent others non-violent, all illegal under the 
previous British law. Certainly British dominance and the Irish 
straggle for independence has affected the Irish public's 
expectation of politicians who in the past were always the people 
"who got things done" by whatever method and often against the 
authority's wishes. Respect for authority has never been an Irish 
characteristic, and the law to some degree is still not strictly 
observed but instead is "made to be broken". R.K. Carthy is 
correct in stating:
"The struggle for national self-determination 
was fought within the evolving structures of 
British parliamentary government. This unique 
experience had a profound impact on Irish 
political culture, especially on the values 
and attitudes held by the political elite 
and the structure and character of the 
nation's political organisation."
R.K. Carthy, ibid., p.16.
3 . 1 . 2  The political instability from the late seventies to the 
election of the present government in 1982 has led to a re-emergence 
of political bargaining and "back-scratching". There have been 
three general elections in two years between 1980 and 1982 with the 
government alternating between a coalition and a Fianna Fail 
minority government. The present coalition majority over Fianna Fail 
is only eleven with seventy seats held by Fine Gael, sixteen by 
Labour, and the remaining five seats held by independents and the 
Workers' Party. The composition of seats in the previous Dail led to 
a situation where the minor parties and independents sided with 
Fianna Fail and voted against the government. The combination forced
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a general election. After the numerous elections of the recent 
years and the changes in government there has been a rise in public 
apathy, (only 72.8 % of the electorate voted in the last general 
election - a fall by Irish standards). This trend together with 
economic difficulties has given rise to an atmosphere of political 
instability despite the current government's ability to survive the 
combination of the opposition.
This instability, it is claimed by some political 
commentators, is due partly to the lack of any clear political 
choice between the major parties. The Irish fight for independence 
was fraught with the founding and failure of many organisations, 
some of which suffered inter-party divisions and internal disputes. 
Although united in the desire for independence Irish revolutionaries 
have long differed over the best way of gaining that independence 
and the actual degree of independence desired. These differences 
are reflected in Irish politics, and are the founding differences 
between the major political parties. Both Fianna Fail and Fine Gael 
can trace their history to before the Civil War between the pro-treaty 
and anti-treaty sides, (the Irish Free State Treaty). The Labour 
Party alone remains the only major Irish party founded on political 
ideology. However, the Labour Party has never gained a following 
strong enough to seriously threaten the other two main parties.
Irish history then has to a great extent depended on the popularity 
of a political leader. It is the names of great Irishmen that are 
remembered not any particular party or political philosophy. This 
remains true today:
"A hierarchically organized and centrally 
controlled organisation bound the masses 
to the leadership, ensuring the party's 
continuing pre-eminence across the country." (sic.)
R.K. Carthy, ibid., p.17.
The party loyalty to its leader is a continuance of a national
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fixation with great men. Irish politics is largely dominated by 
the character of its politicians and not by political issues.
Indeed even today there are few political differences between the 
two major parties, other than historical differences. Both command 
a similar range of followers, appealing to city and country voters 
alike. There is no real class vote in Ireland - even the Labour 
Party is not restricted to city working class voters. Both Fianna 
Fail and Fine Gael have centre to right-wing policies and Labour 
follows a more Liberal policy than strict socialism. R.K. Carthy 
commenting on the extreme similarities between the political 
parties claims:
"The Irish party system is unique. In no 
other European policy does a small number 
of programmically indistinguishable parties, 
each commanding heterogeneous electoral 
support, constitute the entire party system."
R.K. Carthy, ibid., p.85.
This is the truth of Irish politics. The only party with any 
marked difference to the major parties are the smaller radical 
parties, (the Workers' Party, Sinn Fein and the Communist Party), 
and it is noticeable that they are all of socialist origin.
However, none of them command a large following. Though Labour 
has been losing seats, it is not to the benefit of these outside 
parties. The Workers' Party has been maintaining its two seats in 
the Dail, but its support seems to be largely from the working-class 
areas of inner-city Dublin. Its policies are not entirely class 
based but tend towards attracting working class voters.
When later examining the legislation on local radio 
proposed by the two governments, (the previous Fianna Fail and 
the present coalition), the lack of any real difference between the 
options will be made clear. The similarity of the proposals reflects 
the similarity between the political parties. It is the degree of
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strength of the Labour Party's influence which provides the unknown 
element in attempting to surmise the proposed legislation. The 
coalition has promised to draft a bill on local radio before the 1985 
summer recess; such promises have often been broken. How strong 
Labour's influence will be in shaping the bill is difficult to 
assess. However, there will be many groups and organisations vying 
with each other to influence the bill. The underlying network of 
bargaining and the exchange of favours among the political 
parties and between politicians and outside power groups seems 
likely to eventually force a compromise on the draft bill.
3.2 THE BROADCAST MEDIA IN IRELAND: Ireland can boast of being
the country from which two broadcasting "firsts" were made.
The first trans-Atlantic wireless message by Marconi was sent from 
Clifden in Connemara and also the first wireless "news" was 
broadcast during the 1916 Rising from the Irish School of 
Wireless Telegraphy in O'Connell Street. In these incidents 
alone has Ireland pioneered radio history. Ireland's first 
Wireless Telegraphy Act was not passed until 1926. In Britain 
the BBC was established in 1922, (then the British Broadcasting 
Company), and in America the first independent companies were 
broadcasting as early as 1920. In many respects this should have 
left Ireland in an ideal position to watch and learn from others' 
mistakes. As it transpired, Ireland insisted on experiencing the 
confusions of the early squabbles for licences among the wireless 
manufacturers that both Britain and America experienced.
The Marconi Company first applied for a licence to 
broadcast in 1922 but any decision on radio was postponed for the 
duration of the Civil War. When an Irish consortium later applied 
to be given the monopoly for wireless manufacture and broadcasting
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the official reply from the Postmaster General was against any 
monopoly, but it stated that all Irish companies should be entitled 
to broadcast, "as is provided for in the case of the British 
Broadcasting Company", (cf. Maurice Gorham, Forty Years of 
Irish Broadcasting, 1967.) Thus as early as 1922, the Irish 
were to look to Britain for the example in broadcasting matters.
After a history of British rule perhaps it is not surprising
that Ireland should seem to depend on the British lead in areas 
of legislation among others. Ireland's links to Britain were 
never severed in this respect;
"The effects of the British connection still 
influence many aspects of Irish life...In many 
areas of law, social reform, technology, 
organisation and communication, what Britain 
does today Ireland does years later."
D. Fisher, Broadcasting in Ireland:
Case Studies on Broadcasting Systems,
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1978, p.4.
In areas of broadcasting law this statement certainly holds true,
3.2.1 The 1923 White Paper on radio broadcasting suggested the 
union of five interested manufacturing groups which was to be 
given the sole right to broadcast. The company was open to any 
other firm which wished to join and was allowed fifteen minutes 
of advertising time per day. This proposal was very similar to 
the situation in Britain. However, it was decided that a special 
government committee be appointed to discuss broadcast legislation. 
This committee gave rise to the first broadcasting scandal in 
Irish history. Typically enough, it involved the political and 
commercial association of one of the committee members with an 
outside interest party. Much allegation and denial was entered 
into by both sides and there was much personal abuse. The situation 
was never clearly resolved. It appears that the owners of one of
the companies applying for a licence, (Mr. Belton), had a previous 
financial arrangement with one of the leading politicians on the 
appointed committee, (Mr. Darrell Figgis). Mr. Belton, it was 
alleged, had hoped that Mr. Figgis would "use his great influence 
with the Government" on behalf of Mr. Belton. He had entered into 
a financial arrangement with Mr. Figgis to that purpose, (not only 
in connection with radio broadcasting but also in connection with 
other projects, mostly building contracts which were to receive 
government finance). More damagingly, Mr. Belton was said to have 
promised Mr. Figgis money to support his election finances for 
a number of independent candidates with whom Mr. Figgis had 
political allegiance. In return for his financial assistance,
Mr. Belton expected the co-operation of Mr. Figgis to arrange 
the government contracts. The strength of these allegations was 
demonstrated by numerous letters between the two men which were 
produced seemingly in defence by both parties, but which only served 
to further entangle the situation. The public scandal which grew 
around the affair finally led to the resignation of Mr. Figgis 
from the committee, and was to continue to shadow his political 
career. In a second controversy the Postmaster General, Mr. Walsh, 
became involved in accusations with another of the committee 
members, Mr. McGarry. In an effort to support his own plans for 
radio, (outlined in the White Paper), Mr. Walsh accused the committee 
of harbouring ill-feelings towards him and trying to discredit 
him. He then accused Mr. McGarry of being financially involved 
with one of the firms applying for a licence. Mr. McGarry had 
declared his involvement with an electrical firm which could 
conceivably have manufactured wireless components or could have 
been connected with another firm which manufactured components.
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However, he denied being partisan in the matter of issuing licences 
and denied using either direct or indirect influence on behalf 
of any company. Yet he later refused to sign the committee's 
report because of his connections with an electronic firm. The 
whole political muddle tends to disprove the notion that the 
committee ever seriously discussed Ireland's future radio system.
In an understatement, Maurice Gorham comments on the committee's 
final publication:
"Its proceedings make fascinating reading 
for anyone interested in the history of 
broadcasting, and cast some light on 
the political personalities prominent..."
M. Gorham, Forty Years of Irish Broadcasting,
Dublin: Talbot Press Ltd.,
1967, p.10.
Not only does the controversy surrounding the committee serve to 
examplify Irish political intrigue and the use of influence to gain 
control, but it also illustrates the nature of the decisions 
taken in regard to broadcasting.
3.2.2 The Wireless Telegraphy Act of 1926 established a 
public service broadcasting institution controlled by the 
state with responsibility for broadcasting radio programmes.
The institution was only to broadcast programmes it did not 
involve itself in the manufacture of radio sets. The station 
was financed from the issue of radio licences, from an import 
duty on radio sets, and also from advertising revenue. When 
necessary, and it soon became necessary, the government could 
provide additional finance. The government retained control of 
all financing and expenditure and the first Director General was 
a civil servant, Seamus Clandillon, who was to hold this position 
until 1934. The first station, 2RN, began broadcasting from 
Dublin in 1926. A year later a Cork station, 6CK, was opened
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which had the facility to generate programmes but also relayed 
Dublin produced programmes. Much later in 1932 a 60kw transmitter 
was constructed in Athlone and the Dublin signal was finally 
available for nationwide reception. It is a reflection of Irish 
priorities that this transmitter was hurriedly made ready for 
operation for an International Eucharistic Congress which was 
held in Dublin in June of that year. The transmitter was
operational in time for the congress but the building was not
completed until the following year. Radio Athlone became the 
new name under which 2RN continued to broadcast and is still 
seen marked on old wireless sets but the service became known
generally as Radio Eireann, and with the introduction of
television in the early 1960's its present name was adopted,
Radio Telefis Eireann, (RTE).
3.3 MEDIA PROFESSIONALISM: RTE has often been criticised for not
being politically impartial throughout its history. These criticisms 
have mostly come from politicians who have believed themselves 
"wronged" by RTE or who declared that the opposition have had more 
airtime than has been given to them. Sometimes even it has 
been said that RTE, or an RTE department, is staffed by 
sympathisers of a particular party who produce a certain bias in 
programme output. Such accusations are largely unfounded. None 
would be tolerated in the state broadcasting station who were 
known to be consciously and deliberately producing what would 
amount to propaganda. If there exists any bias within the minds 
of RTE broadcasters and producers it must certainly be 
unconscious and greatly disguised:
"Whatever influence supervisory authorities 
may have over broadcast output - unobtrusively 
and by retrospective comment far more than by 
active intervention - the test of tolerance
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in broadcasting, in the end, is the content 
of output itself; and the limits of tolerance 
are likely to be set, in practical terms, 
mainly by broadcasters' own conceptions of 
how the world ticks, and especially, of 
what they themselves are about."
Westergaard, "Power, Class and the Media" in
Mass Communications and Society, 
Curran, et al. , eds., rpt., 1979, 
London: Arnold & O.U. Press, 1977,
p.106.
The argument that individuals reflect the societal values to 
which they have been conditioned returns to the themes outlined 
earlier in the second chapter. Relating the Marxist-Elitist 
theories to the media has been a primary task of John Westergaard. 
Together with Henrietta Resler, Westergaard gives a thorough 
analysis of contemporary Britain illustrating examples which 
support his Marxist-Elitist premises. The role of the media is 
crucial to the maintenance and self-perpetuation of the societal 
elite. Developing Bachrach and Baratz' work on non-decision-making 
Westergaard argues strongly on the importance of unconscious 
acceptance of the status quo:
"In fact no control could be firmer and more 
extensive than the one which embraced the minds 
and wills of its subjects so successfully 
that opposition never even raised its head."
Westergaard and Resler, Class in a Capitalist
Society: A Study of Contemporary 
Britain, 1902 rpt., Middlesex: 
Pelican Books, 1975, p.145.
The consequences of non-decision-making have three implications
on the nature of power and control:
1. First, power can exist in the structure of an organisation as 
well as residing in individuals and groups. This gives power a 
more intransigent quality. It is not merely a quality possessed
by individuals it is a force which to exist must be used. Power as 
a force can exist therefore in structure.
2. Power exists also in "routine application", in everyday
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procedures. The channels of communication, the functions of 
employees, the exercise of authority, all represent forms of 
power.
3. The unquestioned assumptions, the acceptance of "how things 
are done" as natural and legitimate illustrates power over 
the minds of people. Conflict is allowed, to a degree, but not 
enough to threaten the control by the elite. Consensus cannot be 
positive in this situation because it is a forced consensus - 
the issues have already been decided, the options defined. The 
result of this must necessarily restrict the alternatives open 
to suggestion and therefore the range of conflict is narrowed, 
confining it to mere "legitimate" opposition. Power of course,
"lies closest to the interests that benefit most from this 
pre-determination of the boundaries of conflict." (ibid. p.147.)
Applied to the media these three areas of control 
relate to the authority structure, the everyday operation of 
the media company, and the often unconscious values behind 
non-decision-making. The make-up of the organisation's authority 
from producer to Director-General and the RTE Authority,in the 
Irish case, is the first area of control. The routine behaviour 
and operation of the media company, the work of its employees, 
is covered by the second area. The third area of control involves 
the personalities of those engaged in decision-making, how they 
consider "reality". It becomes obvious in Westergaard and Reslers' 
threefold definition of control that concrete examples will be hard 
to obtain, and therefore proof of control may often be difficult to 
illustrate. This may be due to the unconscious nature of individual 
assumptions which support the status quo of the elite, but may equally 
be due to the lack of desire of individuals in the media, to seriously 
question their conceptions and the structures of authority. Such
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internal questioning may give rise to a discomfort and a sense of 
criticism which would make work in the media a threat to the status 
quo and would lead to a situation intolerable to its controllers.
3.3.1 Ireland is fortunate in having a well-documented example of 
three ex-inembers of RTE who resigned, mainly as a matter of conscience, 
and who provided an insight to the Irish media as it was in the 
late 1960's, and as it probably largely remained. (Philip Schlessinger 
and the Glasgow Media Group provide a more scientific study of the 
British media.) Summarising the necessity of questioning the media's 
role in society, and also the likely results of such questioning 
by any of its employees, Bob Quinn wrote in an open letter to his 
colleagues at RTE:
"...query its sacred cows, its gods and its 
liturgies, its systems, its impeccable phrases 
imported from the respectable corruption 
of business management. Ignore above all its 
offers of a comfortable place in the technocratic 
womb; its bribes of security, status and free 
burial service. Having ignored all of these 
expressions you will find yourself out of a job.
And you can't afford this because you have a 
mortgage, an overdraft, a hire-purchase agreement 
and a realisation that you were never free."
Doolan, Dowling and Quinn, Sit Down and be Counted,
Dublin: Wellington Publishers Ltd., 
1969, Appendix III, pp.xxxiv-xxxv.
It is precisely this type of critical outlook encouraged by
Bob Quinn over a decade ago that should be prominent in the
media and it is this same outlook that is actively discouraged
by the media controls. It is the purpose of the media to reflect
the consensus within society, the consensus encouraged by the
elite who decide what it and what is not consensus. The broadcasters
are required by law to maintain balance and to be impartial and
objective in all matters, especially those matters likely to give
rise to controversy. Politics, news, current affairs and discussion
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programmes must all be balanced with representatives from all sides 
given equal time to put forward their views. The views of the 
presenter or interviewer must not be broadcast: s/he must remain 
impartial and be objective in questioning and discussing the issue. 
This is a requirement of law. It ensures that the media reflects 
the interests of the majority consensus and is arranged to prevent 
the broadcast of radical minority opinions which would be 
unrepresentative of general public opinion and which might threaten 
the fabric of national cohesion. In Britain at the time of the
General Strike the BBC demonstrated that it was on the side of
government and Lord Hill has commented in relation to Northern 
Ireland that "the BBC is not and cannot be impartial." In Ireland 
also, a former Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, responsible for 
RTE, has said that RTE was "responsible to the Government who 
appointed the Authority and provided the capital." (Mr. Erskine 
Childers.) A former Taoiseach, Mr. Sean Lemass stated in the Dail 
that:
"RTE was set up as an instrument of public 
policy and as such was responsible to the 
Government... To this view the Government
reject the view that RTE should be, either
generally or in regard to its current affairs 
programmes, completely independent of 
Government supervision."
Doolan, Dowling and Quinn, op.cit., pp.90-91.
These statements may seem somewhat archaic compared to today's 
standards of liberal media freedom. However there remains the 
fundamental nature of the media's support for a majority 
consensus by the use of "professional standards" of impartiality, 
objectivity and balance. Westergaard and Resler note the 
frequency of emphasis these professional standards receive by 
both the broadcasters themselves and also by government. In contrast 
Westergaard and Resler observe:
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"But there is, of course, little in the way 
of corresponding formal prescription to 
define what the limits of consensus are - 
to lay down what will, and what will not, 
offend against good taste or decency, or be 
likely to encourage crime and disorder, or 
be offensive to public feeling."
Westergaard and Resler, op.cit., p.270.
3.3.2 This lack of "formal prescription" means that the producer 
and director must interpret themselves what is meant by the 
terms of professional standards. There may exist an internal 
reference, such as the BBC's "Blue Book", but it is largely 
up to the individual to define the terms and their application 
to a particular programme item. This decision may partly be 
based on previous experience of what has been "allowed" and what 
has been refused, but eventually the decision comes to rest on 
the producer's own subjective opinions of what is "in the 
public's interest". This must necessarily be subjective if there 
exists no exact definition of professional standards nor of 
their application to programming. To know that programme content 
depends on a subjective interpretation of the legal restrictions 
on broadcasting places the producer in a difficult situation, 
and an extremely responsible position in regard to public 
accountability. Given these circumstances the response of 
broadcasters becomes predictable;
"Producers generally play safe. They 
work to formulae - unwritten professional 
assumptions and codes of practice - that 
keep the content, tone and perspective of 
most programmes within accepted moulds." 
ibid., p.271.
It is this type of "playing it safe" that leads to the unquestioning 
attitude that Bob Quinn in his open letter deplored. This 
passive acceptance of the status quo is based on fear; fear for 
job security, promotion and the desire to quieten the conscience.
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False consensus exists where none can imagine or dare imagine an 
alternative. The media can only become stagnant in these 
conditions and any hope for an actively critical form of 
thinking by broadcasters is lost.
3.3.3 In a democratic state the media are seen ideally as being 
a "third estate" - a force that monitors state activities on behalf 
of the public and provides for the broadcast of opposing views. 
However, this function of the media is a myth. The media hampered 
by state controls and professional codes of conduct cannot in reality 
be a "honest broker" to the state. It cannot be impartial when its 
impartiality is subjectively defined by the media producers 
themselves; it poses a contradiction. It is this contradiction 
however, that is accepted by the media and society. The very notion 
of media impartiality is part of the conditioning necessary to the 
maintenance of the status quo. The public need to feel that the 
media are representing their interests and acting as a third 
estate on their behalf, and the media producers also must believe 
this to be their purpose. It is only when the media come close 
to actively fulfilling this role and going beyond the structures 
provided for investigation, transcending the traditional boundaries 
of reportage, that the producer realises that it is not the job 
of the media to seriously criticise the status quo. Doolan, Dowling 
and Quinn's book chronicles numerous incidents in early RTE 
programming which attempted to question political and social issues 
and which met with severe disapproval by the RTE authorities. Two 
programmes in particular are mentioned, 7 Days and Home Truths.
7 Days was a political current affairs magazine programme and 
Home Truths was a consumer affairs programme orientated towards 
the middle to lower income groups. Both programmes were eventually
58
dropped by RTE after numerous arguments between the programme
producers and the RTE authorities. Explaining the underlying 
reasons for the ending of these two programmes Doolan, Dowling 
and Quinn comment:
"Programmes which had sought to test the 
public's maturity inevitably increased 
the testyness of national leaders.
'7 Days' did such programmes and underwent 
such pressures, not only from enraged 
public servants but from within the 
Authority itself, whose political and 
temperamental predictions favoured 
the status quo."
Doolan, Dowling and Quinn, op.cit., p.112.
and on Home Truths they quote a statement by the Advertising
Sales Manager of RTE, Mr. R. Gahan:
"While the programme said nothing untrue,... 
the station could not afford to express 
the kind of truth the programme was 
transmitting." 
ibid., p.96.
This appears to be the regard RTE holds for any programme 
initiating critical inquiry. Numerous examples are recorded 
of items which have been refused on the grounds that they may 
compromise RTE with outside interests, both government and 
economic powers:
"Mr. Dowling was ordered by the Controller 
of Programmes to get a graphic artist to 
change the name of a brand of toothpaste...
An item on Mr. Charles Haughey was ordered 
to be removed...Mr. Dowling refused. It was 
taken out of the tape without his knowledge 
by means of a razor cut...the disappearance
of three programmes which had been completed
prior to the transfer of '7 Days' to the
Head of News; these were, an item on 
property sales at Mountpleasant Square; 
housing conditions as seen by Father Sweetman,
S.J., and Special Branch activities in 
student circles." 
ibid., Appendix III, pp.L-Li.
Government and business powers combined to pressurise RTE to
reprimand the producers of 7 Days and Home Truths and
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succeeded in eventually forcing the resignation of the producers - 
Doolan, Dowling and Quinn.
3.4 THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA: The public's conception of the freedom of
the media from, especially, political pressure is part of the general 
public conception of the state as being an institution concerned with
the protection of each individual citizen. Introducing his theories
of the press, Siebert recognises that:
"the press always takes on the form and 
coloration of the social and political 
structures within which it operates.
Especially, it reflects the system of
social controls whereby the relations
of individuals and institutions are 
adjusted. We believe that an understanding 
of these aspects of society is basic to 
any systematic understanding of the press."
Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, Four Theories
of the Press, rpt. 1979,
Chicago: University of Illinois, 
1956, pp.1-2.
The press and the media are a creation of the society in which 
they exist. An opinion of the role of the media in society then 
must be based on an opinion of society itself, an opinion subject 
to the biases and pragmatics outlined in the second chapter. In 
believing in the concept of a liberal society, as described from 
Stuart Mills to Parkins, to be an optimistic fallacy it follows 
that Siebert's description of a libertarian media system must 
also be based on a misconception of society.
The Libertarian theory is founded on a view of mankind 
as rational and essentially good. Thus man's actions are 
predictably good when given freedom, education, basic comforts 
and security. Each individual has the right to seek fulfillment 
from life and on the sole conditions that his actions do not 
injure another the individual should be given as much freedom as 
possible. The state's function is to facilitate the citizens
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in their quest for self-fulfillment and happiness by providing 
the requirements for existence: health care, housing, security 
and the finances necessary for the attainment of goods and 
services. This belief in the underlying rationality of 
mankind leads to the liberal-pluralist belief in the self-righting 
nature of society; what is best for society will eventually 
win over all opposition if given the freedom to do so. The 
open-market principle holds equally for the media. The "truth" 
will find more favour with the public than any falsehood and 
the freedom of expression of all opinions will eventually give 
rise to the "truth". If the individual has the right to knowledge 
then the media has the duty to provide it. It becomes the 
responsibility of the media therefore to provide the public 
with information and opinion from all sides of a given issue - 
especially political issues which affect their well-being. The 
degree of press freedom in relation to state security has always 
been a divided issue. It is accepted that the individual has 
a right to privacy from the press, (and all media), but the 
amount of secrecy allowed the state is questionable. Clearly 
the media's freedom must be limited to some degree - but to what 
extent? Summarising the functions of the media in a liberal 
state Siebert concludes:
"Basically the underlying purpose of the 
media was to help discover truth, to 
assist in the process of solving political 
and social problems by presenting all 
manner of evidence and opinion as a basis 
for decisions. The essential characteristic 
of this process was its freedom from 
government controls or domination...it was 
to provide a check on government which 
no other institution could provide." 
ibid., p.51.
3.4.1 The Marxist-Elitist view of society, (covered in chapter
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two) , throws doubt on whether the media can ever fulfill such 
functions. If it is against the interests of the state to allow 
the expressions of certain opinions which, the state declares, are 
contrary to public interest, then the media will be forbidden 
to broadcast those opinions on the grounds that they are 
offensive to public morality, may incite to crime, or whatever.
The freedom of the press exists to question anything that 
lies within the constructed consensus but does not allow the 
investigation of what lies outside that consensus. Neither is 
the questioning of the structure of the consensus itself allowed 
nor especially, any investigation of the real interests the 
consensus may support. Those interests are the power groups upon 
which society is based; economic and political institutions. As 
long as the public believe the press to be concerned with 
safegarding the public good and believe in the privilege of the 
freedom of the press those power elites remain secure. It is only 
when the media become critical of the societal institutions and 
begin stretching the limits of their conventional freedom that 
direct measures must be taken to control the media. Normally 
such measures are unnecessary. The three forms of control 
suggested by John Westergaard are sufficent; administration 
usually confuses and smothers any queries before they have time 
to surface. The process of socialisation and the promise of 
promotion usually succeeds in quietening any questioning mind.
It was a vain attempt by Doolan, Dowling and Quinn to 
arouse public consciousness that caused the conditions forcing 
their resignations, not any one specific incident. The legal 
constraints of impartiality, objectivity, balance and the 
maintenance of public order serve to constrain any attempt 
to widen the boundaries of consensus and suffocate the inquiring
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attitude that is necessary for growth. Work in such an environment 
can only lead to the production of routine programmes which 
cover the same content with only a different presentation. News 
and current affairs become a mere broadcast of facts with no 
attempt to analyse or search beneath the surface for explanations. 
RTE is caught in such an atmosphere and is suffering from 
stagnation.
"Intellectual and imaginative daring, the 
desire to try new forms and procedures 
are all progressively neglected or even 
actively suppressed...Management has 
substituted for these qualities a nervous 
self-censorship...[authorities] have no 
real interpretation of RTE1s role of 
impartiality other than a shrewd and 
cynical anticipation of external pressures 
and censures."
Doolan, Dowling and Quinn, op.cit.,
Appendix III, p.xxxvi.
It is perhaps expecting too much to hope that the qualities
outlined above could prevail in the Irish media given its
history. If as Westergaard suggests:
"in the selection of news and background 
information the tone of commentary..., 
in the emphasis of interviewers and 
discussion-chairmen, in choice of 
spokesperson, the broadcasting media are 
not 'neutral' between those who accept 
and those who appear to threaten the 
established order..."
Westergaard and Resler, op.cit., p.273.
then the media should stop pretending to be "neutral" and 
should no longer cloak itself behind the professional terms 
"impartiality", "objectivity" and "balance".
3.5 RIVAL GROUPS: Local radio represents a possibility for a
new media force in Ireland. The potential for control of local 
radio is an opportunity for the various economic and social 
groups in the country to assert themselves, to gain dominance
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over their rivals. Access to local radio has become an important 
issue reflecting the relative power these groups have with the 
ultimate controller, the state. In turn, it is a reflection of 
what Irish society considers important in determining which of 
the conflicting interests is to be given dominance in this new 
media system.
3.5.1 The present coalition government set up an interparty 
committee which investigated the various interests' proposals 
for local radio. This Oireachtas Committee is part of a plan to 
open government legislation to public involvement. The success of 
the Committee system has already been questioned with the Mag ill 
Book of Irish Politics, 1934 commenting:
"Instead of revitalising the Irish Parliamentary 
system, these new committees [of which the 
committee dealing with local radio legislation 
is but one] appear to have added another 
sluggish layer to Government..."
M. Farrell, ed., Dublin: Magill Publications Ltd.,
1933, p.102.
Outlines for government legislation were published and the public 
was invited to submit reactions to the proposal to the committee. 
Most of the organisations and individuals interested in local 
radio wrote to the committee. It is fair to assume that all 
parties seriously interested in local radio submitted their 
opinions to the Oireachtas committee. Some of these were 
selected to give further oral testimonies to the committee.
The committee was not obliged to issue a report nor to offer 
any recommendations to the Minister for Communications who has 
the responsibility for preparing the bill on local radio.
However, it is assumed that the public may influence legislation 
and that legislation would take account of public attitudes. In 
any case the system gives the government the ideal opportunity
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to declare that it has satisfied public interests and given 
all parties equal opportunities to express an opinion and influence 
policy. These submissions provide access for analysis of the 
opinions of groups interested in influencing the control of local 
radio in Ireland.
The opinions of the various interest groups may be 
broadly defined as falling within two distinct categories: 
those who support what has been termed "community radio" and 
those who propose "independent commercial radio". Within these 
two groups are other interest groups who in supporting one or 
another side hope to further their own interests by using the 
local radio medium. Some see community radio as offering the 
best opportunities for their interests; others support commercial 
radio for their own benefit. Since the terms used in the local 
radio debate have often been misapplied and confused, (community 
radio and independent radio have been popularly used as attractive 
descriptions), definitions will be given to distinguish between 
the usages. Drawing from the few definitions which have been 
offered and attempting to apply them to the Irish case, final 
definitions will be given which will be adhered to when describing 
the proposals to the Oireachtas Committee.
3.6 INDEPENDENT RADIO: "Independent" local radio finds its origin
in the early British arguments for an "independent" radio and later 
television service. Independent was taken to mean independent from 
government influence and later, independent from the BBC. The phrase 
grew in popularity with the advent of "pirate" radio stations. These 
"pirate" stations claimed independence from all forms of authority, 
government, commercial and the established broadcasters. The "pirate" 
stations appealed to the anti-establishment attitude among
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and early seventies. Being independent meant being free from
restrictions; anyone could broadcast any content without fear 
of intervention. In theory this should have led to true impartiality 
and the freedom of access for all. That this did not result 
undermines the hope of any such "independent" media system.
The "pirate" stations were under three controls: control from their 
dependence on advertising, control from their fear of transgressing 
the unofficial approval that tolerated their existence in exchange 
for their unquestioning attitude to the status quo, and control from
the initial expense and knowledge necessary to set up a radio
station. Subject to these basic controls, even "pirate" stations 
can never be independent.
3.6.1 In Ireland also the existing "pirate" stations are 
subject to these restrictions. There is no "pirate" station that 
broadcasts material challenging the established order. Indeed an 
interviewer for a "pirate" station was dismissed for planning to 
broadcast an interview with Ken Livingstone, Danny Morrison and 
Gerry Adams, (the Labour leader for the Greater London Council 
and two members of the Sinn Fein Party, all elected local 
representatives). Mr. Gavin Duffy, the interviewer, received 
a written message from the then Minister for Posts and Telegraphs 
asking him to refrain from continuing the interview. When Mr.
Duffy publically declared his intention of ignoring the Minister's 
warning he was dismissed by the station, Radio Leinster, and the 
interview never took place. Both interviewees were elected public 
representatives, (although not Irish), but were known to be 
highly critical of the British government's policy in Northern 
Ireland and would probably be equally critical of the Irish
teenagers and the popular culture prevalent in the late sixties
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governraent. Such a broadcast at any hour and despite the probably 
small number of listeners was too great an embarrassment for the 
government who gave proof of their influence with the owners of 
"independent" "pirate" stations. Radio Leinster did not have 
a large listener area and was not one of the major "pirate" 
stations. Following the 1983 raids on the "pirate" stations Radio 
Leinster closed and has not broadcast since. It has remained 
the only Irish example of a "pirate" attempt to broadcast a 
controversial issue, (see Irish Times, 24-12-82, p.l.)
All the Irish "pirate" stations depend on advertising 
to provide the finance needed for broadcasting and all depend on 
popular music for content with only a few stations attempting a 
current affairs discussion; usually a weekly round-up of local news 
and events with an occasional interview. Any coverage of local 
politics is restricted to presentation of facts only and opinions 
and analysis are rarely broadcast. There are no radical "pirate" 
stations. The only attempt to broadcast what is termed 
anti-establishment material, (by H-Block hunger strikers in 1981), 
ended after the general election in that year, probably because of 
lack of funds and due to technical difficulties. Any hope for such 
broadcasters to evade the predictable Posts and Telegraphs' detector 
van would be to use a portable transmitter, which would certainly 
limit the broadcast area. Such a station would need to be 
self-financing since it would be unlikely to receive advertising 
subscriptions.
3.6.2 None of the Irish "pirate" stations can be said to be 
entirely independent of outside pressures and no plan for true 
"independent" local radio is likely to be acceptable to those who 
hold state control. If the state cannot control what is broadcast
67
it will seek to silence such broadcasts; and if the state or any 
other controls broadcast material then the broadcaster cannot be 
"independent". Various degrees of independence can be achieved and 
one station can be closer to independence than another but none can 
claim total independence, so long as the three basic controls 
outlined above exist.
3.7 COMMUNITY RADIO: The ideals of community radio have been
put forward, usually by a minority, in most countries. Whilst never 
finding full nationwide application in any country community radio 
systems have developed in some major countries, most notably Canada 
and Sweden, and Australia. Universally community radio is taken to 
imply a system whereby control of the station rests, to varying 
degrees, with the listeners served. The degree to which control 
actually rests with the community is what makes the term "community 
radio" controversial. All community stations proport to serve the 
interests of the community; allowing access for local people to 
broadcast, catering for minority interests within the community and 
being owned by local people. However with such general definitions 
it is easy to understand how some commercial stations can claim to 
be community radio stations without fulfilling the spirit of true 
community radio. A specific declarations of the aims and purposes 
of community radio was given by the British Community Communications 
Group, known as COMCOM. This 1979 charter has been widely used by 
community broadcasting groups and remains the tightest definition of 
how community radio should be structured. COMCOM outlines ten 
principles:
Community broadcasting should;
1. serve either local communities or communities of interests;
2. be legally organised on a non-profit basis;
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3. have a Governing Board democratically elected and representing 
all the community interests which includes the station workers, 
paid and voluntary, and decides programming policy and manages the 
general running of the station;
4. provide entertainment, information and education, encouraging 
the two-way communication of all interests and opinions;
5. have a variety of funding, from spot advertising, local sources 
and public funds;
6. allow for flexible job allocation, union membership for paid 
personnel and the use of voluntary workers;
7. provide equal employment opportunities for women and minority and 
ethnic groups; [a legal requirement for all industries,]
8. provide local people with access to production and transmitting 
facilities and provide for training;
9. transmit predominately local programme material;
10. encourage a programme policy that develops participatory 
democracy, combats racism, sexism, and all other discriminatory 
attitudes. [Perhaps in Ireland, including religious discrimination.] 
The right of reply for individuals and interest groups was later 
added. [Taken from the Community Broadcasting Charter, COMCOI1, July, 
1979.] This charter outlines a system for community radio that is 
essentially non-profit-making in character, represents the community 
through a democratic body made up from the interests groups in the 
community and which controls the station and material broadcast.
These aims have been summarised by Peter Lewis in an overview of
community radio models;
"...community radio programming is initiated by 
community groups or individuals broadcasting by 
themselves for themselves. The initiations are 
locally inspired and operated on the bias of 
low cost technology... and are not financed for
profit. There is room for considerable variety
in structure and philosophies, a reflection,
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indeed, of the varieties, social and cultural, 
of the communities which initiate and sustain them."
Peter M. Lewis, Different Keepers: Models of
Structure and Finance in 
Community Radio, London:
International Institute of 
Communications, 1977, p.6.
The major problem for organisers of community radio is how 
to finance the service. Funds for initial costs and continual running 
costs have to be met. Some stations in America depend on listener 
subscriptions; most though sell spot advertisements, (the same as 
commercial stations.) Other stations allow private investment; in 
return the investor is allowed the same voting right as other community 
representatives on the management committee.
3.7.1 In Ireland the system corresponding best to the ideals of 
community radio is presented by the National Association of Community 
Broadcasting, (NACB). Its charter owes much to COMCOM's documentation 
but also incorporates the Irish Co-operative traditional models, 
although not all NACB stations are co-operatives. The NACB aims and 
directives are briefly:
1. representation on any Local Radio Authority appointed by the 
government ;
2. that community organisations be given priority in the allocation 
of licences. These organisations should include all interested 
community groups and individuals, with no one group having a controlling 
share. RTE, provincial newspapers and local businessmen may all 
participate equally with the community.
4. The NACB will represent all such community stations that comply 
with the non-profit and democratic control guidelines that constitute 
a community station. The NACB will undertake to provide technical 
information and training services for all community stations.
[NACB, "Submission to the Oireachtas Committee on Legislation".]
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stations and the commercial local radio stations, the latter including 
the most profitable and successful "pirate" stations in Ireland. The 
commercial stations do not suggest neglecting the community entirely; 
they encourage local societies and individuals to seek access and 
broadcast interviews, community announcements, provide "job-spots" 
for the local unemployed and have participated in local charity fund 
raising. The commercial stations recognise the need for community 
support and encourage participation as a method of gaining local 
popularity. The major differences between commercial and community 
"pirate" stations is not so much an issue of content, (although 
community stations tend to play more local and Irish music, and also 
have more speech content), but more an issue of control. Community 
stations have a committee structure that allows control to be evenly 
spread among elected representatives of the interest groups and 
societies in the community, the business investors and the station 
workers. This committee decides on policy and management of the 
station. The commercial stations are operated like any other commercial 
enterprise with the investors owning and controlling the station and 
the workers and listeners being restricted to non-participatory roles. 
Financial returns tend to influence policy decisions and limit the 
choices available to the station managers.
3.8.1 Among the proposals to the Oireachtas committee from those 
preferring commercial local radio are some organisations and some 
"pirate" stations which attempt to propose a community-type local 
radio system but whose proposals remain outside the strict definition 
provided for community radio. Together with these exceptions are the 
commercial radio stations who suggest benefits for the community but 
also fail to meet the criteria set for community radio. These two
3.8 COMMERCIAL RADIO: A degree of rivalry exists between community
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groups propose community attractions but offer no community control. 
Submissions were made to the Oireachtas committee also by a number of 
social and cultural societies who wished to be recognised and protected 
by the proposed legislation. Some of these organisations merely wished 
to stress the importance of their aims and purposes; others either 
proposed amendments to legislation which would further their interests 
or supported the proposals of others. By examining the supporters of 
a proposal it is possible to understand more of both the supporters 
and those who initiated the proposal.
3.9 THE OIREACHTAS COMMITTEE SUBMISSIONS: The proposals made to the
Oireachtas committee can be divided into those made by the NACB and 
its supporters; those made by commercial local radio supporters, 
including "pirate" stations; and those outside these two groups, RTE 
and Gael Linn. The inter-party committee is made up from both Dail and 
Senate members and has responsibility for studying many pieces of new 
legislation not just that on local radio. It is headed by Mervyn 
Taylor, a member of the Fine Gael party. Fifty-seven written submissions 
were made to the committee by individuals and groups interested in 
local radio, some were asked to make further oral submissions. The 
written submissions varied from large detailed studies to one-page 
letters. From these submissions sixteen can be judged to be purely 
community proposals and fifteen purely commercial, (in accordance with 
the definitions for community and commercial radio outlined earlier).
Ten are community-type proposals but outside the strict definition of 
community stations; three are commercial proposals with reference to 
community influence and the remaining fourteen offer no proposals 
but wish to have their opinions and hopes acknowledged. Some of the 
written material is extremely well researched and presented; others 
contain highly personalised views. (One writer criticised the
content of a Dublin "pirate" station characterised by the "blasting 
out of the drug-taking, sex-obsessed singer..."). Those proposals 
that are well presented are, most often, from the commercial 
proposers.
3.10 COMMERCIAL PROPOSALS: The proposals for commercial local
radio stations place a strong emphasis on the need for an authority 
to supervise the local radio system. They propose an Independent Local 
Radio Authority separate from the RTE Authority but similar in all 
respects to the RTE Authority: government appointed, responsible to 
the Minister, with the duty of issuing licences under the guidelines 
given in the ultimate legislation. Most suggest that an Advertising 
Control Council be established to monitor advertising content and 
duration. Not all agree that the Authority should own the radio 
transmitters and lease these to the station contractors for a 
reasonable charge which would be used to cover the Authority's expenses 
and also provide a fund for less profitable stations. Not all agree 
that less profitable stations should be given financial assistance.
When these stations write of "independence" they imply independence 
from RTE and not from governmental control. These broadcasters firmly 
believe in professionalism, the duties of impartiality, objectivity 
and balance and the freedom of the press. It is this professional 
attitude together with the complete separation from RTE and public 
service broadcasting that will give them their "independence".
This is not the independence of self-determination for the 
individual that is supported by the authors reviewed in the second 
chapter. The controls advocated by the commercial stations leave no 
room for the possibilities of the community to determine the nature 
and policy of the station of which they will be the listeners; nor 
to decide whether their own community actually may want a radio
station, (cf. Peter Lewis's example of the Thames Valley community 
which decided against a ILR station but nevertheless received one; 
Lewis, Whose Media? 1978.) The commercial proposals are based 
firmly on the British model of Independent Local Radio, discussed in 
the following chapter. The commercial nature of the stations are 
founded on the ideals of the open market system: a mixture of free 
competition among the stations with a supervisory authority to control 
the competition in the interests of the community. This Pluralist model 
and the media system developed from it negates the freedom of the 
community to choose for itself and consistently fails to enforce the 
responsibility of the station to be accountable to the community which 
it proports to serve.
The importance of finance and marketing is stressed by the 
commercial proposers. There cannot be too many stations concentrated 
in the one area since there will not be the market to support the 
station. The competition for advertising would lead to the collapse 
of some stations. Thus the service areas of the stations should 
not overlap and the service area should contain a minimum population 
to attract advertising. Most agree on the figure 100,000 as the 
population size required to support a station. The problems of 
population spread in the country, (half of the Irish population 
reside in communities of under 1,500), are solved by proposing a 
system of "twinning" stations. They propose establishing major stations 
around the country in the major population areas and then allowing 
for "satellite" stations which would depend on the major station for 
its content but would "opt-out" to broadcast their own local content 
for a set period of the day.
3.10.1 Perhaps the most reasoned submission from the commercial 
proposers is from Robbie Robinson, owner and broadcaster with the
second biggest Dublin "pirate" station, Sunshine Radio. Robinson 
had considered his plan for local radio since the first suggestion 
by the government of legalising local radio in Ireland. As a result 
his plans are well thought out and detailed. He recognises the 
importance of community involvement and his "pirate" station has been 
active in supporting community ventures and in providing community 
announcements, usually free of cost. His standards for local radio 
are based on those of the British Independent Local Radio. He is a 
firm believer in professionalism. In his office a map of Ireland 
illustrates localities for five major stations, (two in Dublin, 
one each for Cork, Galway and Limerick), and ten satellite stations. 
The five regional stations would provide the capital necessary to 
support the ten satellites. These need not be owned by the same 
people but there may be some mutual shareholders. Shareholding would 
be limited to 20% with the majority being owned by the station 
manager and broadcasters. This gives an incentive to the station 
operators to provide the best service possible to their listeners.
The more listeners that are satisfied with the station's service, 
the greater the listenership figures and the greater the advertising 
revenue that will be generated. (This is the same logic as that behind 
the arguments for commercial radio given in the first chapter.) If 
the service is not supported by the listeners then the advertising 
revenue will not be sufficient to maintain the station. This returns 
to the public service versus private enterprise controversy, "Do you 
give the people what they want or what you think they ought to have?", 
an argument treated in the first chapter.
3.10.2 Another of the Dublin-based "pirate" broadcasters, Eamon 
Cooke of Radio Dublin, one of the first "pirate" stations to begin 
broadcasting, submitted detailed plans for a local radio system. He
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outlines three station types: a "professionally" run 24-hour station 
in a city, a rural station run on similar lines but taking into 
account local conditions, and a community station with minimal 
staffing and relying on volunteers. He provides costing for a total 
of 85 staff; 75 full-time and ten part-time and replacements during 
an annual four week holiday leave, in all costing approximately 52,000 
pounds per week - an enormous expenditure. The costs for the community 
station with a staff of 37 is estimated at 17,000 pounds per week. 
Naturally Cooke points out that with such costings the originally 
proposed thirty stations could not be feasible. (The number of thirty 
local radio stations originated in 1978 and has been in public use 
since.) In detailing the initial capital for the rural stations,
Cooke estimates a gross income from advertising at 3,000 pounds per 
week. His figures are well above those given by any other submission.
The proposed eleven stations of all three types are situated as 
follows: three in Dublin, two in Cork, one in Donegal, Limerick,
Dundalk, Waterford, Athlone and Galway.
3.10.3 The Eire Broadcasting Corporation, (EBC), is the commercial 
proposer which submitted by far the most lengthly, and certainly 
most detailed, documentation to the Oireachtas committee. Composed 
of a number of commercially interested groups, this corporation has 
been active since 1978 when it made its first submission to the 
Minister for Posts and Telegraphs. Consequently the first piece of 
proposed legislation on local radio which was published corresponded 
almost exactly to the EBC1s recommendations with only a few alterations. 
These differences were covered in subsequent proposals made by the 
EBC and were presented to the committee with detailed technical advice 
on frequencies and power outputs for stations. The EBC recommended 
that the proposed legislation for local radio be extended to include
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other forms of community broadcasting; closed circuit television 
and relay systems of locally produced programming. (Already a temporary 
licence for a closed circuit community television system has been 
issued on an experimental basis to a group in Ballyfermot, Dublin.)
The proposal to establish a Local Broadcasting Authority with 
responsibility for all forms of local broadcasting seems likely to 
be accepted by the government. If it meant a serious review of 
broadcasting in Ireland and the development of a broadcasting policy 
for the country, then indeed, this proposal might well be beneficial. 
However it seems rather to have been accepted as a means of legislating 
for the future without giving due regard to the future needs and 
problems. There still remains the lack of any fully considered policy 
on broadcasting for Ireland and the indications are that the local 
radio legislation will fail to produce any debate on broadcasting 
policy. The EBC also proposed a ten year contract for broadcasters 
with a re-appraisal after the first seven years and a system of a 
"rolling-contract" every following year. A news service should be 
established to provide national and international news relays to the 
ten local radio stations and the subsequent twenty satellites, (hence 
the original number of thirty stations proposed by the government).
The licence for this news service should be linked to a Dublin station 
similar to the British ILR system in London. The EBC argue that no 
"pirate" be allowed a licence, that religious advertising be allowed, 
that excess profits be used not to support other stations but for 
community projects and that the owners and directors be allowed to 
express opinions on current affairs since many owners may also be 
broadcasters and disc jockies.
3.10.4 The reasoning of Robbie Robinson's arguments for commercial 
radio contrasts sharply with the more obvious arguments of the EBC.
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The EBC comment:
"Indeed we believe that the need to maintain 
revenue by the maintenance of high audience 
levels and the need also to gain a varied 
audience are two of the important motivating 
factors for the provision of good entertainment, 
news and education provided by the independent 
local radio stations."
EBC, "A Case for Independent Local Radio in
Ireland, 1978", presented to 
The Joint Oireachtas Committee 
on Legislation, Oct., 1983, p.22.
The veneer of public service broadcasting is spread very thinly
over this statement. Such attitudes call into question the motives
behind the commercial proposers. The phrases used are reminiscent of
the marketing talk of the larger British Independent Local Radio
stations. The EBC remain one of the less public but more obviously
commercial-minded proposals. Recalling the close similarity between
the early proposals made by the EBC and the early legislative
proposals made by various governments it is important not to dismiss
the blatant commercial attitude of the EBC but to compare it to the
more public but less obviously commercial-minded comments made by
Robbie Robinson:
"I don't like to labour too much on the
financial side, but that's the thing
that's going to make it work. If there's 
no money in the thing it will not work.
Without the cash, without the commercials,
without the popular music vehicle, none of
this community message, none of the community 
involvement, will have an opportunities - 
because it won't be there."
(Interview with the author, July 15, 1983.)
Robinson's arguments appear to make perfect sense. He seems to
be suggesting that the content of community radio can be best
provided by professionals with financial investment. This service 
will be arranged with the consent of the public through the market 
forces for nominal financial return for the investors. A simple 
commercial transaction with both the public and the investors mutually
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benefitting. Ironically the underlying point is made by the EBC which 
forms the crux of the opposing arguments of the community broadcasters:
"We venture to suggest that the single most 
important question which the Irish Minister 
for Posts and Telegraphs has to decide, is 
who should control broadcasting." (Italics added.)
EBC, "A Case for Independent Local Radio in Ireland,
1978", op.cit., p.4.
3.11 COMMUNITY PROPOSALS: The National Association for Community
Broadcasting, (NACB), submitted a report which received the support of 
a number of separate organisations which have indirect links with the 
NACB. The NACB report contains a description of the organisation, its 
aims and members. It is a relatively small but very precise 
document which captures the essence and potential of community 
radio. A summary is given of the charter and the structure of 
community stations, (outlined earlier), its advantages to the 
community and the function of the NACB organisation itself as 
a co-operative administration not a bureaucratic authority.
More interestingly, the report comments on the alternative to 
the "professional" mode of broadcasting. It argues that local 
radio can be seen as a medium for community self-expression 
and growth. The development of the station by being controlled 
"from the grassroots" and from the "bottom upwards" reflects 
the development of the community which it serves. This model 
of communication necessitates the democratic structure proposed 
by the NACB in its charter and insists on direct broadcasting 
by the community itself, not "mediated through a third person".
The aim of broadcasting undergoes a significant change; its aim 
becomes orientated towards social action; the "aftermath of the 
programme is its purpose." This radical approach to the purpose 
of broadcasting is better described by the Conradh na Gaeilge:
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"Development, in short, is a process 
through which people in community 
gain more control over their own 
1ives...Communication itself must 
become an integral part of the 
development process through which 
people gain more control over their 
own lives...A full role for broadcasting 
in the process of development can only 
be achieved if (a) the ownership, 
control and execution of broadcasting 
is democratic, (b) broadcasting 
encourages attitudes which are supportive 
of development."
"Proposals to the Joint Oireachtas Committee
for Legislation." pp.14-15.
The NACB also included a brief report on technical details emphasising
a preference for a number of small low-powered stations rather than
a few high-powered stations for areas of high population.
3.11.1 Supporting the NACB document is the submission by the 
Muintir na Tire organisation. Muintir na Tire is a voluntary 
community based group representing the major interests of the community 
and seeking the further development of the community. Quite often 
Muintir na Tire provide social services in co-operation with the 
local government bodies. It was founded in Tipperary and consequently 
has a strong presence in that area. Muintir na Tire give details 
of both the Tipperary and the Dublin community radio stations;
TCR AND Concord Community Radio. TCR was initially set up 
by the Tipperary group of Muintir na Tire. Among the aims of 
Muintir na Tire are, the increase in community social consciousness, 
the dissemination of community information and the facilitation 
of two-way communication in the community. To further these aims 
Muintir na Tire sought the advice of the NACB to establish a 
democratic community controlled radio station, and being satisfied 
with the NACB objectives, fully endorsed the NACB to speak on its 
behalf. Muintir na Tire is strong in its criticisms of those 
who propose a community service station while retaining financial
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"What value local community radio, if what 
a community may wish to say to itself is 
controlled, packaged, trivialised and 
ultimately minimised by an elite brokerage 
group whose first consideration may be 
financial."
Muintir na Tire, "Submission to the Oireachtas
Committee on Local Radio.", p.ix.
3.11.2 Another major supporter of the NACB is the Society of the 
Knights of Saint Columbanus. This society was founded on the religious 
principles of the Roman Catholic Church and is composed of lay members 
of that Church. Its purpose is to encourage the principles of the 
Church in the establishment of a Catholic society. The lengthy 
document submitted by it is composed of several reports, some 
concerning general aspects of broadcasting in Ireland. It offers 
its full support to the NACB approving especially the open access 
of the airwaves for the local community. A detailed report on 
the Kilkenny community radio, KCR, and its constitution is 
included, and this model is offered to the committee as an example 
of a community station which should be endorsed by the committee.
The Knights of Saint Columbanus further propose the establishment 
of a monitoring body to oversee the work of the Local Radio Authority. 
Members of the public, organisations and local radio stations would 
all have the right of appeal against any decision of the Authority 
with the monitoring body having the final ruling. The monitoring 
body would also undertake to research the effects of local 
community radio and to ensure the inclusion of cultural and 
linguistic programming by the local radio stations. What is 
proposed is the separation of the administrative and technical 
sections of the Authority from the monitoring role and the appeal 
body. By suggesting that both Authority and appeal body be
and editorial control;
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government appointed, the Knights of Saint Columbanus at once remove 
the opportunities for effectiveness such a scheme could offer. 
Naturally, the cost of two separate bodies each with its own personnel 
and directors would also disadvantage any such proposal. The idea 
of separating the monitoring and appeals sections from the Authority 
has its advantages but only if the control is removed from the 
government that appoints the Authority. Perhaps if the monitoring 
and appeals commission was made up from an elected representation 
from the station management, personnel, administrative authority 
and other cultural and interest groups, then the commission could 
be truly separate from both the Authority and the government while 
also being fully representative.
3.12 OTHER PROPOSALS: Supporting the desire for community
involvement but retaining the arguments for professionalism and 
private ownership are a number of proposers who may be loosely 
associated with the principles of the NACB yet do not wholly 
subscribe to the definition of community radio. Among these are 
some national organisations and some "pirate" stations who claim that 
the NACB merely impose yet another unnecessary control on its members, 
and that by remaining outside any such umbrella group, they are more 
independent than the NACB community stations.
3.12.1 In this latter group is a submission by Community Radio 
Wexford, a "pirate" station. Written mostly by Pierre van Osselaer, 
one of the major financiers, the report shows a lot of thought and 
preparation and illustrates how important an issue some individuals 
consider local radio. An amount of background reading and study is 
obvious from the information and detail given. Again there is a serious 
appeal to the committee for an overall communications and broadcasting 
policy and for legislation for all manner of possible community
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broadcasting. Van Osselaer hopes the final draft legislation 
"will be based on original thinking and inspired by national 
contingencies and relevant experience..." A detailed structure for 
the administration for a Communications Council is provided, with 
regional co-ordinators overseeing the local stations' content, 
equipment, staffing, frequencies and technical advice. The final 
Authority over the Communications Council would be responsible 
to the Minister and would be composed of representatives from 
socio-economic institutions, academic institutions, media industries 
and at least two foreign consultancies, (the necessity of foreign 
consultants on a permanent basis seems extreme). The Communications 
Council would be composed of representatives from the Authority, 
from the regional co-ordinators, station managers, An Bord Telecom, 
RTE and representatives from the personnel of the regional 
administration. (An Bord Telecom has responsibility for the advising 
on frequency allocation.) Each region would have a revenue fund with 
a regional commercial manager. Each station would contribute to the 
fund in relation to its income and each station would be allocated 
research tasks according to relevant knowledge and interests, thus 
encouraging expertise and educating the station personnel. Suggested 
content controls are given with minimum percentage limitations, 
including serials and dramas, educational and community programming, 
and Irish and foreign language and culture programmes. Minimum 
equipment standards are provided. Finally the structure of a 
station with its constitution is outlined. The structure proposed 
is similar to that of the NACB model. A community committee and 
a staff committee are democratically elected and both are 
represented on the programming committee. The directors retain 
the position of chairperson of the community committee whose
two-thirds majority decisions are binding. In return the directors 
agree to allocate 20% of the station profits to the community 
committee and to await the community committee's agreement on 
the disposal of shareholdings in access of 20%. The constitution 
is very similar to early drafts of the KCR's constitution in 
Kilkenny.
The major division between the Wexford station's proposals 
and those of the NACB is in emphasis; the Wexford group wish to 
acknowledge the right of the individual to finance and profit from 
a station, while the NACB argue that the community has the right 
to finance and profit from the use of their airwaves. The argument 
is whether the individual or the community should benefit. The 
"pirate" station confirms the belief in the free market economy 
and the individual's right to make and dispose of profit as 
individually chosen. The NACB state that the community good should 
come before any individual benefit and that the community should own 
and control what should be a community resource. What is behind the 
NACB proposals is a Marxist belief that the collective good outweighs 
the individual right to profit.
3.12.2 The national television and radio network, RTE, naturally 
has an interest in the allocation of control of local radio. RTE 
understandably feels annoyed that it made proposals for the 
provision of RTE local radio as early as 1976 before the large 
scale growth of "pirate" stations. The RTE proposals were for 
the establishment of stations that would be run by local committees 
with RTE providing technical and editorial advice: technical advice 
to provide for the installation and maintenance of RTE equipment 
and editorial advice to ensure compliance with broadcast 
legislation on matters of libel and adherence to balance,
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impartiality, objectivity and section 31 of the Broadcasting Act,
(on the interviewing of illegal organisations, the IRA, etc.).
RTE claim that their experience with the mobile local radio unit 
has been highly successful and has proved a genuine need for the 
type of service that, RTE believe, is not and will not be provided 
by independent commercial radio. The RTE document Radio Pobal na 
Tire outlines plans for a number of major stations in the large 
population centres in Ireland with smaller satellite stations with 
an "opt-out" facility, (again the original number was a total of 
thirty). The local community would be consulted on specialist 
programmes on local interests and a community committee would be 
elected as spokespersons. Ultimate control, as far as can be determined 
from the rather general descriptions given by RTE, would rest with the 
RTE Authority. Why appoint another bureaucratic administration, RTE 
asks, since the present RTE Authority could serve instead? RTE points 
to the loss in advertising revenue taken from it by the broadcasts 
of "pirate" stations. This revenue has to be replaced by the government 
from the taxpayers. If RTE were allowed to set up local radio 
stations it would reduce the money needed from the taxpayers. RTE 
speaks of being the quiet patient sufferer in the long-standing 
"pirate" situation. Arguments in favour of the public service 
principal are also put forward. RTE claims that, as a public 
service institution, it can have no other interests than those of 
the public in mind in establishing a local radio service. (The 
same argument could be used in favour of community radio.)
RTE has been accused of merely wishing to provide "jobs for the 
boys"; RTE Trade Union Group freely admits to trying to maintain 
job levels, and uses this as an argument in favour of its 
proposals. RTE points to the broadcasting facilities and studios
which it has in most of the major population centres in Ireland.
Little extra expense will be needed to establish an RTE local 
radio service, it argues. RTE has been waiting since 1978 for 
permission to carry out its local radio plans while "pirate" 
stations have been allowed to broadcast relatively unhindered 
and have been taking advertising revenue which might otherwise 
have gone to RTE. A perfectly justifiable attitude. RTE readily 
agrees that the type of material broadcast during the community 
week of its mobile local radio unit could not be sustained to 
provide an indefinite service, but that it could provide the 
framework for a service. Supplementary content from the national 
and regional service could help increase broadcast hours. RTE 
local radio sounds like a patchwork of Cork local radio content 
coupled with the best and worst of RTE Radio 1 and 2 and some 
local request and phone-in programmes. The exact function and power 
of the community committees which RTE says will "run the station" 
remains unclear.
The proposals made by the RTE Trade Union Group are much 
more concise. Stephen Cass is the spokesperson for this union group 
which represents all the unions involved in RTE. The document is large, 
detailed, well written and receives the support of the ICTU,
(Irish Congress of Trade Unions). First the Group point out that 
in a number of years, local radio will have to compete with "direct 
broadcasting", (DBS), via satellite from other European and even 
world countries. The Group fear that DBS will give rise to sound-only 
channels and will lead eventually to "narrow-casting" - specialist 
radio stations broadcasting one type of music, or news-only stations. 
With such a level of outside competition could local radio survive, - 
could the national RTE network survive? The Group admit that in such 
a situation a community owned and controlled station would probably
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have the best chance of survival. It would be supported by the 
community involved. The Group state that programme content "should be 
the determining factor in the structure, control and physical resources 
of these stations" and that content should only be determined by the 
local community who will be the listeners of the station. In this 
aspect the RTE Trade Union Group support the NACB and indeed 
have quite a friendly relationship with them exchanging ideas 
and opinions. The Union Group propose a community-type station 
that differs from the RTE administration's proposals. Their 
suggestions are more explicit, and they openly criticise some 
foreign forms of local radio. Britain and America, they state, 
provide useful guidelines, "showing how not to structure a 
Local Community Radio Service". What the RTE Trade Union 
Group suggest is that the RTE authorities provide the technical 
facilities and resources but, unlike the RTE authorities, that 
the local community retain all other control. They point out 
that this system would be less expensive and would standardise 
the equipment used by all stations. Programme exchange and the 
opt-out system is also referred to, and it is suggested that all 
professional staff should receive union wage rates. The aim of the 
Union Group, and in this it is supported by the ICTU, is twofold: 
to protect the present union jobs in RTE and to promote the 
"most efficient" local radio service that is possible for the country. 
Both the RTE administration and the RTE Trade Union Group are emphatic 
in asserting that:
"RTE does not, repeat not, seek monopoly control 
of local radio in Ireland, but rather control 
by the community of local radio as being confined 
to existing broad statutory supervision of the 
County Community Services to ensure compliance 
with the Broadcasting Acts, and to provide the 
transmission and technical facilities necessary 
to achieve optimum coverage at minimum cost in 
each service area."
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RTE Trade Union Group, "Submission to the Oireachtas
Committee on Local Radio",
Oct. 1983, Appendix 2, n.p.
The Union Group would support the NACB community structural
organisation but would like assurances that professional journalists
(NUJ), would be hired to insure adherence to the legal restrictions
on current affairs and news broadcasts, and also that RTE technicians
control all technical affairs.
By wishing to maintain these controls the NACB and RTE 
remain in disagreement. The NACB point out that the present "pirate" 
stations in existence have proved that there are individuals outside 
RTE with sufficient technical expertise to establish and service 
local radio stations and that the cost of equipment has not been 
prohibitive to the "pirates". The NACB itself has four "pirate" 
community station members and has published detailed documentation 
on frequency plans and station equipment which would be perfectly 
feasible. (Technical proposals for local radio are considered in 
chapter four.) By seeking to obtain technical control RTE would be 
establishing a technical elite and thereby continuing a level of 
dominance over the public and the community. RTE may be justified in 
trying to maintain current job numbers, but not at the expense of the 
community's right to control a public resource.
3.12.3 One of the first national interest groups to involve 
itself in local radio was the Irish language and culture group, 
Gael-Linn. In 1981 Gael-Linn commissioned two British journalists 
with personal interests in local radio to report on the possibilities 
for local radio in Ireland. The resulting document remains one 
of the more interesting pieces submitted to the Oireachtas Committee, 
and one which has never received the media attention which it 
richly deserves. Blanchard and Coe, the two journalists, list a
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number of points to be considered and outline some factors which 
any proposed legislation should take into account. Four brief 
points should be remembered by the legislators:
1. that local radio will most likely be funded by advertising;
2. that it will be expected to act as a public service, (to a varying 
degree);
3. that there are two distinct options for local radio - community 
stations and commercial stations;
4. that Ireland's population trend is over half the total population 
being under twenty-five years old.
Blanchard and Coe provide a detailed criticism of the Fianna Fail 
Bill, published in 1981, which was based on the British local 
radio legislation, (see 3.13.3). The report stresses the importance 
of public discussion and debate on the local radio issues and also 
on broadcasting policies in general. This debate should present 
all the options available to the country and give examples of 
local radio systems in other countries. The realistic feasibility 
of each suggestion should be carefully weighed and its likely 
consequences for the community should be outlined. A national 
frequency plan should be drawn up networking the whole country 
and should attempt to define what is meant by "local" radio - 
the service area and radius of the station. The importance of 
this plan is that it decides the number and possible location 
of stations as well as their service area. Thus the frequency 
plan should involve the widest possible discussion. The report 
proposes the establishment of three major institutions: the 
Local Radio Authority, the Irish Radio Institute and the Local 
Radio Workshops. The Authority is similar to that proposed by 
the government but Blanchard and Coe speak of the need for an 
appeals procedure. The Irish Radio Institute will be a national
body involving RTE, the local radio stations and any others 
interested in researching the effects of radio, providing a 
sound archive and library, a general information service, and 
the development of educational and cultural radio programming.
This Institute would provide a discussion ground for Irish radio, 
helping to broaden the consciousness of radio broadcasters. The
Institute would also be responsible for the establishment of the 
Local Radio Workshops. These Workshops would be a series of public 
sessions teaching the basic principals of radio broadcasting with 
the aim of teaching the public to "do it for themselves". The 
Workshops should provide the public with a better understanding 
of their local station and should encourage participation. Also 
it would provide a forum for discussion of the local radio service. 
The cost of these bodies would be offset by the rental charges 
of the local radio transmitters, which, the report states, should 
be owned by the Authority.
Unfortunately, however much these institutions and 
workshops may be needed, it is unlikely that they could be afforded 
in the bureaucratic sense outlined by Blanchard and Coe. Gael-Linn 
are also concerned with the propagation of the Irish language and 
are eager that local radio encourage the use of Irish. This has 
always been a requirement written into any proposed legislation, but 
many language' and cultural groups consider the wording used in these 
requirements to be far too lax. With their experience of the use 
of the Welsh minority language in Britain, Blanchard and Coe agree 
that the protections written into any legislation to date have been 
far too weak to be effective. Most Irish language and cultural 
groups would argue that broadcasters should be forced to use a 
certain percentage of Irish and should be penalised in some way
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if they do not adhere to the minimum requirements. The Gael-Linn
report suggests that a "code of linguistic practice" be drawn up
with Bord na Gaeilge, (the Irish Language Board), acting as 
a monitor. Failure to comply with these regulations would lead 
to revocation of licence after a number of warnings. The report 
favours the establishment of community stations only insofar as they 
seem to offer the best protection for Irish language and cultural 
values. Blanchard and Coe summarise their warning to the government;
"Vie cannot stress too strongly that if resources 
are not found to give institutional life and
staying power to substantially enhance public
debate and practical involvement with radio as 
a medium, then any hopes that the projected 
local radio system will operate as a genuine 
public service and in a culturally innovative 
way are bound to be disappointed."
Blanchard & Coe, "An Outline for the Development
of Local Radio in Ireland."
Dublin: Gael Linn, 1982, p.7.
3.12.4 The role of the provincial press in local radio in Ireland 
is a contentious issue which has given rise to some heated 
accusations on both sides, from members of the press itself and 
also from those involved with "pirates" or interested in the media. 
Those seeking an "independent" form of local radio claim that 
the provincial press have already gained control of one media 
system and should not be allowed to diversify into yet another.
The monopoly of ownership, it is claimed, will cause a distortion
in news content and will lead to the dominance of a media elite.
The owners of the provincial press argue in turn that local radio 
will threaten their advertising revenue which they depend on for 
their income. In return for this loss of income the provincial 
press declare they have a right to a minimum shareholding in a 
local radio station. Also, the provincial press have an established 
news gathering network of local journalists and "stringers",
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which would be unnecessarily duplicated by any new local radio 
news team. Competition between the provincial press and local 
radio, argue the press, will only lead to the eventual loss 
of either local radio or the provincial press, or both. 
Alternatively, it is argued that competition can only benefit 
the content of both the press and local radio, and that the two 
media should be seen as complementary and not as alternatives to 
the advertisers, as has been the case in Britain.
The effect local radio will have on the provincial 
press is uncertain and parallels cannot be drawn with the British 
situation where the provincial press are often owned by larger 
media conglomerates and where the "local" area served may contain 
well over 100,000 potential readers and advertisers with large 
budgets. The provincial press in Ireland do not depend on national 
advertisers for their primary advertising income but, instead on 
local businesses, hotels and small advertisers, with "local" meaning 
a potential readership of only approximately 20,000. For many of 
these advertisers it may well involve a choice between the local 
newspaper or the local radio. In order to preserve journalists' jobs 
it could perhaps be agreed that local journalists co-operate and 
provide news for both the local radio and newspaper. Such an 
arrangement could satisfy the demands for NUJ, (National Union of 
Journalists), staffing and wage levels. However working agreements 
and a great deal of co-operation would have to exist between the 
local radio station and the provincial paper: this level of 
co-operation does not exist presently with the "pirate" stations. 
Past legislation has recognised the provincial press's right to a 
quarter share in any local radio station. The Provincial Newspaper 
Association of Ireland in its recommendations to the Oireachtas 
Committee suggested increasing this 25% shareholding to "not less
than 49%" - an extreme demand. Two other representatives from the 
provincial press, (the Leinster Leader and the Clare Champion, 
Limerick Leader and Nenagh Guardian amalgamation), stated their 
satisfaction with the 25% shareholding.
There are a number of concerns in allowing an interest group 
an immediate share in the ownership of a local station. The only 
group with an immediate recognisable right to ownership is 
primarily the local listeners themselves and each should be allowed 
equal right to ownership with no majority controlling ownership.
A 25% ownership, (not to speak of the suggested 49% ownership), 
gives a possible controlling advantage over other shareholders.
The ownership patterns among the provincial press newspapers 
shows the spreading monopoly of ownership, especially by one 
particular group, the Independent Newspapers group. This one 
company owns Ireland's most popular national daily newspaper, 
evening newspaper, two Sunday newspapers and up to seven of the 
provincial papers. In addition it owns several printing and 
newspaper marketing companies, some investment holdings and two 
magazines. It also has similar media companies in Britain,
Germany, France, Australia, Canada, Mexico, Liberia and America, 
(where it owns two radio stations), and speaks of "indirect 
shareholding in Reuters". (Extel Statistical Services Ltd., 1984.)
A 25% immediate shareholding for provincial newspapers in such 
monopolistic conditions may well give rise to concern. If each 
of the provincial newspapers owned by the Independent were allowed 
25% ownership in their local radio station, the Independent would 
have access to the ownership of up to seven possible stations. 
Admittedly the Independent group is one of the country's largest 
conglomerates, but it does illustrate how indirect ownership can
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lead to a monopoly situation.
3.13 EARLY LEGISLATION: In 1978 RTE were involved in public
discussions on the establishment of a second national television 
channel. The discussion centred on what content RTE should broadcast 
on this new channel; there was no serious question that the channel 
be given to some group other than RTE. At this time RTE requested 
that it be given government permission to develop a local radio 
service for the country following the success of its Community 
Radio Project, that is the provision of a local radio service for 
one week in a given locality using an outside broadcast van. Plans 
for such a service were being considered by RTE and proposals 
for a small Dublin based station were well advanced. At this 
time there were few "pirate" stations, mostly Dublin based.
Instead when RTE was given the second national television channel 
it was also announced that the government intended to introduce 
"independent" local radio. By 1979 a Broadcasting Wireless Telegraphy 
Bill was introduced by the then Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, 
Albert Reynolds. This Bill was to end the "pirate" broadcasting.
It was withdrawn to await the establishment of the independent 
local radio. The Independent Local Radio Bill was prepared by 
Albert Reynolds in 1981 but the defeat of the Fianna Fail 
government prevented its passage. This lost opportunity was 
responsible for the present chaotic "pirate" situation where 
approximately ninety stations are broadcasting on unassigned 
frequencies outside the law. Although declared "illegal", these 
stations are not directly breaking the law since there has been 
no law covering local radio or television broadcasting. The 
Broadcasting Act covering RTE1s right to broadcast merely states 
that anyone wishing to broadcast must apply to the Minister
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for Posts and Telegraphs for a licence. However the Minister 
cannot grant any licence until legislation is passed stating the 
conditions for such licences. In the absence of this legislation 
the "pirates" claim they are not breaking any law and are merely 
exercising their constitutional right to freedom of expression; 
a freedom which they believe is hindered by the press and RTE1s 
monopolistic control over the media. An energetic spokesperson 
in defence of this argument is Fr. Jerry Joyce, who has broadcast 
for KCR in Kilkenny;
"Community radio is about allowing people to 
take their place...KCR is of the people and 
by the people. Now that's very different in our 
book from professionals doing it on our behalf.
So the professionals as we see them are modelled 
on voluntary organisations and not the existing 
media...If we have a professional, the professional's 
task is not to broadcast but to assist me, Joe Soap, 
to go broadcast. Anything else is censorship by 
professional elitism."
(Interview with the author, March 24, 1983.)
Following the defeat of the 1981 Fianna Fail government a 
coalition government was elected and the new Minister for Posts and 
Telegraphs, Mr. Cooney, withdrew both Bills. He undergave an 
obligation to introduce a system of local radio with "genuine 
community involvement". In March 1982 RTE published its proposals 
for RTE community radio. Radio Pobal na Tire and asked that the 
government reconsider RTE's position in relation to local radio.
The coalition was defeated in turn and a Fianna Fail government was 
re-elected. The Fianna Fail Minister, Mr. Wilson, promised 
legislation but had done nothing when the 23rd Dail was defeated.
The present coalition government appointed a Junior Minister for 
Communications, Ted Nealon, to act under the Minister for 
Communications, Jim Mitchell. The Oireachtas Committee on 
Legislation was given the task of preparing a new Bill taking 
into consideration the headings published by the government. These
headings form the only guidelines on what, if any, legislation 
may be forthcoming. The present government took action against the 
"pirates" in May of 1983, when two of the major Dublin stations 
were closed by Department of Communications officials, and a number 
of other stations closed voluntarily. However the Dublin stations 
quickly reopened, though in reduced numbers.
3.13.1 Any legislation for local radio will form two parts. One 
Bill will forbid the broadcast of material by anyone other than those 
licenced by the Minister on behalf of the government. It will also 
apply sanctions to those broadcasting illegally, both broadcasters 
and advertisers. A second Bill will detail the local radio system: 
ownership restrictions, content rulings and the composition and 
functions of the Authority. The existing legislation concerned with 
broadcasting is the Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1926, amended in 1972, 
and the Broadcasting Authority Act, 1960, amended in 1976. This 
latter legislation details the provisions for the RTE licence and 
is therefore concerned mainly with television broadcasting. It also 
gives the duties of the RTE Authority. However the former piece 
of legislation is the only present protection the state has against 
"pirate" broadcasters. This legislation was first written in 1926 
and marked the introduction of radio to Ireland, (see 3.1). In 1972 
it was updated to increase fines and to include television 
transactions. The purpose of the Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1972 is 
summarised as enabling the Minister of Communications:
"to prohibit the manufacture or importation of 
certain apparatus for wireless telegraphy and 
to make certain declarations in relation to 
the issue of licences for apparatus for wireless 
telegraphy,..."
The Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1972, Dublin:
Dublin: G.P.S.O., No.5 of 1972.
The Act requires that persons with wireless equipment capable of
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transmitting a frequency specified by the Minister should notify 
the Posts and Telegraphs Department with information concerning 
the equipment, its location and the name and address of the owner.
The Minister is given the power to restrict the sale, manufacture 
and importation of wireless equipment, "for the purpose of 
preventing or reducing the risk of interference with wireless 
telegraphy". In order to avoid "undue interference" the Minister 
may arrange and alter allocations of the radio frequency spectrum 
for particular types of broadcast and users will be issued with 
licences stating these conditions and restrictions. Infringement 
of licence conditions by the user or by any persons without a 
licence will result in prosecution and a fine of twenty-five pounds 
for a first offence.For subsequent offences a fine "not exceeding 
one hundred pounds" and the confiscation of all equipment. Any 
person using, installing or providing premises for any such illegal 
equipment, or assisting in the illegal use of equipment will also 
be subject to prosecution and a fine.
3.13.2 Even in 1972 a hundred pound fine was not excessive and 
certainly today it is considered an ineffective deterrent. The Act was 
first used in 1975 against Eamon Cooke the owner of Radio Dublin, 
one of the first "pirate" stations to start broadcasting. The case was 
dismissed on the grounds that the wireless transmitter could be used 
for purposes other than the transmissions of radio broadcasts. This 
court ruling tended to undermine the effectiveness of the Act and as 
a result it has been rarely used. Potentially the Act would 
allow the Minister for Communications to prevent the "pirates" 
from obtaining their equipment, whether imported or made in this 
country. The Act was used again in May 1983 to authorise "raids" 
on the premises of the two largest Dublin based "pirate" stations,
Radio Nova and Radio Sunshine. On this occasion the court 
upheld the government's case and ruled against the stations which 
were fined and lost their equipment to the courts.
The case provoked much argument on whether the "pirates" 
were actually causing interference with European radio signals and 
emergency and defence services in this country. In the Dail the 
official reply was that interference was caused to Dublin, Meath and 
Louth ambulance services, to Dublin Airport and the defence forces. 
Television and national radio reception was also claimed to have 
suffered as a result of "pirate" broadcasts. However if the results 
were as serious as the government claimed, then the government was 
responsible for not having acted sooner, and also for having failed 
in the action it did take. The "pirates" were broadcasting again in 
a matter of days after having been prosecuted, and although some 
stations voluntarily closed in fear of further government action, 
they soon reopened once it was obvious the government had felt its 
duty done. If the "pirates" were causing the interference claimed 
then the government would have been forced to take further action.
Why exactly the government did act at that time is a matter for 
speculation. Perhaps there was some request made by the European 
Broadcasting Union. Perhaps rumours of extension plans by Radio Nova's 
owner Chris Carey forced the government to demonstrate its power.
The lack of any clear reasoning behind the "May-raids" served to 
increase the government's authority and remained a cautionary warning 
to the "pirates", who were well behaved until Nova's phone-in 
competition in October 1984, when the Dublin switchboards were 
jammed with phone callers answering the Radio Nova competition.
The switchboard at the station's offices was unable to cope with 
the number of phone calls and overflowed causing a large section
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of Dublin city phones to jam. The resulting chaos took an hour to 
return to normal.
Certainly continual use of the 1972 legislation could 
severly curb the activities of the "pirate1 broadcasters. It 
would however require the time and manpower of the Department of 
Communications officials, as well as involving court action; it 
would also cause an amount of public sympathy for the "pirates".
If the legislation had been used in the mid and late 1970s the 
"pirate" stations would not have gained the hold they now have 
over the public and government alike. Threats to close down the 
"pirates" in May 1983 caused such a public outcry that the government 
promised that the stations would not be closed until the new legal 
system was fully prepared. Thus it has been long accepted that the 
introduction of legislation completely banning "pirate" broadcasting 
would await the introduction of legislation containing the conditions 
for legal local radio.
3.13.3 The Broadcasting and Wireless Telegraphy Bill, 1979
was a tight concise piece of legislation prohibiting the broadcast 
of any type of material without a licence. In the words of the 
Bill itself:
"It makes it an offence for anyone to provide 
accommodation, equipment or programme material 
for unlicenced broadcasts, or to advertise by 
means of, or take part in, such broadcasts."
Broadcasting and Wireless Telegraphy Bill, 1979,
Dublin: G.P.S.O., No.12 of 1979.
This Bill is likely to become law with the introduction of local
radio. Prepared in 1979, it was shelved with the collapse of the
then Fianna Fail government. It is based on the British legislation
which ended the British "pirate" broadcasting problem in the early
1970s. It effectively prohibits the provision or leasing of
premises in the knowledge that the premises will be used for
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"pirate" broadcasting. Those providing equipment in the knowledge 
that it will be used for "pirate" broadcasting; those advertising 
with "pirate" broadcasters; those taking part solely or in an 
interview or providing music for a "pirate" broadcast; those 
producing or directing a programme for "pirate" broadcast or 
providing a pre-recorded programme for "pirate" broadcast; those 
employed in any capacity by a "pirate" broadcaster may all be 
prosecuted under the provisions of the Bill. The possible sanction 
imposed by the Bill is a maximum fine of $10,000 and the 
confiscation of the equipment. Summary convictions and the impeding 
of an Officer licenced by the Court in the execution of duties 
carries a maximum fine of $300. Prison sentences, either accompanying 
or instead of a fine, range from a maximum period of two years on 
conviction to three months on summary conviction. The Bill, it has 
been generally agreed, would be a successful deterrent against "pirate" 
broadcasting, and it avoids the clause in the 1972 legislation which 
made convictions difficult. The 1979 Bill gives a clear definition 
of broadcasting which not only covers radio but also television and 
possibly other forms of telecommunications, satellite broadcasting;
" 'broadcast' means a broadcast by wireless 
telegraphy of communications, sounds, signs, 
visual images or signals, whether such 
communications, sounds, signs, visual images 
or signals are actually received or not..."
Broadcasting and Wireless Telegraphy Bill, 1979,
ibid., Sect.l, para.20, p.2.
In 1981 Reynolds introduced the Independent Local Radio 
Authority Bill, 1981 which has remained the manifestation of 
Fianna Fail's policy on local radio with only a slight amendment 
made later by Terry Leyden in the form of the Independent Local 
Broadcasting Authority Bill, 1983. In his dismissal of Leyden's 
attempt to reintroduce this Fianna Fail Bill, fir. Mitchell described
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it as "legislation by tippex!" Mr. Leyden in turn spoke of the 
government being "inert and either incapable or unwilling to respond 
to the crisis situation that has arisen in broadcasting". That 
Fianna Fail itself had not responded while previously in government 
was a point Mr. Leyden did not recognise. Fianna Fail introduced 
this latter Bill in response to the "May-raids" in 1983, and claimed 
that with its passage, local radio stations could be operational by 
the end of the following month. This claim inadvertently explains 
the simple purpose of the Fianna Fail policy on local radio - to 
merely licence the better "pirate" stations and to allow for the 
development of commercial local radio. The Fianna Fail Bill closely 
resembles its British counterpart with whole sections being modelled 
on the British wording. Yet there are parts of the Bill which will 
certainly set the precedent for any new piece of legislation by 
the government.
The government-appointed Authority will number between 
eight and twelve members, who may be dismissed by the government 
at any time. Members of the Dail, Seanad or the EEC Assembly will 
not be eligible for membership, and any member with an interest 
in a company bidding for a licence will be obliged to declare 
that interest, and refrain from any decision regarding that 
particular licence. In considering an application for licence 
the Authority is to take into account:
1. the views of the community in establishing that there is a 
"genuine demand" for local radio,
2. "the quality and range" of the proposed programming, including 
programming in the Irish language and relating to Irish culture,
3. "the expertise and resources" available to the proposers,
4. "the extent to which each proposer is based in or associated 
with the local community",
5. "the extent to which employment will be created",
6. "the existing involvement... in local broadcasting".
(Sect.22, paras.5-25, p.14.)
These conditions are likely to apply to any forthcoming legislation.
The British system of local public meetings is endorsed and the 
article for the protection for the Irish language and culture will 
probably become mere lip-service for most commercial broadcasters. 
Section 18 details the major considerations the Authority should apply 
in the licencing of the contractor, (a term borrowed from British 
legislation):
1. that "high standards" be maintained,
2. that "the varied interests and concerns of the whole community" 
be provided for,
3. that "due regard" be given to the "Irish cultural traditions",
4. that the service "offer a broad range of news, information
and entertainment consistent with the local character of the services",
5. that "Irish produced, recorded, published and performed material" 
be utilised "to the greatest possible extent",
6. that programming from the various stations does not "consist of 
identical or similar material to such an extent as would be 
inconsistent with the character of the services as local broadcasting". 
(Sect.18, paras.20-30, p.9.)
A Broadcasting Complaints Commission is to be established under the 
Fianna Fail Bill covering mainly complaints on the impartiality and 
objectivity of programmes broadcast by established stations. It 
notably does not allow for complaints either against a station 
or against the Authority with regard to failure in the fulfillment 
of the conditions of either the two above sections.
Despite the fact that these sections will set the precedent
102
for future legislation, it is obvious that the enforcement of these 
considerations depends solely on the inclinations of the Authority.
The terms are quite vague and indeterminate and it is most likely 
that they will be loosely applied by the Authority. Similarly in 
British legislation the responsibility for enforcement lies with 
the Independent Broadcasting Authority for the control of the 
commercial stations. The following chapter describes the British 
system which offers a suggestion on how the Irish commercial 
local radio will develop, the role the Authority will play in 
response to their responsibilities, and the effect that lack of 
public accountability has on an Authority. The British result 
is quite discouraging and holds little comfort for community 
radio supporters.
3.14 PARTY POLICIES: Party policies on local radio vary according
to public opinion and political convenience, swaying from the desire 
to "directly encourage public participation and community involvement" 
to a more general approach emphasising the "financial viability" of 
the "independent contractors". The Fianna Fail policy on local radio 
has never been clearly enunciated but can be discerned from their 
previous Bills. An emphasis is placed on the introduction of 
commercial local radio with consideration to community interests; 
the Irish language and culture; the prohibition of controlling 
interests by provincial papers, record manufacturers, distributors 
or other media promoters. The Fianna Fail Bills first included the 
clause on the "financial viability" of potential stations, implying 
that proposed local radio stations should have secure funding 
before applying for a licence. This clause makes it difficult for 
community co-operatives to compete with commercial contractors.
RTE received little sympathy from Fianna Fail being allowed, however,
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3.14.1 The major policy of interest, and likely to become quite 
controversial, is the coalition policy between Fine Gael and Labour. 
Fine Gael published a document entitled, "Fine Gael Policy on Local 
Broadcasting" which, though now superceded by Ministerial statements, 
remained their sole publication until 1982, when headings for 
proposed legislation were announced by Ted Nealon. The document 
describes conflicting opinions voiced at the 1978 Ard Fheis,
(Annual Conference), between the majority opinion favouring an 
"Independent Broadcasting Authority" and a "substantial body of 
opinion, principally reflecting the rural viewpoint" which were 
concerned with the coverage of uncommercial sparsely populated 
regions. This latter group obviously succeeded in gaining the 
Fine Gael support for the minority shareholding for RTE and the 
clear-cut statement that "local radio should be genuinely local in 
character - as far as possible owned, organised and run on a local 
community basis". This represents a commitment by Fine Gael to 
community radio, but of course, without clearly defining what 
exactly is meant by "community radio". However, with continual 
pressure by the community radio interest groups this statement, 
together with Labour's insistence, could lead to coalition 
legislation for a limited community radio system. This Fine Gael 
document unfortunately still retains the proviso that local 
contractors "must have adequate finance". A suggestion was made 
for "twinning" stations but more recent announcements by the 
Minister Jim Mitchell, have replaced this idea with a "two-tiered" 
structure of regional commercial stations and smaller community 
stations owned and operated by community co-operatives. However, 
even in the 1978/9 policy document Fine Gael had stated that,
a mandatory shareholding in each station of 25%.
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"preference should be given to non-profit-making trusts based 
in an area, e.g., widely based community co-operative organisations 
especially established for this purpose", (n.p., n.d., Dublin: Dorset 
Press, Ltd. Available from Fine Gael Press and Information Services.)
It is a matter of speculation to what extent Fine Gael 
policy has been influenced by its Labour Party coalition partners. 
Certainly Fine Gael's usual favour for the private sector has been 
substantially curbed. However, the present proposal for a "two-tiered" 
structure may merely represent the best commercial possibility for 
profit for the regional stations, with the assurance of a service of 
some kind for the uncommercial low population areas, whilst at the same 
time seeming to allow for community radio. The commercial interests 
will be satisfied with regional radio since this gives the best 
opportunity for private profit. The community stations will also be 
facilitated but will present no commercial threat since they will be 
restricted to smaller areas and will be non-profit-making. Local 
radio will, therefore, be provided in uneconomic areas at no cost 
to the government. The content of community radio will be sufficiently 
restricted by legislation and the market forces, (since they will 
be allowed advertising), to remove any potential threat to the status 
quo that may arise from the community co-operative structure demanding 
greater control and self-determination.
3.14.2 In April 1984 the Labour Party published, "Labour Party 
Policy Position on Community Radio" replacing its earlier document 
on local radio. The position as outlined in this latest document 
seems likely to prove to be a stumbling-block to the Fine Gael 
and Labour coalitin relationship on the local radio issue. This 
issue is not considered important enough to seriously threaten 
government but may be the cause of some embarrassment if Labour
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stand firm on their position. The Labour policy as stated in 1984 
closely resembles the policy of the RTE Trade Union Group whose 
spokesperson is Stephen Cass. The Labour document pledges 
"support for those seeking the introduction of genuine democratically 
controlled local community radio". However, it continues:
"The best mechanism to achieve this,..., is for RTE to make 
available transmitters and studio facilities to local community 
interests who will decide on programme content within guidelines 
laid down by the new Authority", (n.p., n.d. Available from the 
Labour Party Press Office.) The new Authority would "concern 
itself with broadcasting standards" whilst RTE would maintain 
control of transmitters and the allocation of frequencies. The 
policy recognises a Local Board of Management for each station 
with mandatory youth representation. The NACB proposed structure 
is supported and the NACB "pirate stations" are seen as a possible 
model. A statement from the NACB proposal to the Oireachtas Committee 
is quoted and emphasised: "There are grave doubts that local 
commercial radio could ever reconcile its essential commercialism 
with real commercial broadcasting." The distinction made by the 
Labour Party is in terms of structure only: no mention is made of 
the potential differences in content and community development.
The document does make the enlightened prophecy that, "The entry 
of private commercial interests into local broadcasting would... 
create a precedent for a similar approach to television broadcasting." 
The most critical statement in the Labour policy document in regard 
to the coalition's proposed legislation states, "Vie do not see the 
proposals put forward by the Minister of State as representing the 
optimum model for community local radio." This relates to the outlines 
made by Ted Nealon which resembled the Fianna Fail Bill and which 
have since been superceded by Jim Mitchell's "two-tiered" model.
It remains to be seen whether the Labour Party as a whole will 
accept the coalition compromise which does not allow for the RTE 
involvement which the document clearly desired. The relationship 
between Fine Gael and Labour will force a compromise between 
community radio in some form, and commercial local radio which will 
form a basis for the eventual legislation.
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CHAPTER IV
In the introductory chapter it was argued that Ireland 
lacked any "radical alternative" to the dominant social and political 
structures. Similarly there is a lack of suggestions for a radically 
alternative system of local radio for the country. It was questioned 
whether community radio represents such a "radical alternative" to 
the commercial models for local radio, or whether it merely 
represents an accepted, tolerated alternative since it actually 
fails to radically oppose the dominant commercial values while 
seeming to offer a choice of alternative radio. In the examination 
of the Irish political context and the major proposals to the 
Joint Oireachtas Committee that considered legislation for local 
radio, it became obvious that the local radio debate will be 
solved by political expediency, as the forerunner of RTE was formed 
in 1926, and not by any serious in-depth investigation of the 
issues involved in local radio. It is therefore seen that local 
radio is but one example of centralised control in Ireland, control 
that depends not on overt intervention but on the unquestioned 
assumptions and operational framework of the country.
In this chapter possible alternatives from other countries 
will be outlined in regard to their suitability and adaptability to 
Ireland. In particular local radio in Britain will be critically 
examined since it is on the British model that Irish legislation 
has largely focused. However, the more imaginative systems from 
other countries will be described in the hope that a progressive 
system of local radio does exist which offers a challenge to the 
dominant ideology in which it operates. Any model of local radio 
depends on the technical control of the frequencies available to
"ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS OF CONTROL."
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it, and so a concise guideline for an understanding of frequency 
limitations will be offered with reference to Ireland's 
particular problems in this area. This necessary information 
together with the knowledge of foreign local radio systems 
should assist in the preparation of practical recommendations 
for local radio in Ireland which will make up the final chapter.
4.1 THE BRITISH MODEL: The British duopoly ultimately
depends on governmental control through the Home Office. Both 
the BBC and the IBA operate a local radio system which caters 
for the major population centres throughout Britain and Northern 
Ireland. The IBA commercial system is the Independent Local Radio, 
(ILR), and tends to emphasise the commercial marketing necessary 
for a successful station whilst, simultaneously, maintaining a 
public profile of consumer services and community involvement.
This double-sided nature of the ILR system is evident in the 
IBA annual review, The Television and Radio Guide. The section on 
local radio highlights the professionalism of the service and its 
financial success as well as listing its consumer services and 
instances of community involvement and special announcements.
No contradiction is seen between the two sides of the ILR and 
this description is the norm for each station. In contrast the 
BBC local radio stations are portrayed in the annual BBC Review 
as being primarily a public service but the BBC hurriedly assure 
the public that its local radio service is extensive in its 
subject and geographical coverage and that it has a high 
listenership competitive with that of the ILR. Similarly though, 
the BBC describes a service that provides for community 
involvement and broadcasts community information using music 
as a medium for these other services:
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"Local news and information is the bread and 
batter of every station, bat each of them 
broadcasts a wide range of other programmes: 
features about local music and the arts, 
discussions about local issues, programmes 
for schools, religious programmes including 
local services, programmes for the blind, 
for old people, for immigrants, for local 
shoppers, programmes on local sports and 
hobbies."
BBC, Broadcasting in the Seventies,
London: BBC, 1969, p.6.
The IBA description hardly differs:
"Mixing local and national news and sports, 
a wide range of popular and specialist 
music, information and features, 
advertisements and entertainment, each 
station provides stimulus, companionship, 
knowledge and public service."
IBA, Television and Radio 1979,
London: IBA, 1978, p.135.
The IBA Guide makes attractive reading describing a lively 
service with exciting programming, interesting discussions, plenty 
of local information on a vast range of interests; a caring staff 
to provide additional 24-hour phone-in services on jobs, youth 
information, general consumer advice and news and traffic. The 
sponsorship activities of many stations in local drama, music 
and arts bodies are referred to and examples of stations providing 
vital information and assistance during snow and flood emergencies 
are outlined. The overall picture given of the ILR by the IBA is 
predictably positive. No hint of criticism is tolerated and no 
suggestions for improvements are made. The Television and Radio Guide, 
from which all public information on the ILR is derived, cannot 
be taken as a valid reference but is purely an exercise in 
public relations. The annual BBC handbook is not such an extreme 
example of public relations but contents itself instead with the 
phrases, "public service broadcasting", "providing local news and 
information services", "allowing for greater public participation"
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and "meeting the needs of the community". Similar generalisations
are often used by RTE. The content of the BBC local stations
hardly differs from their commercial counterpart and the criticisms 
of them hardly differ either as this warning by Anthony Wright on 
the authenticity of BBC and IBA statements demonstrates:
"In general, though, the evidence reported 
here suggests the need to treat with 
caution some of the official claims made 
for the performance of the ILR stations
and BBC stations in the field of public
affairs broadcasting ... For example, 
some of the claims made for the BBC 
stations by Michael Barton, "BBC in the 
Community" (BBC Lunchtime Lecture, Oct.
1976), and for the ILR stations by John 
Thompson, "The Creation of Independent 
Local Radio in the U.K." EBU Review,
Jan, 1979." (sic.)
Local Radio and Local Democracy,
London: IBA, 1979/80, p.34.
BBC local radio may best be described as an attempt to copy the
ILR service on a reduced budget. The following description of
the BBC's London station in comparison to the ILR London station
applies equally to all of the BBC local radio stations:
"The BBC response appears to have been to 
concentrate their available resources in 
a desperate battle to increase the audience, 
not for commercial reasons, but to present 
a justification for spending public money 
(licence fee) on its services."
Local Radio Workshop, Nothing Local About It:
London's Local Radio,
Comedia Series No.14,
London: Comedia Publishing Group & LRVi 
revised edition, 1983, p.15.
4.2 LOCAL RADIO HISTORY: A history of British local radio
exemplifies the considerations which initially influenced the
local radio system and which still underlie the system. This
history provides a useful comparison to the Irish situation,
demonstrating the basic commercial incentives covered by a concern
for the public interest, and it offers an insight to those powers
which have benefited most from local radio. The decision in 1971
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to expand the BBC local radio system to include the new ILR system 
stemmed from the earlier decision in 1954 to introduce commercial 
television. The lobby for commercial broadcasting harried the 
Beveridge Committee although at that time, 1951, it was quite 
small. The growth of this lobby and its final success with the 
introduction of the Independent Television Act, 1954 is an example 
of political lobbying at its best by those with a considerable 
degree of indirect influence. H.H. Wilson's book Pressure Group;
The Campaign for Commercial Television, gives an excellent detailed 
account of how a relatively small but powerful group of Conservative 
M.P.s backed by commercial interests forced government legislation 
over a period of four years on an issue that was of marginal interest. 
The Beveridge Report recommended the continuance of the BBC 
broadcasting monopoly though advising the decentralisation and 
régionalisation of the BBC. Beveridge also suggested the development 
of local radio stations by the BBC on the VHF waveband. However, 
the Beveridge Report, like those before it and since, was destined 
for library shelves and not for government policy. What has become 
the most important feature of the Beveridge Report was the minority 
note of dissent by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. Selwyn Lloyd was at that time 
a little known Conservative backbench M.P. His report urged for 
a commercial broadcasting service to provide competition for the 
BBC and to break what he considered to be an unhealthy monopoly 
of broadcasting held by the BBC. "He was partly critical of the 
conception °that it is the BBC's duty to decide what is good for 
people to hear or to see, and that the BBC must evaluate the 
public taste'." (Wilson, 1961, p.56, quoting from Lloyd's minority 
dissent in the Beveridge Report, 1951.) Lloyd seemed to suggest 
that the public be given a choice in "public taste" and be allowed
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to decide for itself "what is good for people to hear or to see".
He failed to recognise that choice would not exist since both services 
offer the same level of output. The only system where people might 
have such a choice is where they themselves have direct access to 
the management of the broadcasting station.
4.2.1 Lloyd was not content to let the commercial 
broadcasting issue rest with the publication of the Beveridge 
Report. He organised an informal group of Conservative M.P.s 
with ideas similar to his own into the Conservative Broadcasting 
Policy Committee. The aim of the group was to organise a lobby 
for the forthcoming debate on the government White Paper on 
Broadcasting. The Labour government had decided to extend the 
BBC's Royal Charter for a further fifteen years and proposed 
the introduction of regional committees to advise the BBC on 
programming for Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales similar 
in structure to those recommended by Beveridge. By the time 
the Labour government had settled on the terms for the Regional 
Advisory Committees the debate on the White Paper was imminent,
(July 1951), and Lloyd's group had finally become the Broadcasting 
Study Group with the acceptance of the Conservative Whip. The 
sole interest of this group may indeed have been the establishment 
of a commercially based service which they sincerely thought would 
benefit the nation, but since such a service would also have clearly 
been of personal benefit to the members of the group, their motives 
must be suspect. Most of those involved in the lobby for commercial 
broadcasting were financially involved in broadcasting and related 
industries, and would have directly gained from the introduction of 
commercial broadcasting. H.H. Wilson relates the involvements of 
members of the Broadcasting Study Group. Together with Selwyn Lloyd
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was Mr. John Rodgers, a director of J. Walter Thompson Ltd.;
Mr. Charles Orr-Ewing of A.C. Cosser Ltd., a radio electronics 
firm; Mr. A. Fell from Pye Radio Ltd.; Sir Wavell Wakefield, 
a director of Broadcast Relay Services, Rediffusion and Hulton 
Visual Productions; and Mr. John Profumo, who Wilson satirically 
states, was:
"an exception in not having direct financial 
interests in developing a commercial system."
(italics added.)
Pressure Group: The Campaign for Commercial Television,
London: Seeker & Warbug, 1961, p.82.
(Profumo was, however, unfortunate in later being credited with the
downfall of the Macmillan government after which he resigned from
active politics.) Other involved were Lady Tweedsmure, a public
relations consultant and director of an advertising agency;
Mr. Ian Harvey, also a director of an advertising agency; Mr. F.P.
Bishop, another director from Broadcast Relay Services, and
Chairperson of an electrical firm and Chairperson of the Executive
Committee of the Advertising Agency; and Sir William Darling,
the president of the Incorporated Sales Managers' Association.
(cf. Wilson, pp.82-84.) Wilson comments:
"It could hardly be said that this Study Group 
was representative of general Conservative 
thinking with regard to broadcasting." 
ibid., p.84.
Neither was the group representative of the public's thinking 
on broadcasting, since it had obvious vested interests in 
pressurising for the introduction of commercial broadcasting.
The Labour debate on the White Paper in July 1951 
showed a House divided on the issue of the BBC's monopoly. No 
Labour member argued for the introduction of an alternative 
service but the Conservatives were far from being united behind 
the Broadcasting Study Group. The tactics of the Study Group was
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to disguise their interest in commercial broadcasting and they 
instead:
"decided to emphasise their devotion to 
public service broadcasting and the 
continuation of the BBC, focusing their 
argument for an alternative system on 
the dangers of political bias under a 
monopoly, and stressing the right of the 
listener and viewer to enjoy freedom of 
choice." 
ibid., p.86.
The Broadcasting Study Group received support from an unexpected 
quarter in the Lord's debate. Lord Wool ton was the most outspoken 
supporter of the Study Group. His speech centered on the dangers 
of monopoly and, following the war experience of Goebbels propaganda 
machine, the fear of the BBC "falling into the hands" of a communist 
group. Though this may have seemed extreme, Lord Woolton spoke of 
the need for an alternative service "with some form of free 
enterprise". His was the only open support Lloyd's group 
received in the Lords and Woolton qualified his statements by 
implying "that he was being pressured by a small minority of 
backbench supporters for the commercial cause". (Wilson, 1961, 
p.77.) However, Lord Woolton's support was to become influential 
to the commercial campaign when later Woolton replaced Lord 
Salisbury on the Cabinet. Following the White Paper debate, the 
broadcasting issue was shelved, and during the summer recess a 
General Election was called. With the change in government to 
a Conservative majority the decision regarding the BBC's future 
and the future of British broadcasting lay with a Conservative 
government. Lord Woolton was appointed President of the Privy 
Council and was later to become a member of the Cabinet. With 
this influential ally the Broadcasting Study Group was set to 
turn government opinion in favour of commercial broadcasting.
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4.2.2 As the new Conservative government prepared a 
White Paper on broadcasting the Study Group reached a compromise 
with Lord Woolton. In a document circulated to all Conservative 
M.P.s entitled, The Future of British Broadcasting, the group 
settled for the introduction of commercial broadcasting only; 
radio was to remain the monopoly of the BBC. It was television 
that most attracted the Conservative M.P.s who had financial 
interests in advertising. During the eventual parliamentary debate 
on these proposals when they became consolidated in a White Paper, 
the Home Secretary, when introducing the Bill, admitted that, "as 
a medium for advertising, television offers certain advantages 
over the sound programmes". In acquiring the Cabinet's approval 
for their plans, the Study Group carefully worded their arguments 
stressing the need for viewer choice, the importance of the 
television medium, the national benefits of free enterprise 
and the improvement in quality that competition would effect. 
Wilson describes this public relations work of the group:
"The whole campaign reflects the public 
relations stress on manipulation, the use 
of 'gimmicks' to sell a pre-packaged policy.
Thus the great play on 'monopoly', the 
discreet substitution of 'independent' for 
'commercial', and the emphasis on a 
hypothetical danger of partisan control 
of the BBC,..." (italics added.) 
ibid. , p.210.
Public relations and advertising techniques probably came easy 
to the Conservative M.P.s who were involved in these industries. 
These were tactics that were used later by the lobby for the 
ILR and have been put forward in Ireland. The Conservative 
White Paper on May 15the, 1952, prepared for the ending of the 
BBC monopoly. The White Paper, however, still only represented 
a largely disinterested attempt on behalf of the Conservative 
party to introduce commercial television. "Analysing events
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after May 15th, one may observe how skillfully those interested 
in commercial television manipulated events and pressures to 
keep the government committed to what at first appeared to be 
no more than a feeble, half-hearted gesture to a rather persistent 
Party minority." (Wilson, 1961, p.92.) The final debate in the 
Commons produced no in-depth argument, but rather a lot of shouting 
and emotional pleas on behalf of the opposition led by Mr. Herbert 
Morrison: "I believe with absolute sincerity... that this proposed 
development is totally against the British temperament; the British 
way of life and the best or even reasonably good British traditions." 
The only interesting point put forward during the whole debate 
on British broadcasting was from a Lords' speaker, Viscount Samuel, 
who during the earlier debate on Labour's White Paper, asked:
"'What kind of civilization do we wish to live in?
What sort of mental atmosphere do we wish to have 
around us?...our modern 20th-century civilization, 
by common consent of intellectual people, is already 
far too much commercialized by the selling of things 
we use and consume. These are aspects of human life 
which receive undue prominence in the modern age...' 
Now with radio and television this influence would 
enter every home and affect 'the intellectual and 
mental environment of every family'." 
ibid., pp.73-74.
The Conservative decision to promote commercial television was a 
post-election decision and so a public election debate on the merits 
of commercial television was never developed and even those who 
voted for the Conservatives in the 1951 General Election could not 
have anticipated the introduction of commercial television.
The Bill eventually passed through both Houses and was 
enacted in 1954. During its passage the aspects most debated were 
with regard to the prohibition of ownership by newspapers and those 
involved in the entertainment business, and the type of advertising 
to be allowed: spot-advertisments or sponsorship of programmes. This
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period of over a year in the passage of the Bill did allow the 
development of public debate but seems that the debate took for 
granted the acceptance of the Bill and was therefore limited to 
discussions on the form of commercial television. However, the delay 
did succeed in including in the final Act an emphasis on the "public 
service" nature of broadcasting and the consideration of the "public 
interest". Despite the lack of legal definitions of these terms, it 
that they are included at all is to be welcomed. The lack of clear 
definitions in the 1954 Act and the cheery claims for the public 
service aspect of the British commercial television service were 
cynically regarded by its American counterparts. Clear-sightedly an 
editorial in America's leading media magazine satirically joked in 
the manner of Punch:
"We submit, one can't be just a 'little bit' 
commercial. Either it is or it isn't...
Dear little John Bulls,
Don't you cry;
You'll be fully commercial 
Bye and bye."
Broadcasting, Nov. 19, 1953,
in Wilson, 1961, op.cit., pp.190-191.
Wilson makes a good argument in the defence of "public
service" broadcasting and argues against the social effects of
advertising in any form. His arguments are worth reading, (pp.139-215), 
but it is not fitting to present here a critique on the effects of
adverising. His final comment on the conduct and motives behind the
pressure group for commercial broadcasting are indicative of his view 
on the overall drive for commercialisation, a drive that became 
acceptable to a degree that allowed for the introduction of the 
Independent Local Radio service, (ILR), in Britain:
"Throughout the controversy it was apparent that 
the commercial advocates [including government 
members] were contemptuous of efforts to uphold 
either cultural or intellectual standards; 
the decisive consideration was that television 
was a great marketing device." (italics added.)
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ibid., pp.214-215.
4.2.3 During the pressure for commercial television the 
inclusion of commercial radio on both a national and a local 
basis was considered. The commercial incentive that made television 
attractive was only a little less strong with regard to radio. That 
the 1954 Act did not include radio was a result of a compromise 
between Lloyd's Study Group and the Conservative Cabinet. Commercial 
radio supporters waited an opportunity and were equally prepared to 
compromise in the short-term if it meant an eventual success. That 
there is no national commercial radio in Britain is the result 
of a compromise but also an accident of history which allowed the 
BBC to first gain access to the necessary frequencies for national 
radio broadcasting. How long this "accident" will be tolerated is 
a matter for some conjecture but the sole justification referred 
to by the Minister, Christopher Chataway, was that: "The case which 
is now largely accepted for competition in television is no less 
strong in radio." Alternatively it is as easy to say that if an 
idea is argued often enough by enough people it will eventually 
become the right opinion. That there may exist any contrary 
argument made by less powerful people becomes irrelevant since 
the more powerful group's idea will become accepted by a majority 
too apathetic to consider all the arguments and decide rationally. 
Thus the minority become labelled as "radicals", "obsessive" and 
even "revolutionaries".
Commercial television made the introduction of the ILR 
inevitable, yet it took from 1954 to 1971 for that transition to 
take place. The intermediary years saw the mushrooming of "pirate" 
radio stations and the reluctance of numerous governments to enact 
controlling legislation. This hesitancy was largely a result of 
insecure governments without a decisive majority and, as time
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passed, a lack of desire to enact legislation that in closing the 
"pirates" would result in the loss of popularity with the "pirate" 
audience. With the passage of the 1954 Act, Selwyn Lloyd's interest 
in broadcasting seems to have dissolved, and with John Profumo's 
resignation in the early 1960's and the forced change of government, 
the Conservative's pressure group became ineffective. Without an 
active pressure group, commercial radio was dropped until a new group 
was formed in the late 1960's that in combination with events in 
radio "piracy" forced the Conservative government to support an 
ILR service in their 1970 election manifesto.
4.3 "Pirate" History: The story of "pirate" radio in Britain
is full of the imagery of Hollywood films: adventure on the high seas, 
Robin Hood ethics, the struggles of the "under-dogs", heroic escapes 
from the authorities, rivalries and physical conflict between different 
"pirates", and between "pirates" and the authorities - some resulting 
in death. Many stations were able to capitalise on this public image 
and made money. Others tried to live in accordance with the independent 
spirit and lost heavily. The successes and the failures and the whole 
story of the British "pirates" makes exciting reading and gives plenty 
of opportunity to use nostalgia to give the impression that the 
"pirates" did represent a democratic system of broadcasting free from 
the restrictions of a national service, truly "giving the people 
what they want", (cf. Paul Harris, Broadcasting from the High Seas, 
1977, for this type of history of "pirate" radio in Britain.) Behind 
this facade can be seen the commercial incentives which resulted in 
a commercial television system and it was with the support of these 
same incentives that the British "pirate" radio became the ILR. An 
examination of the ownership and directorship of the ILR stations 
illustrates this clearly.
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4.3.1 "Pirate" radio began in Europe as early as 1958 when 
Radio Syd began broadcasting from a converted ship anchored 
in international waters off Sweden. Radio Veronica, broadcasting 
also from a ship to the Dutch people, began broadcasting in English 
in 1962. "Pirate" radio was established in Britain when an Irishman, 
Ronan O'Rahilly, sought to use it as a medium to compete with the 
four big record companies. Phillips, Pye, EMI and Decca provided the 
records for most European and British radio and O'Rahilly first 
considered "pirate" radio as a means of breaking the record monopoly. 
Since he could not persuade the BBC to play any of his "pop" records 
and since he was also refused by Radio Luxemburg, O'Rahilly 
realised he could broadcast his own records from a "pirate" ship 
similar to Syd and Veronica. He discussed his plan with an 
Australian businessman, Allan Crawford, who was also interested in the 
entertainment industry. The two men proceeded to fit out ships with 
radio masts and transmitters in Greenore Harbour in Ireland - owned 
by O'Rahilly's father. Later the two resulting ships united to 
broadcast under the one name, Radio Caroline, positioned to provide 
coverage of a large part of Britain. O'Rahilly took the name Caroline 
from John F. Kennedy's daughter since Kennedy was the first Irish- 
American President and represented success and independence. The 
success of Radio Caroline soon encouraged other entrepreneurs 
and Radio City, Radio London, Radio 390 and Radio 27 0 all started 
broadcasting in 1965. By this time, "pirate" radio in Britain was 
well established. Only three years earlier the Pilkington Report 
had recommended that the BBC be allowed develop a number of 
experimental local radio stations, but this was dismissed by the 
government who alleged that no public demand existed. Government 
inaction during this formative period of "pirate" radio allowed for
its continual growth and spread. Paul Harris comments on the 
experience:
"Pirate radio, with its romantic associations 
and lucrative temptations, began to capture 
the imagination of all sorts of people who 
went out in small boats with primitive 
transmitting equipment, a selection of °pop' 
records and a record player...Amateurs quickly 
disappeared from the air, for to run a pirate 
station was expensive, and risky too."
Broadcasting from the High Seas,
Edinburgh: Paul Harris, 1977, p.43.
Some of the risks involved ships breaking anchor in storms 
and running aground. Other risks involved the unpredictability of 
advertising revenue, since advertisers were naturally wary of the 
semi-illegal nature of the stations. However, the first deaths from 
the "pirates" came in December 1964 when one of the owners of Radio 
Invicta died with two employees in a storm at sea. The owners 
of this station situated in an abandoned fort in the Thames estuary 
were known to have had previous arguments, some violent. Following 
the 1964 General Election the Labour government introduced a White 
Paper in 1966 encouraging the BBC to experiment with eight local 
radio stations and to establish Radio 1, an all-music station - 
a lesson learnt from the "pirates". In 1967 another death was to 
occur among the "pirates" that finally ended the romantic image 
of "pirate" broadcasting.
Radio City had resulted from an exchange between 
"Screaming Lord Such" and his "pop" music manager, Reg Calvert.
The station was situated on another of the Thames estuary forts 
known as Shivering Sands. Calvert had been in partnership with 
a Major Smedley and Allen Crawford, who had earlier merged with 
O'Rahilly. In June 1967 Calvert was found shot dead in the home 
of Major Smedley. The Major, who was arrested, claimed that 
Calvert had cheated him and an associate, Kitty Black, by selling
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the Radio City transmitter to Philip Birch from Radio London.
Birch had entered into an agreement with Calvert for the transmitter 
and the station on the Shivering Sands fort. The Major and Kitty 
Black met with Calvert and Birch after having sent a group of men 
to forcibly take control of the fort from Calvert's men. During 
the meeting Calvert had threatened the Major's life and when he 
later visited the Major's home the Major shot him in self-defence.
The resulting court hearing and the publicity which surrounded it 
did much to shatter the romantic image of the "pirates" who were 
being renamed "sordid gangsters in ruthless competition". In 
July Tony Benn announced impending legislation and this time 
legislation was introduced, but not by Mr. Benn who was moved 
shortly after to become Minister for Technology.
The Marine, Etc., Broadcasting (Offenses) Act, 1967 was 
introduced in July of 1967 by Mr. Edward Watson Short, the new 
Postmaster General. It was a very thorough piece of legislation, 
on which an Irish Bill was later modelled. It effectively prohibited 
unlicenced broadcasting by any medium and also prohibited advertising 
and participation in such broadcasts. The supply of equipment to those 
engaged in unlicenced broadcasting and the rental of premises to 
"pirates" is outlawed. The comprehensiveness of the Act served well 
and almost all of the British "pirates" closed when it was enacted.
The "pirates" did not give up without a fight but the determination 
of Mr. Short made up for previous years of inactivity. Though 
Radio Caroline was to continue broadcasting periodically for the 
next few years the British "pirate" era was ended.
4.4 COMMERCIAL PRESSURE: As early as 1964 the first commercial/
political consortium had been set up. Mr. John Gorst, M.P., and 
John Whitney established the Local Radio Association. (Whitney was
later to become Managing Director of the ILR station Capital Radio.) 
Gorst had a background in advertising and public relations and had 
connections with the media company, Pye. The Association represented 
approximately 150 companies with interests in commercial local radio.
In 1960 Wigmore Broadcasting had been registered by Lord Wigmore,
Ian Hunter, (a major festivals promoter), and Hughie Green. Wigmore 
Broadcasting later became involved in the bid for the London 
entertainment franchise. By 1967 several other groups had been 
established: the Local Radio Services by Whitney and Philip Waddilove; 
The Free Radio Association by Geoffrey Pearl; the Campaign for 
Independent Broadcasting by Philip Prewitt; and the Free Communications 
Group the Commercial Broadcasting Consultants Ltd. by Hughie Green and 
Tony Cadman, who declared that there was frequency space for 115 low 
powered medium wave stations. The background to these names is similar 
to those involved in the commercial television Study Group.They had 
interests in the entertainment business, record and bands promotions, 
radio manufacturing, and most were Conservative party supporters or 
members. Those who benefited financially from commercial television 
were set to become involved in commercial local radio.
4.4.1 In 1969 the Labour government which had been in power 
since March 1966 allowed the BBC to extend its local radio service 
to twenty stations, following the success of its original eight.
In response to the mounting pressure by those involved in the 
commercial campaign, the Labour government announced an independent 
inquiry which was to examine British broadcasting and would be 
headed by Lord Annan. Local radio would be included in the Committee's
i
brief which would report in 1973. However, by 1970 another General 
Election was to interfere with the future of British local radio.
The Conservatives entered the election with a manifesto pledged to the
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introduction of an independent local radio service. The pressure 
group had learnt well the tactics of its forerunners in commercial 
television. John Stonehouse outlined the Labour party's response:
"The Government don't want commercial local 
radio to happen in Britain. That is why we 
have decided that local broadcasting should 
be through proper community stations, not 
run by commercial interests, who will only 
be concerned with maximum profits, but by 
local broadcasting councils interested in 
projecting community interests. [By this 
Labour meant BBC local radio stations.]
Mike Baron, Independent Radio: The Story
of Independent Radio in the 
United Kingdom, Suffolk:
Terence Dalton, 1975, pp.58-59.
Labour, however, did not get an opportunity to further develop
its plans concerning local radio since the 1970 General Election
returned the Conservatives. At this lost opportunity the Local
Radio Workshop expressed their frustration:
"Had the BBC been more democratic, flexible, 
and better financed, and had the Labour 
government had a more progressive broadcasting 
policy, the lobby for commercial broadcasting 
would not have been able to make such political 
capital out of the exploitation of popular taste."
Capital: Local Radio and Private Profit,
Comedia Series, No.15,
London: Comedia & LRW, 1983, p.105.
This sad expression applies equally to the analysis of both commercial
television and local radio in Britain.
4.5 1970 GENERAL ELECTION: The 1970 General Election was
noteworthy in that it was the first election to be held since the 
extension of the voting franchise to the 18-21 age group. It was 
to this age group especially that the "pirates" had appealed.
During earlier elections it had become obvious to "pirate" operators 
that their hopes for legal commercial radio would be best met by the 
Conservatives. This knowledge had led to urges to "Vote Conservative 
for Independent Radio!" during previous election campaigns. In 1970
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this unorganised appeal was consolidated by Radio Northsea 
International. The story surrounding this station is controversial.
It first began broadcasting in April 1970 and ended abruptly in 
July. During that brief period, RNI broadcast overt anti-Labour 
propaganda and was jammed first by the Labour government and then 
by the newly elected Conservative government when the station 
continued its anti-Labour broadcasts after the election. The 
details of this official jamming were never released and are 
restricted under the Official Secrets Act. This unprecedented 
action by the British government is speculated on by both Harris 
and Barron, and Barron points out that: "An analysis of the results 
show that in the constituencies nearest Radio Northsea, the swing 
against Labour was greatest...It is possible that Radio Northsea 
played a decisive role in the Election." (Baron, 1975, p.60, sic.)
Irrespective of RNI, the election pledge by the 
Conservatives to the newly franchised 18-21 year olds probably 
helped to ensure a Conservative victory. Once in power, the Minister 
for Posts and Telecommunications, Christopher Chataway, dismissed 
the Annan Committee, (later re-appointed by Labour), and announced 
a new White Paper, An Alternative Service of Radio Broadcasting.
By 1972 the Sound Broadcasting Act, 1972 was passed establishing 
the ILR, and a year later broadcasting legislation was consolidated 
in the Independent Broadcasting Authority Act, 1973. The BBC 
local radio service was limited to twenty and proposals for nine 
ILR stations were advanced. This number was later extended by a 
further ten stations. The commercial pressure group which had first 
began its lobbying in 1951 had succeeded at last in a full commercial 
system.
4.6 RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY: The relative ease with
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which the 1972 Conservative government introduced the ILR was partly 
due, it has been seen, to the public acceptance of the commercial 
television service, the ITV. The theoretical difference between 
the BBC and the ITV service rests on the difference between public 
service broadcasting and broadcasting for private commercial gain. 
These differences, overwhelming to the academic observer, have been 
successfully set aside by the IBA throughout a decade of public 
relations, in which it has portrayed itself as a collection of 
companies concerned not so much with profit as in providing a service 
useful to and acceptable by the public. The ITV service certainly 
has been accepted, (market figures alone prove that), and is of a 
standard directly comparable to that of the BBC. Indeed there has 
been a subtle reversal of roles whereby the BBC now seems to be in 
a role where it is necessary for it to justify its existence and its 
dependence on public funds for the provision of a service which 
ITV seems to have equalled if not superceded. No longer is there 
a question of the IBA needing to prove itself since its television 
companies have provided an acceptable service and have also added 
to the income of the British economy. Now it is the BBC that must 
prove that its services fulfil a need not answered by the IBA and 
that it is worth the heavy investment of public funds in the form 
of licence fees and additional expenditure from public finances.
In the field of local radio this rivalry has become even 
more strident with the indirect support of the Conservative government 
for the IBA's commercial enterprise, (almost as if the removal of the 
BBC from local radio broadcasting may be a prelude to its breakup).
The BBC have become more and more involved in the battle for audience 
figures to the detriment of its services. Not only by this attack on 
its financial viability has the BBC been undermined by the IBA
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services, the very nature of the BBC's ethos of public service 
broadcasting has been replaced by the IBA's notion of "independence" 
and "giving the people what they want". The IBA public relations 
campaign has stressed its responsibility to provide for "a public 
service...[of] a high general standard", as outlined in the 
Independent Broadcasting Act, 1973, and its accountability to 
the government and the public through the Broadcasting Complaints 
Commission. The IBA indirectly assert that a broadcasting system 
securely based on legislation is more trustworthy than its BBC 
counterpart which cannot be entirely free from governmental 
influence since it depends on the government for finance. The IBA 
would have it that their "independence" makes it a more responsible 
service with greater public accountability. Whichever may prove to 
be the "better" system in this regard, both the IBA and the BBC 
systems are found wanting in the important area of accountability 
for the failure in the fulfilment of their responsibilities and 
duties.
4.6.1 Both services are headed by a government appointed 
body with administrative powers over finance and appointments 
and responsibility for the broadcasting output. Each service 
has a Director General with authority for the daily management 
of the organisation and the relationship between the Director-General 
and the government appointed body is often unsure and confused. The 
BBC Governors seem to have a less influential role than that of the 
IBA. This is partly due to structural differences. The IBA authorise 
contracts with independent companies to broadcast, leasing equipment 
and transmitters, and assigning frequencies. The BBC Governors 
oversee the functions of a single corporation and liase between it 
and the government through the Home Office. Both the IBA and the
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BBC Governors are ultimately responsible for the broadcast output 
and for ensuring the fulfilment of their organisation's duties.
4.7 BBC GOVERNORS: The Royal Charter outlines the duties of
the BBC Governors but this has been interpreted and re-stated in 
a variety of forms by successive Director Generals, government 
ministers, Governors and investigative committees. A number of 
instances throughout the BBC's history exemplify the complexities 
of the Governors' role. Stands taken on these occasions of external 
pressure have provided guidelines for successive Boards of Governors. 
From the time of the British General Strike in 1926, Lord Reith made 
it obvious that the BBC could be relied upon by the government to 
provide support for the status quo and the dominant powers in society. 
The General Strike marked the first occasion since the transfer 
from the British Broadcasting Company, that the Director General 
assumed responsibility for making the new British Broadcasting 
Corporation's policy clear. It was not the Governors who made 
the public statement on behalf of the BBC. Four years later Reith 
consolidated the power of the Director General's position by 
engineering the publication of the Whitley Document, which detailed 
procedures for the relationship between the Governors and the 
Director General, and made some significant changes to the position 
recommended by the Crawford Commission in 1926. In an analysis of 
the subvention, Caroline Heller quotes first the Crawford Committee's 
description of the role of the Governors: "to act as the trustees for 
the national interest in broadcasting" and compares this to the 
Whitley Document: "The Governors act primarily as Trustees to 
safeguard the Broadcasting Service in the national interest."
In Crawford's terms the national interest takes precedence over 
broadcasting service but in the Whitley Document it is the broadcasting
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service which is protected, albeit, in the national interest. More 
directly, the Whitley Document continues to describe the functions 
of the Governors:
"Their functions are executive, their responsibilities 
are general and not particular,... [they are] 
responsible for seeing that the many purposes for 
which broadcasting was established...are carried out. 
With the Director General they discuss and then decide 
upon major issues of policy and finance, but they 
leave the execution of that policy and the general 
administration of the service in all its branches 
to the Director General and his competent officers."
Heller, Broadcasting and Accountability,
BFI Television Monograph, No.7, 
London: BFI, 1978, pp.16-17.
4.7.1 An attempt to break away from this relationship between 
the Governors and the Director General was made during Lord Simon 
of Wythenshaw's term as Chairperson, (then Sir Ernest Simon). In 
the Governors' report to the Beveridge Committee, Lord Simon likened 
the relationship to that between a departmental Minister and the 
Permanent Secretary. The Permanent Secretary is the administrative 
head of the department with the knowledge of years of civil service 
experience. The Minister, usually appointed for a fixed term of 
office, has the responsibility of ensuring the government's policies 
are enforced by the department through its activities. Similarly 
Lord Simon assumed the Governors should be able to enforce their 
policies, (reflecting the public interest), on the management 
structures of the BBC. In the words of the Beveridge Report, the 
Governors should:
"perform effectively the functions of a 
Minister in keeping his department in 
touch with public opinion and subject 
to external criticism. The channels of 
informed democratic control of broadcasting 
must lie with the Governors." (italics added.)
Lord Beveridge, Report of the Committee
on Broadcasting, I960,
London: H.M.S.O., 1962,
comnd.1735, para.408.
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Despite the noble aspirations recommended by Beveridge on how the 
Governors should act, it is worth recalling the satirical reflections 
on the nature of Ministerial control in the television and radio 
series, Yes Minister. Justifying this pessimistic view of the 
Governors' struggle for power is Heller's reference to a remark by 
a Postmaster General that, "the Governors were still unable to exercise 
any real influence, and appeared to be governed by the professionals." 
(R. Bevens, The Greasy Pole, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1965,
pp.116-118.)
4.7.2 The BBC Governors are naturally eager to publicly 
assert the importance of their position. Lord Normanbrook in the
1965 series of Lunchtime Lectures emphasised that it is the
Governors who appoint the Director General and the heads of staff, 
and he outlined a referral system within the BBC hierarchy which 
allows for the dissemination of influence from the Governors 
throughout the organisation. It is this referral system, Normanbrook 
stated, that replaces a direct system of control from the Governors.
The problem with this view is that it may merely be a justification 
on behalf of the Governors for their inability to directly control 
the affairs of the BBC. Normanbrook himself admitted:
"I am ready to admit that the control which they 
[the Governors] exercise is mainly by retrospective 
review - by comment, whether praise or blame, 
after the event. It is, of course, easy to say
that this is not enough, that there ought to be
a tighter control and a more strict enforcement of
views and attitudes of the Board."
The Functions of the BBC Governors,
BBC Lunchtime Lectures,
4th Series, No.3, 1965, p.15.
The frustration implicit in this comment together with 
other cynical comments by other previous BBC Governors calls into 
question the usefulness of this system of supervision. (The purpose 
of the BBC's General Advisory Council has also been variously
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criticised by members themselves, (cf. Heller, 1978, p.43). Sir 
Michael Swann's written apology to a number of M.P.s following 
their appearance with an especially hostile audience on The People 
Talking programme was a result of a full meeting of the Governors 
and the Director General, and yet Sir Michael was still severely 
criticised by BBC producers and newspaper journalists. Whether or 
not the incident merited an apology, it was insisted upon that 
the Governors were unduly interfering with the BBC and that 
they had no right to make an apology on behalf of the BBC - an 
attitude which supports Tom Burns' comment:
"It is probably nearer the truth to regard BBC's 
position as one of responsibility without power."
The BBC - Public Institution and Private World,
London: Macmillan, 1977, p.13.
Presuming the audience admitted to the programme were general 
members of the public, or representatives from public groups,
Sir Michael may be questioned on the grounds of his reasons for 
needing to apologise for what was a public reaction to the M.P.s 
present. The Governors are representative of public opinion but 
should recognise the legitimacy of a public audience to express 
their opinion no matter how contrary it may be to that of the 
Governors themselves. Sir Michael need not have apologised to 
the M.P.s for public opinion. This incident therefore also gives 
rise to questions on the representativness of the Governors and 
the overall conclusions by John Scupham are valid:
"No organisation, nor combination of organisations, 
can speak with authority for the common viewer.
No committee representing sectional interests 
could usefully sit around a table weighing one 
of them against another, or arrive at a balanced 
overall view of the total programme output."
Broadcasting and the Community , No.3 in
The New Thinker's Library, 
Raymond Williams, ed.
London: Watts & Co., 1967 , p. 59.
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"It is proper that the BBC in particular should 
be informed, persuaded, lobbied, and generally 
pursued and pestered by the community that it 
exists to serve." 
ibid. , p.60.
The Governors should be open to the various interest groups and 
individuals who complain and applaud, instead of consistently 
taking a defensive stand on behalf of the BBC management.
4.8 INDEPENDENT AUTHORITY: The Independent Broadcasting
Authority, IBA, is also government appointed but differs from 
the BBC Governors in many respects. The functions of the IBA 
are stated in the Independent Broadcasting Act, 1973 and are 
briefly fourfold:
1. The IBA own and are responsible for the operation of the 
television and radio transmitters, assigning frequencies and 
maximum transmitter powers;
2. They select the contractors who run the television and radio 
stations and issue them with licences;
3. The IBA are responsible for the enforcement of legislative 
conditions and for the adherence of the contractors to those 
conditions. (Contrary to popular assumption, the contractors are 
not legally bound to their original broadcasting but merely to 
their contract to provide programming in accordance with broadcasting 
legislation);
4. The IBA regulate the amount of advertising and its content 
through the Advertising Advisory Committee, - by law, a maximum of 
nine minutes per hour is allowed for radio advertising.
The IBA are restricted in their reliance on the independent 
companies to supply them with information. They may request 
information, and are entitled to annual reports, but remain dependent
and it is for this reason that :
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on the details when making decisions. With up to 38 ILR companies and 
15 television companies, it may be appreciated that the IBA's task 
of informing itself on details of each company is demanding. 
Considering the staff of 1,600 in 1983, the Authority's twelve 
members are more concerned with administrative duties than with 
the general overview of the system and the particular services of 
the ILR stations. From that staff number, the greatest percentage 
are electricians and engineers solely involved with the building 
and maintenance of the IBA transmitters. The two functions which 
are probably seen as the most important to the Authority are the 
selection of broadcasting contractors, and the supervision of 
content in accordance with legislation.
4.8.1 The Authority is not required to give explanations 
for their choice of contractors and have established their opinions 
of incidents of controversial programming content. In 1973 following 
newspaper reports on a documentary on the painter Andy Warhol, 
which it was asserted would contain indecent material, a member 
of the National Viewers' and Listeners' Association, Mr. Ross 
Me Whirter, was granted a temporary injunction against the programme. 
The Court in upholding the appeal criticised the Authority for not 
having previewed the documentary. The Authority defended itself by 
arguing that it was not its role to act as public censor, and that 
the documentary producers had a professional responsibility for 
programme content and would only refer a programme to the Authority 
if they were uncertain of public opinion. That the producers had 
not felt the need to refer the programme to them implied that its 
content was not in question. The Authority fully supported the 
producers and had trust in their professional decision. However, 
the Authority was pressurised by the publicity from the Court
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hearing into previewing the documentary, and thereby overturning 
their original stand of confidence in the producers. The Authority
finally agreed that the programme was neither indecent nor offensive
and the programme was broadcast. The relationship of trust between 
the Authority and the programme-makers was irrevocably breached 
and the Authority's decision was upheld by the Court. In the words 
of the Times Law Report:
"The Authority were the people who mattered.
They were the censors. The courts had no
right whatever... to interfere with their 
decisions so long as they were in accordance 
with the law."
Feb. 5th, 1973, in Heller, 1978, op.cit., p.36.
4.8.2 It is one of the most irritating points to the numerous 
pressure groups that the IBA is not required to offer public 
explanations for its choice of contractors. Yet that choice itself 
has on occasion provided an insight to the nature of people 
chosen for ILR membership. The contracts are awarded mainly on 
consideration of financial viability and the programme proposals.
A. Wright describes the importance of these proposals and then 
illustrates the ease with which they are later dismissed:
"However, in the case of the ILR stations there 
is the additional evidence and argument provided 
by the programme plans submitted to the IBA by 
the successful applicants for each local radio 
franchise, and these constitute one of the 
important elements on the basis of which the 
applicants were considered. The mention of these 
programme plans tends to occasion a good deal 
of mirth, on account of their blandness and the 
fact that specific programme plans seen often 
not to have been fulfilled."
Local Radio and Local Democracy ,
London: IBA, 1979/80, p.13.
These programme plans which are "treated with a good deal of mirth"
by the contractors, cause an equal degree of anger to many pressure
groups criticising the IBA's closed-door policy. The Authority's
lack of accountability in this area leaves unanswered questions
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on the fulfilment of their broadcasting responsibilities. (When 
the IBA withdrew their offer to Northside Sound, (a community group 
in Derry, Northern Ireland), to licence an ILR station no adequate 
reason was given despite public questioning on Ulster television.)
4.9 CAPITAL - LOCAL RADIO? Using Capital Radio as a case study, 
based on information from the Local Radio Workshop study, it can be 
seen that the circumstances of the IBA's contract award points to the 
emphasis the IBA places on financial investment over considerations 
of content and local needs. Capital Radio Ltd. holds the London 
franchise for both the all-news station and the general entertainment 
station. The company shareholders include a large number of investment 
companies and wealthy individual shareholders including Sir Richard 
Attenborough, Bryan Forbes, Barclay-White, Rediffusion and Observer 
Holdings. Following financial difficulties in 1974, the Standard 
Broadcasting Corporation was invited to become a shareholder. The LRW 
speak of the "slapdash and insubstantial nature of their programme 
plans". These programme plans are the only published material which 
the public has to attempt an understanding of the IBA's decision:
"the rest of Capital's application, and the entire applications of all 
the other contenders, are unavailable". (LRW, 1983.) Again the IBA 
appears to have been invested with public responsibility without 
being accountable to the public. That the IBA should be held 
accountable seems urgently necessary.
An example from Capital's programme plans quoted in the 
first of the LRW's studies is worth repeating at length. Concerning 
womens' programming, (a large number of local radio listeners are 
women at home):
"...there are certain fundamentals that women 
enjoy. Women are sentimental, or they care 
deeply about emotions. Women are fanatical,
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or they can see through plausible rationalisations 
...They are escapists, or are not sufficiently 
cold-blooded to enjoy drama which, if taken seriously, 
would represent alarm and despondency. This is what 
gives them their bias towards stories about hospitals 
and against stories about guns; towards local issues 
(where they can see plainly enough what is at stake) 
and away from foreign news (of dubious implication);
towards happy endings, but happy endings to sagas
which are as grittily tough as they know real life 
usually is."
Nothing Local About It; London's Local Radio,
Comedia Series, No.14,
London; Comedia & LRW, revised ed. ,
1983, pp.179-180.
That the writers of such a patronising attitude towards women,
(who make up the bulk of their listenership), should have been
granted a licence demands a closer investigation into the relationship
between the owners of the station and the members of the IBA. The
finance behind Capital and its impressive list of supporters initially
won for Capital the London franchise and when it came up for renewal
in 1983 Capital easily retained the licence despite lobbying from
several protest groups.
4.9.1 Concerning Capital Radio's links with the IBA and with 
the broadcasting industry, it is worth noting the career of Capital's 
Managing Director from 1973 to 1982. John Whitney formerly produced 
sponsored programmes for sale to Radio Luxemburg during the 1950's.
In 1964 he co-founded the Local Radio Association on behalf of several 
commercial interests to pressurise for independent local radio. John 
Whitney left Capital for a more influential position: he became 
Director General of the IBA. His is only one of the numerous examples 
of the close connections among the IBA, BBC and private industry. The 
effect of this cross positioning must be the closed, self-protective 
attitude prevalent among the Governors and Authority members who 
are supposedly responsible for the broadcasting service in Britain 
and accountable to the British public.
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"One Chairman of the IBA has become Chairman 
of the BBC; one Vice-Chairman of the BBC has 
become Chairman of the IBA. The Chief Secretary 
of the BBC has become Director of Television 
at the IBA. Three Channel Controllers since 1967 
have accepted posts in senior management in 
various commercial programme companies. Managerial 
miscegenation has almost become complete and it is 
almost inevitable, therefore, that one convergent 
set of ideas and cultural purposes will come to be 
expressed by British broadcasting, despite the 
differences of structure and constitution within 
the double system."
A. Smith, Television and Political Life,
London: MacMillan Ltd., 1979, p.38.
Smith's description suggests the role of the BBC Governors and the
IBA Authority membership has been devalued to the level of job
promotion. If this is the case, neither can remain "independent"
from the organisation they are supposed to oversee and their interests
cannot be "independent" from those organisations. This implies that it
is not the "public interest" nor the "national interest" that is being
safeguarded by either the Governors or the Authority. Instead it is
the self-perpetuating commercial interests of the elite group from
which the Governors and Authority members are appointed which are being
so carefully guarded and protected.
4.10 LOCAL ADVISORY COUNCILS/COMMITTEES: The BBC and the IBA
are continually eager to point to the Local Advisory Councils/ 
Committees, (LACs), to illustrate local participation in the local 
radio services. The ILR is obliged by law to establish LACs to 
advice and monitor the local station's service. The BBC likewise 
encourages public participation, through LAC representation, to 
influence and advise on matters concerning local listenership 
views and opinions as outlined in the BBC Charter. The functions 
of the ILR Local Advisory Committees are as stated in the 197 3 
Broadcasting Act:
"to give to the Authority,..., such advice as in 
the opinion of the committee would be appropriate
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for reflecting so far as is reasonably practicable, 
the range of tastes and interests of persons 
residing in that area."
Independent Broadcasting Authority Act, 1973,
Section 11, Subsection 5.
This somewhat vague and general terminology leaves the ILR
Advisory Committee with an equally vague and general function.
They are "representatives" of the "tastes and interests" of their
locality and as such are chosen for their "normality". It therefore
seems unusual that many of the Advisory Committee members have
high-sounding names, as may be noted from the IBA Television and
Radio guide.
The ILR Advisory Committees are appointed by the 
IBA and report directly to the IBA regional officer for their 
locality. The BBC also appoint their Advisory Councils but they 
report instead to the local station manager. The role of the BBC 
Advisory Councils is rather more confusing. The 1966 White Paper 
which extended the BBC's Charter to include a local radio service 
stated that the Local Advisory Council:
"will play a fully formative part in the 
development of the station both as regards 
programme policy and as regards finance...
[and] will have the maximum possible voice 
in the [station's] direction..."
Broadcasting, London: H.M.S.O., 1966.
This definition of the BBC's LACs' role is quite specific giving 
the LACs an important involvement in the stations' policy and 
financing. The LACs thereby play a part in the actual shaping of 
the stations. However, the BBC re-defined the Advisory Councils' 
role by 1975 in their evidence to the Annan Committee:
"[The LACs'] primary purpose is to provide 
the station manager and his staff with 
a feedback of information and comment 
about programmes and to make suggestions 
for covering subjects or areas hitherto 
neglected."
BBC, Memorandum for the Committee on the Future
of Broadcasting, 1975,
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The BBC and the Public,
London: BBC, 1975.
No mention is made of the earlier duties related to the more
important areas of policy and finance. In no way could the BBC's
LACs, as described in 1975 and as most likely functioning ever since,
be said to "play a fully formative part in the development of the
station". The opportunity for the local public to become fully
involved in their station has been conveniently removed by the
BBC public service.
4.10.1 The representativeness of the LACs has been variously 
defended by both the BBC and the IBA. The BBC first enthused about 
their Advisory Councils in optimistic tones:
"A Council has an average of twelve members 
widely representative of the community - 
including youth, women, social services, 
sport, religion, education, industry, and 
commerce. They are chosen not as delegates 
of any sectional interest but for their 
personal qualities and their ability to 
think for the community as a whole."
BBC Local Radio: Some Questions Answered,
rpt. 1968, London: BBC, 1967.
The confident tone of these early descriptions, however, soon gave
way to the mid-seventies criticisms of both the BBC's and the ILR's
LACs by the Annan Committee and others. Annan comments that many
of the LAC members had doubts about their effectiveness, generally
describing themselves as being, "middle-class, middle-aged and
middle-brow". Annan concluded that: "Certainly they cannot be
regarded as part of the mechanism through which the broadcasters
are made accountable to the public; they are appointed by, and
operate through, the BBC and the IBA", (Annan, 1977, p.55.).
Unfortunately Annan only recommended that the LACs be made more
representative, and that perhaps the stations should advertise to
the public in an attempt to encourage a more democratic membership
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"by interest groups", - though who might be included in these groups
is not defined.
In a reply to the Annan Report, Peter M. Lewis extends 
his criticism of the LACs quoting from the Community Communications 
Group, (COMCOM), publication:
"Little or no public participation is permitted 
in their selection. The members of the Councils 
are far removed from and incidental to any 
decision-making process. They have no powers.
They meet infrequently and in confidence. No 
record of their meetings is publicly available; 
all correspondence is directed through the BBC/IBA.
No public participation or even attendance is 
permitted...we therefore recommend the abandonment 
of advisory councils."
Whose Media? The Annan Report and After.
London: Consumers' Association, 
1978, pp.71-72.
Yet it is through these LACs that the local radio system is expected 
to "provide for community involvement".
of the LACs. Annan also suggested that the LACs be nominated
4.11 HOPES AND POTENTIALS: The Annan Report and other early 
commentators on local radio were full of hope for the influence 
local radio could have on the public. A. Wright succinctly summarises 
these hopes with satire gained from hind-sight:
"Certain phrases recur: 'stimulate local democracy',
'promote public awareness', 'encourage community 
participation' - and so on." (Quoting from the 
1966 White Paper, the 1971 White Paper, and the 
Annan Report, 1977.)
Local Radio and Local Democracy,
London: IBA, 1979/80, p.l.
Wright conveys the optimism with which the potentials for local radio
were viewed. In the early 1970s in Britain the local government system
was under review and local radio was seen as being able to play a part
in encouraging interest in local government, and in creating an
atmosphere of self-sufficiency and independence in an attempt to
decentralise the nation. The growth of interest in small industry,
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Iself-employment and entrepreneuralism, together with an emphasis on 
community information and co-operation, injected into the plans for 
local radio the belief that local radio could actively promote 
economic and social revitalisation in communities. There were few 
interest groups in Britain which did not claim that local radio would 
be an invaluable asset in the promotion of their aims. This enthusiasm 
for the new medium was also to encourage many who declared that local 
radio would facilitate the opening of the channels of communication 
which had hitherto not existed in communities. Furthermore, open-access 
to local radio would allow for two-way communication with the exchange 
of views and opinions by many who would otherwise never be heard. For 
these reasons local radio was welcomed by minority groups as well as 
by local councillors, the social services, and arts and educational 
interests. Wright describes these varieties of claims for local radio:
"Many people (including Annan) regarded local 
broadcasting as the most suitable arena for 
access and participatory programming. It was 
relatively cheap, informal and local; its 
ideology proclaimed its openness and 
accessibility to the local community... In other 
words, local radio would not merely serve and 
reflect a more participatory society, but it 
would itself help to build such a society...
A media system that was both local and interactive 
could be seen as having a central role to play in 
a reconstructed democracy committed to widespread 
citizen participation." 
ibid . , p .3.
Unfortunately Britain still awaits this "reconstructed 
democracy committed to widespread citizen participation". Instead 
British local radio has seen the continued concentration of ownership 
among interlocking directorships and shareholdings; the increase in 
multinational shareholdings in the ILR services; the exchange of 
personnel between the BBC, ILR and other commercial media 
organisations; and increased cutbacks in both staffing and finance 
of the BBC local radio service. The pressure on the BBC to maintain
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audience ratings has led to a decline in its standard of broadcasting, 
whilst the ILR rivalry for advertising has led to an emphasis on the 
need for programming to "sell".
4.12 ACCESS PROGRAMMING: The access programmes encouraged by
Annan, and promoted by both the BBC and the ILR, have been reduced to 
phone-ins on banal and pretentious subjects given surface treatment 
only, with no investigation of background information. In their survey 
of a week's programming on Capital Radio, the Local Radio Workshop 
recorded the following example of a phone-in:
"man presenter: (to caller 2) Have you got a bad
voice there? 
woman caller: I got a bad stroke, b...
man presenter: (interrupting) Pardon?
woman caller: I got a bad stroke, b...
man presenter: (interrupting) Ah, have you?
Oh I see, lovely, thanks very much 
for voting. I can't hear you very well 
unfortunately. Lets go on to the next 
caller..." From BBC Radio London.
Nothing Local About It: London's Local Radio,
Comedia Series, No.14,
London: Comedia & LRW, revised ed.,
1983.
The example hardly represents the sympathetic contact between presenter 
and listener on which the public relations' literature enthuses and 
which both services claim to have achieved. The criticisms of the ILR 
put forward at the time of the Annan Report are still valid and extend 
now to include the BBC local radio, (cf. Annan, 1977, Section 11.28 
to 11.40, pp.156-161, for Annan's appraisal of the ILR service.)
Dismissing the claims made by station managers, Wright 
concludes that access broadcasting has not lived up to its initial 
promises. The fault is not due to the interest groups which seem to 
have given up "pestering" the local radio stations for airtime, 
but rather the fault is due to the station broadcasters themselves 
who do not wish to risk upsetting the audience ratings by broadcasting 
material which may be only of marginal interest:
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‘"...where are the less organised, the less 
powerful and the less respectable groups?
Access was supposed to provide a voice for 
the voiceless, yet these established access 
slots seem cosily consensual and provide an 
additional voice for those groups and 
organisations whose voice is already powerful 
and whose participation in political and 
social life is already considerable."
Wright, op.cit., p.66.
4.13 PUBLIC MEETINGS: Public consultation also takes the form of
public open meetings prior to the establishment of a local radio 
station. Annan recommended that these meetings be better advertised, 
and praised the opportunity these meetings afforded the public to 
acquaint themselves with the broadcasters, their intentions, services, 
programming, technical details and possible financial involvement.
Also the public meetings enabled the broadcasters to meet those who 
would become their audience, and learn directly from them, what are 
the community needs and interests. Annan's favourable encouragement 
of these meetings is gratifying but ill-founded. At one point the 
report states; "About 60-70 people turned up at most of these 
meetings: sometimes as many as 200." Following what they fail to 
recognise is a dismal turn-out for British cities ranging from 
populations of 300,000 to London's 3 million, Annan cheerfully adds: 
"This is an excellent way in which the public can be brought into 
the discussion of broadcast policy." (Annan, 1977, p.157.) Indeed 
the public meetings represent an ideal opportunity for the public to 
openly confront and discuss with the broadcasters and owners of their 
local station. However, these meetings have obviously failed to 
attract a representative number of local citizens, who most likely 
realise that the meetings offer them no possibility of enforcing any 
decisions upon which they as local radio listeners may agree. The 
public meetings, therefore, like the hopes of open access, fail to
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involve the public in local radio and fail also to make the stations 
more accountable.
4.14 OFF-AIR ACTIVITIES: The third area in which the 197 3
Broadcasting Act attempted to give the ILR public responsibility 
was in its "off-air activities". The IBA encourages stations to 
promote local cultural and community activities and to involve 
themselves in the interests of the locality that they serve. In 
an attempt to copy the BBC's cultural involvements in national 
orchestras and drama societies, the ILR stations have established 
and sponsor numerous musical, drama and dance associations, art 
foundations and charities, as well as setting up 24-hour phone 
services on job vacancies, youth information, traffic, weather and 
general information services. Capital Radio in London was the first 
ILR station to start a 24-hour phone service. Now Capital Radio 
provides "Helpline", "Jobfinder", "Flatshare" and "Help a London 
Child" charity appeal. It financially supports the Viren Orchestra, 
the Duke of York Theatre, the National Youth Orchestra, the London 
Choral Society and a number of festivals and charities. These 
off-air activities makes Capital the leader in ILR cultural and 
social activities. Whilst these services are beneficial to the 
locality served, they can also be regarded as a public relations act 
disguising the station's detachment from social service content in 
its broadcasting. Such off-air activities will not affect audience 
ratings and advertising income but will help to present a facade of 
involvement in community activities which is good for the station's 
image. In this way also, the ILR stations claim a refund on the 
secondary rental paid to the IBA from the stations' profits. This 
type of channelling of profits into cultural organisations and 
charities is practised by many businesses. The ILR have succeeded
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to a particularly high degree in promoting these off-air activities 
to enhance the stations' image of cultural involvement and the IBA 
year book endorses this promotion. However, occasionally reports 
are made of the stations' real level of commitments to these 
projects. The LRW refer to this:
"The broadcasters themselves have a cynical way 
of describing these items - they say they are 
necessary in order to gain 'brownie points' 
from the IBA."
Nothing Local About It, 1983, op.cit., p.26.
Again it seems that British local radio has found a means of obeying 
the letter of the law without regard to its spirit. The LRW make the 
further point that:
"Capital's off-air cultural activities are in 
areas of the arts which have traditionally 
been patronised by wealthy sections of society.
Their appeal to the company lies in the prestige 
which can be earned for the station among those 
influential groups, and the occasional cultural 
input into programming helps the station to win 
a more up-market audience..."
Capital: Local Radio and Private Profit,
1983, op.cit., p.77.
4.15 ALTERNATIVES: The major criticisms of British local radio
have come from minority groups, who perhaps have been ignored by the 
established media, but have been disappointed most by the local radio 
service which had initially promised local participation and access.
At the time of the Annan Report, many of these dissatisfied minority 
groups organised themselves and united to form protest groups. The 
groups which have been most successful in their organisation and still 
exist, are the Community Communications Group, (COMCOM), and the Local 
Radio Workshop, (LRW). Together with these two groups are a number of 
individuals who have published their views in minority magazines and 
occasional publications. Some of these critics of the established 
local radio services propose the setting up of a community radio 
service; others make suggestions for the improvement of the existing
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services; still others have run the risk of legal action and have 
set up mobile land-based "pirate" stations to varying degrees of 
success. The alternatives offered by these critics will be briefly 
outlined and a more detailed criticism will be offered on the actual 
recommendations of the Annan Report. Finally the more imaginative 
alternatives existing in foreign countries will be discussed.
4.15.1 The 10-point definition of community radio referred to 
in Chapter Three was devised by COMCOM to differentiate between what 
they consider the true meaning of community radio and the popular 
application to which it is put by proponents of commercially-based 
local radio. COMCOM's definition provides for a democratically 
elected administrative structure comprised of those involved in the 
station and its listeners and shareholders. The community station 
is non-profit-making, covering running costs, and depends on voluntary 
support. Its material is of local content and should aim at promoting 
activity, not mere passive listening. Time is therefore allocated to 
various local interest groups to produce their own programming. For 
this reason, emphasis is placed on training and the "right of reply" 
is encouraged.
4.16 COMMUNITY RADIO LITERATURE: The arguments for community radio
in Britain first surfaced as early as 1973 after the Conservative 
government's introduction of the ILR with Nigel Turner's light-hearted 
look at community radio. Without providing a definition of community 
radio, Turner mourned the loss of the excitement of the British 
"pirate" stations, and the sense of community some "pirates" had 
established with their listeners. His booklet, Community Radio in 
Britain: A Practical Introduction gives broad examples of American 
stations, a BBC local radio station, and Radio Jackie, a 1970s land
147
based "pirate" station. With advice from David Gardiner, Turner sets 
out diagrams and details for the construction of medium wave and VHF 
transmitters and enthusiastically encourages the continuation of radio 
"piracy". What Turner does succeed in capturing in his booklet, is 
the emotion generated by those involved in community radio towards 
the potential of this form of broadcasting, and a sense almost of 
exasperation with the local radio authorities, something shared by 
many of the Irish "pirate" community broadcasters. This early booklet 
set the scene for future work by Peter Lewis and Simon Partridge, both 
linked to COMCOM, and articles by journalists Blanchard and Coe.
4.16.1 Lewis's Council of Europe publication, Community Control 
of Local Radio, saw the first attempt of a definition of community 
radio upon which later definitions were based, and descriptions were 
given of community radio projects in Canada, Sweden and Italy. In a 
later publication, Whose Media?, (1978), Lewis broadens the concept 
of community broadcasting to include video and closed-circuit radio. 
(Universities and hospitals in Britain use an induction loop to 
transmit programmes within campus or hospital grounds.) This book was 
published in answer to the Annan Report and follows some of the 
arguments raised in the post-Annan debate in Britain. His proposals 
for community radio remain strictly within the confines of British 
legislation, and mainly involve suggestions on forming interest groups, 
lobbying politicians and local radio stations for improved community 
commitment, and providing information that may be useful for those 
likely to follow his advice. Lewis's advice illustrates the limits 
of the local radio system. Other than offering ideas for cable radio 
and "piracy", Lewis can only say, "Heave to and wait for the dawn of 
an age (it could be as early as 1979) when a Local Broadcasting 
Authority could grant you a licence", (Lewis, 1978, p.149). 1979
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The inadequacies of Whose Media? were partly answered in a slightly 
earlier booklet, Different Keepers: Models of Structure and Finance 
in Community Radio, 1977. This publication is much more valuable 
in that it provides the much needed examples of community radio systems 
in other countries and offers suggestions and applications to the 
British situation. This booklet is equally useful in the Irish context 
and is well worth consideration. Again published soon after the Annan
Report in May 1977, Lewis takes the then new-found interest in
community radio as a starting point. Underlining what he considers 
important to any study of community radio is the recognition that:
"Local control and the local finance which is 
ultimately the key to local control, is seen by
community broadcasters as the distinctive difference 
between community radio and that provided nationally.
A station which exists to serve local needs as defined 
by local people and which have been developed by sharing 
in programme production and policy decisions..." (p.3). 
[Community radio] "is usually alternative radio - 
alternative to neglect of local affairs, of particular 
sections of the community or of special tastes; or 
indeed to a professional outlook which arrogates to 
itself the definition of 'what the people want'." (p.23).
Different Keepers, London: International Institute
of Communications, 1977.
passed with no mention of community broadcasting by the government.
4.16.2 Simon Partridge's book, Not the BBC/IBA: The Case for 
Community Radio is a more straightforward book dealing specifically 
with community radio. Partridge outlines a brief history of the term 
"community radio" as first used by Rachel Powell, (1965), and the 
broad suggestions made by both Beveridge and Pilkington. Partridge 
continues with examples of community radio stations from America, 
the Swedish experiments, Australian community radio categories, and 
the work of British groups using either cable radio or recording 
programmes for use by the ILR and the BBC. Partridge's relatively 
up-to-date book, (1982), is useful in its description of the Report 
of the Home Office Local Radio Working Party, (HOLRWP), established
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by the Labour government in 1978. The report investigated the forms 
of possible community stations, their potential and the need for such 
stations. The Report inconclusively suggested further study of the 
issues involved and questioned the "demand for community radio in the 
UK as a whole", (Partridge, 1982, p.37). Partridge quotes 
COMCOM's reply to the HOLRVJP from an open letter to the Home Secretary 
and responds to the HOLRWP comment on public demand, asking:
"if there was any community in the UK 
which had been asked whether it wanted 
a local radio station and, if so, how 
it wanted this controlled."
Not the BBC/IBA, Comedia/Minority Press Group Series,
No.8, London: Comedia, 1982, p.37.
The lack of response from the parliamentary parties to community radio
provoked Partridge into warning of the growth of land-based "pirates",
and he directly encouraged readers to involve themselves in "pirate"
broadcasting following the structures for community radio. A democratic
framework of control is provided, (closely resembling Irish "pirate"
community radio structures), and specific technical information is
provided on equipment, radio frequencies, costs and operational problems,
How Partridge expects individuals or groups to set up stations according
to his specifications, and then to await the pleasure of the Home Office
in issuing licences is not made clear. Obviously his plans are not for
those wishing to broadcast illegally since the stations, according to
his designs, would be completely open to prosecution under British law
and, very likely, all equipment would be confiscated. Partridge's book,
however, is a spirited summary of the aims and opinions of the COMCOM
organisation. COMCOM was set up in 1977 in a response to the Annan
Report in the hope of bringing about the "experimental" community
stations recommended by Annan.
4.16.3 Annan's recommendations for local radio were quite weak in
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"Some members of the Committee think that 
the prospectuses of these stations cynically 
set out the bare minimum of public service 
broadcasting consonant with their being 
allocated the franchise; and then, having 
got it, the stations flagrantly failed to 
provide what little they had promised.
Capital Radio seemed to be the type of 
station which, though financially successful, 
was the antithesis of what a local radio 
station should be."
Report of the Committee on the Future of Broadcasting,
London: H.M.S.O., comnd.6753, 1977, 
Section 11, para.32, p.157.
Unfortunately not all of the Committee members agreed with this
scathing criticism and Annan made the contradictory recommendation
that both the ILR and the BBC services be allowed to continue.
However, Annan did recommend that a separate authority be established
to oversee the local radio service and that the control of the BBC's
stations be handed over to this authority. The stations themselves
would not change but the controlling authority would be changed. Annan
encouraged a "greater diversity" in the ownership and format of local
radio stations, and said that "at least some of the stations be run by
non-profit-distributing trusts based in the locality". Advertising
would, nevertheless, remain the primary source of income. The LACs
were dismissed as ineffective and were not to be replaced. Instead
there would merely be "public hearings from time to time". The new
authority would be responsible also for other forms of local
broadcasting and for hospital and student radio. Annan's
recommendations, (which were largely ignored in any case), were
all the more disappointing in relation to some of the sharp insights
that were made in the report. The quality of some of the observations
was not matched by the final recommendations; but even the quality
of these observations was inconsistent. Annan remarked in its
conclus ion:
comparison to its strongest criticisms of the ILR:
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"Vie want the broadcasting industry to grow.
But we do not want more of the same. There 
are enough programmes for the majority;...
What is needed now is programmes for the 
different minorities which add up to make 
the majority. That is why we want to expand 
local radio..." 
ibid., Section 30, para.4, pp.471-472.
4.16.4 For similar reasons the Annan Report was greeted with mixed 
feelings by COMCOM and others. Much of what Annan had to say about 
local radio was approved: its general attitudes, ambitions and 
criticisms. However, COMCOM disapproved of the weakness of the 
observations. Clearly a new authority would not be favourably received 
by the government, yet the logic of such an authority could only be 
supported on the condition that its powers be fully recognised. COMCOM 
suggested that "one of the main objectives of the LBA, (Local 
Broadcasting Authority), should be to initiate and encourage the 
development of a “third force' in British broadcasting", (Partridge, 
1982, p.14). The "third force", as opposed to the BBC and the IBA, 
would consist of voluntary based, non-profit-making stations owned 
and operated by a democratically elected co-operative trust. The 
quiet shelving of the Annan Report left COMCOM silent until their 
publication of "The Community Radio Supporters' Open Letter to the 
Home Secretary" in response to the HOLRWP's report, mentioned earlier. 
In this reply, COMCOM severely criticised the HOLRWP's conclusion 
that the purpose and framework for community radio remained undefined 
and that no need existed in the public's mind for a community radio 
service. Instead COMCOM pointed to its previous publications outlining 
in detail structures and possibilities for community radio and demanded 
that the Home Office prepare immediately, (1981), an experiment in 
community radio broadcasting. To this end a body would have been 
established with representatives from the Home Office and community 
radio enthusiasts, (the Community Radio Working Party), to facilitate
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and monitor the introduction of community radio. The letter continued 
to list the responsibilities and duties of this proposed working party, 
and illustrated how the stations could be allocated frequencies from 
the existing VHF waveband. Partridge summarises this letter and the 
technical advice it contained. Of course, COMCOM met with no favourable 
response from the Home Secretary but its proposals remain a well 
formulated plan with precise information on the use of equipment and 
frequencies. The most recent spokesperson from the Home Office,
Mr. Clive Soely, has stated that: "There are no such things as community 
stations" in Britain but that an experiment of ten to twenty stations 
might be feasible" in the near future"! With no pressure group with 
political and commercial connections, it is unlikely that the "near 
future" will be soon, (1985). These then are the proposals and the 
underlying philosophies of the community radio enthusiasts in Britain, 
who have been waiting patiently for permission to establish a "third 
force" in local radio broadcasting. Some have readily acknowledged 
the influence that local radio systems in other countries have had, 
and it is to these other countries that attention will now be focused.
4.17 OTHER COUNTRIES: Sweden, Canada and Australia have developed
local radio systems that are "alternative" to the national network 
and may be broadly termed community radio. In addition the Netherlands 
have an access system for local participating groups to broadcast to 
local receivers. Some self-styled community stations exist in America 
receiving official recognition from the Federal Communications 
Commission, (FCC), and are tolerated by their competitive neighbouring 
stations.
4.17.1 The American experience of local radio has led to a 
"narrowcasting" of output whereby stations specialise in a type
153
of music or entertainment product. Narrowcasting has meant that in 
a single city many different stations may compete for listeners but 
since the size of the potential audience is often so great it is 
possible for a number of independent stations to exist, all depending 
on advertising for financial revenue. Most of these stations are owned 
by the American broadcasting "giants", the ABC and NBC networks. In a
reaction to the quality of programming and the lack of informative and
educational content, a move was made to set up a new type of local 
radio station, one for which profit was not the major motivating factor 
dictating content. Ironically America, which is hailed as the world 
leader in commercial radio, originated the threefold description of 
the purpose of radio broadcasting which has popularly been used in 
legislation. David Sarnoff, the General Manager of the Radio Corporation 
of America in 1922 was the first to say:
"Broadcasting represents a job of entertaining, 
informing and educating the nation, and should
therefore be distinctly regarded as a public
service."
John Scupham, Broadcasting in the Community, No.3 in
The New Thinker's Library,
Raymond Williams, ed.,
London: C.A. Watts & Co., 1967, p.22.
The general trend in American radio broadcasting has been towards an
emphasis on entertainment to the neglect of information and education.
A 1977-1978 survey showed that:
"Fewer than half the nation's radio stations 
listed news directors on their payrolls...
High profile, top-40 stations try to make
news a tune-in inducement and emphasise sex
and violence, Hollywood gossip and police news."
Donald C. Mathews, "Potomac Fever: Deregulating
Telecommunications", in America, 
vol.141, July 14, 1979, pp.6-8.
It was in this atmosphere that the first non-profit community stations
were developed. KPFA in Berkeley, California, was soon joined in
the 1950s by KRAB, Seattle, and KBOO in Oregon. These stations
depend on listener subscription to maintain running costs and on
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volunteers to assist in programming. Many have united to form the 
National Federation of Community Broadcasters and are not funded 
by the educational grant given to the Corporation for Public 
Broadcasting by the FCC. The community stations have a democratically 
elected structure representing staff, listeners and volunteers.
Funding is the all-important issue for American community stations.
With no advertising revenue listener subscriptions are supplemented 
by fund-raising events, sales of programme guides, (which do carry 
advertisments), and donations. Lewis makes the point that contrary to 
what happens in other countries, in America community stations start 
off with a small amount of capital and gradually build up resources. 
(Different Keepers, 1978, p.7.) Content on American stations is 
dramatically different with "unheard art forms that extend from the 
medieval to the avant-garde." (Partridge, 1982, p.18.) As well as 
unusual music and plays, ethnic minorities and live performances 
are well covered. Local news and politics are catered for and the 
unemployed, handicapped and women are given airtime. Open access 
is encouraged and often school children compile and present programmes. 
The only content rule that applies to American community radio seems 
to be, "expect the unexpected".
4.17.2 Perhaps nowhere else in the world has community radio been 
hailed as such a success as it has been in Canada. The Canadian Radio, 
Television and Telecommunications Commission, (CRTC), has provided 
an example that has been closely watched and studied with interest 
by many other countries. (The Annan Committee visited Canada and Irish 
Ministers have referred to the Canadian experience.) The development 
of community radio resulted initially from its population problems. 
Small isolated communities, especially in Northern Canada, were 
unattractive to the commercial network, CTV. In response to their
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lack of broadcasting facilities, these communities suggested a 
system of small non-profit volunteer stations. This offer must have 
appeared fortuitous to the CRTC, who would have otherwise have been 
obliged to supply a service to disadvantaged areas at large cost. In 
keeping with the principles of commercial broadcasting the CRTC 
stipulated that "those who provide the funds shall not interfere with 
the licencee's control over management and programming decisions of 
the station". (Lewis, Different Keepers, 1978, p.10.) Lewis refers 
to the importance of the National Film Board of Canada, and its 
influence on the CRTC and Canadian broadcasting policy.
The National Film Board has consistently emphasised the role 
which broadcasting can play in safeguarding and promoting the 
ethnic and linguistic minorities of a country. Canadian minorities 
are quite outspoken in their demands and have tended in the past to 
fragment the society. Broadcasting has been seen as a medium for 
allowing the freedom of expression for these minorities in a manner 
that allows for a national unity in the celebration of its diversities. 
Thus community radio was supported by the National Film Board and both 
are now seen as successful examples from which other countries with 
similar minority problems are seeking to learn. (The National Musicians' 
Federation of Ireland has used the Canadian example in their proposals 
to the Oireachtas Committee.)
Community co-operative ventures are widely supported in Canada 
and there are examples of cable networks and a number of self-help 
groups operating housing schemes, environmental clearance and small 
industries. Community radio is seen as merely one of many illustrations 
of community initiatives, but one that has worked particularly well. 
Perhaps the success of community radio in Canada depends primarily on 
the nature of its people and their willingness to involve themselves
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to the benefit of their community. Such a nature cannot be transported 
into another nation and the success of community radio depends not so 
much on its structure as on the willingness of the community itself 
to fully participate. Canadian community radio shows the gains that 
can be achieved in the realisation of the community and the hope for 
continuing community development; but it also stresses the dependence 
on volunteer effort.
4.17.3 Community radio broadcasting is also officially recognised 
in Australia since the publication of the report by the Green Committee 
in 1976. Before this community radio was established on an experimental 
basis by the Public Broadcasting Association of Australia, (PBAA). From 
this experimental period, three distinctive types of stations emerged 
which were designed in accordance with community principles: 
non-profit-making with democratic representation and accountability. 
These three types were consolidated into three categories under which 
an application for community broadcasting can be made to the Australian 
Broadcasting Tribunal. Category E covers educational and cultural
bodies; Category S covers "communities of interest"; and Category C
covers geographical communities. The PBAA which now represents the 
community broadcasters send forward two representatives to become 
members of the Broadcasting Council, on which the national and 
commercial networks are also represented. The Broadcasting Council 
has advisory powers only. The community stations are forbidden to 
advertise but depend on subscriptions, sponsorship and fund-raising 
events for their running costs which are kept relatively low through 
the use of volunteers. A variety of structures exist for community 
stations, but all include nominated members from listeners, staff, 
volunteers and the various ethnic or interest groups involved in
station output. An important body in providing funds for many community
157
stations is the Australia Council which sponsors arts and cultural 
projects and helps to provide a financially secure foundation for 
the community stations.
4.17.4 Swedish community radio, Narradio, (NR), is still being 
developed following a recent survey of a three year experiment which 
started in 1979. The development of NR followed the earlier 
experimentation by the national broadcasting agency with local radio, 
then Sveriges Radio, (SR). In 1973 SR conducted experiments with the 
intention of ascertaining the level of demand for local radio.
Following the success of its three initial stations, SR established 
a further twenty local radio stations in 1976. These stations were 
primarily under the editorial control of the SR and as such were 
under the legal restrictions of the 1966 Radio Act. Resulting from 
a parliamentary broadcasting report, demand for a more democratic 
system of local radio with greater public access increased. The 
Narradio project was initiated allowing for non-profit trusts to 
found and operate small community based stations. These stations, 
although being geographically limited, serve mainly communities of 
interest on a "proportz" system. Political, religious, social, ethnic 
and environmental pressure groups are given access to broadcast with 
airtime related to percentage size of the interest group. All groups 
then elect representatives to a management board which allocates time 
and funding. Financial support comes from the interest groups and local 
and national institutions. No commercial advertising is allowed. These 
community stations are not obliged to comply with impartiality and 
balance restrictions, but are merely governed by the laws of the land 
and the libel laws that apply to newspapers. Overseeing technical 
standards and allocating frequencies is the National Telecommunications 
Administration.
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An analysis of broadcasting in Sweden must take into account 
the liberal theory underlining Swedish legislation. As the first 
nation to institute the role of an Ombudsman, Sweden has a tradition 
of accountibility and freedom of speech. It is partly this tradition 
that has shaped the Narradio experiment. However, there also exists 
an intuitive system of censorship on social issues which are nationally 
held "taboo" by citizens and broadcasters alike, and this unwritten 
code does restrict the broadcast matter of both local and national 
med ia.
4.17.5 The 1967 Broadcasting Act established the Dutch 
"pillarisation" system under the national broadcasting organisation, 
NOS. NOS, together with the institutions it represents, (political, 
educational, leisure, religious and social), provides the facilities 
and studios for the various organisations1 broadcasts. The allocation 
of airtime is decided by the government in accordance with the signed 
and paid public membership of each organisation. The organisation, 
in an attempt to boost membership and thus gain more airtime, provides 
programme guides in the form of magazines to subscribers. A separate 
advertising organisation, STER, is responsible for all advertising 
and is again allocated airtime by government. A Broadcasting Council 
is also government appointed and has the responsibility of overseeing 
the standards of broadcasting and is available to advise government.
An appeal body, the Council of State, supervises the allocation of 
airtime and the admission of organisations to broadcast which, under 
the 1967 legislation, must have a minimum paid membership of 100,000 
and must aim to satisfy a need which no other organisation claims to 
satisfy. Following the growth and eventual restriction on "pirate" 
radio, the Dutch radio, and subsequently television, service changed 
to admit the popular tastes of mass audiences. Radio Syd and Radio
1 5 9
Veronica were among the first "pirate" ships to broadcast off the 
Dutch coast. Owners of Radio Veronica eventually formed the 
broadcasting company VQO and was granted a licence and airtime.
By 1977 there existed four radio channels but the all-music 
organisations have the greatest listenership and hence the largest 
amount of airtime, (cf. Kees van Haak and J. Spicer, Broadcasting 
in the Netherlands, 1977 . )
The local radio service was reviewed in 1977 and an 
experimental system, Werkwinkle, was established. Werkwinkle was an 
attempt to extend the "open-door" policy system of allocating 
broadcasting time to local participating groups. Again membership 
decided the allocation of airtime and advertising was controlled by 
STER. The success of Werkwinkle has called for the re-organisation of 
local radio in conjunction with the national radio system which has 
disintegrated from its original aim to the provision of entertainment 
only broadcasting. Whilst the system regarding membership of 
participating organisations has its failings, the Werkwinkle experiment 
illustrates the potential revitalisation of community interests and 
organisations that local radio can initiate and the development of 
community participation and self-help that can result from the 
involvement of community organisations in local radio broadcasting.
4.18 SOME TECHNOLOGY: The most frequent defence of the introduction
of the ILR is that it provided for the regulation of the radio 
frequencies. The "piratisation" of this public resource was ended 
and an orderly service of independent local radio was established. 
Similarly in Ireland, repeated calls are made for the regulation of 
radio and an end to the "open chaos" caused by "pirate" broadcasters. 
Since the widespread interference caused by early broadcasters in 
America prior to the introduction of legislation, it has been taken for
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granted that the airwaves must be regulated by some agency. How aware 
the public is of what is meant by "interference" or what the worst 
result from unrestricted broadcasting might be is unmeasurable; yet 
it is accepted that the public is generally ignorant of even basic 
radio technology and quite simply believes the claims of the media 
and politicians that the Irish "pirate" situation cannot be allowed 
to continue on account of the "harmful interference" it has caused. 
The public lack of knowledge of radio technology gives credibility 
to politicians' statements against "pirates" and demands for 
governmental authority over radio frequencies and their use. By not 
understanding the issues involved, the public remains ignorant of 
what amounts to the technical control of a public resource, the 
airwaves. This in effect leaves the government free to control the 
airwaves whilst remaining unaccountable to the public.
"it would be good and useful, not to say without 
precedence, if the debate as to who gets the 
right to generate which signals could be conducted 
in public; and if the public were to know and 
understand the terms in which it was being 
conducted. It is surely bad enough to have the 
wool pulled over one's eyes. It is doubly bad if 
the wool can be easily removed but is allowed 
nevertheless to befuddle and obscure."
Brian Winston, "Dangling Conversations", in 
Hardware Software: A Background Guide to the Study
of the Mass Media, Series No.2, 
London: Davis-Poynter, 1974, p.71.
4.19 TECHNICAL CONTROL: The sounds received by a radio set are
broadcast from a station on a radio frequency and the listener in 
changing from one station to another is changing the frequency to 
which the radio set is tuned. However, there is a limited number of 
frequencies available to radio broadcasters and therefore a limited 
number of stations can broadcast without causing channel interference. 
This is the "noise" experienced when changing stations, or the cross 
interference of two station signals breaking into one anothers1
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frequencies and interrupting listening. The frequencies available 
for broadcast are allocated to the IBA and the BBC by the British 
Home Office, (to RTE in Ireland by the Department of Communications), 
which has the authority to decide which frequencies should be 
allocated for radio and television broadcasting, radar and satellite 
use, emergency and defence services, and personal business and private 
communications. In this way the government can control which service 
be allowed to expand and which is to remain restricted. More 
importantly, it decides in co-operation with civil service directives 
whether the BBC or the IBA be allowed to extend its local radio 
services. The decisions made in regard to frequency allocation have 
shaped the local radio network in Britain, and have been used to justify 
the positioning of stations. It has been claimed that the frequencies 
do not exist for a large number of small community based stations; that 
a large number of these stations could not broadcast without causing 
interference and also that the technical standards insisted on by the 
IBA in Britain are a minimum standard to ensure professional quality 
output which would be acceptable to the public. VJithout a knowledge of 
radio technology, it is impossible to assess the validity of these 
claims and thus a technical elitist control is exerted over the public 
and over the broadcasters themselves since the Home Office in Britain, 
the BBC and the IBA are not obliged to account for their decisions.
Yet again decisions taken behind closed doors affect the local radio 
service available to the public:
"Decisions about the sort of communication systems 
we, as a society, establish are often taken behind 
firmly closed doors and are couched in a scientific 
language that is totally incomprehensible to most 
people. And this situation is going to get worse." 
ib id . , p . 6 3 .
4.20 PRIORITIES: Ireland has been allocated eight medium wave
frequencies and twelve VHF frequencies under the last meeting of the
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International Telecommunication Union. These are held at present by 
RTE. In deciding the use of these frequencies a number of factors 
should first be considered. In Britain there exists the tendency to 
first allocate the frequency space, and then to design the system in 
relation to the available frequencies. Thus technical considerations 
take priority over policy decisions. Annan, in a controversial 
assessment of Britain's frequency allocation, refers to this tradition 
and recognises it as proper:
"Both the Sykes Committee in 1923 and the 
Crawford Committee in 1926 recognised that 
any consideration of broadcasting must be 
dominated by the fact that it depends on the 
use of radio frequencies and is one of many 
services, such as telegraphy, telephones and 
radio navigation, which use radio frequencies."
Report of the Committee on the Future of Broadcasting,
1977, op.cit., p.8.
Certainly the frequency availability is important in the design of
a national frequency plan. However, technical considerations should
not have priority over the needs of communities, and should be
accommodated to the national interests so that community needs are
first considered. Technology should be the servant of the national
good and not its master. The questions that are relevant in the design
of a frequency plan are as follows:
1. What are the frequencies available to Ireland under international 
agreement? How many extra frequencies may be shared under Article 8 of 
WARC Copenhagen Conference, 1948? This total should allow for sufficient 
services for both RTE and a community radio service.
2. In the allocation of frequencies, the characteristics of AM and VHF 
should be taken into consideration. Medium wave signals are stronger but 
are open to night-time interference. VHF frequencies are needed for FM 
transmissions for quality music output but have a shorter range and 
require a complex aerial system. Should both AM and VHF frequencies be
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3. What geographical conditions and topographical problems of 
population distribution affect the design of a frequency plan for 
Ireland? How will the less populated areas be served?
4. What maximum transmitter power and aerial height will be proposed 
for each station? How does this relate to the proposed coverage area 
and will there be much "spill-over" of service areas?
5. Who will own and inspect the equipment and transmitter? What 
standards are likely and are they reasonable? Who will retain ultimate 
control over the equipment?
6. How many radio sets in Ireland can receive VHF signals? Are 
VHF sets available to elderly listeners in remote rural areas?
4.21 IN BRIEF: The development of local radio in Britain has
many similarities to the Irish context. Both have grown out of a 
demand created not so much by the public as by commercial incentives. 
The "pirate" history of the ILR in Britain illustrates the likely 
consequences of commercial local radio in Ireland. Previous proposed 
legislation has been clearly based on the ILR model, and the continued 
dominance of the profit motive over broadcast content and community 
service throughout the ILR system is a forwarning of what commercial 
local radio will become in Ireland. The ineffectiveness of the British 
systems of authority over their respective local radio services shadows 
the failures of the existing RTE authorities, and makes evident the 
lack of accountability of such government appointed authorities. In the 
neglect of their duties and the enforcement of their responsibilities 
the IBA and the BBC are equally at fault. The structures for public 
involvement are hopelessly inadequate, and the whole British system of 
local radio represents a failure in community development. The forces 
which pressurised for commercial local radio in Britain were obviously
allocated to each station?
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commercially motivated and their primary interest in private gain has 
resulted in the establishment of a system to the detriment of the BBC 
public service and the localities served by the ILR. The commercial 
forces which control local radio in Britain have succeeded in drawing 
the BBC into a battle for audience figures with the claim that such 
competition improves the national service. The commercial elite is 
supported by the government since local radio has cost little and 
provides yet another facade of "independent honest brokers" to monitor 
the system without actually challenging the status quo. The method 
of frequency allocation and technical standards presents yet another 
layer of elitist control over the interests of the communities served. 
Public ignorance of radio technology has never been expelled by those 
in control although it would be quite simple to educate the public on 
the possibilities and potentials for the development of a local radio, 
(and other), frequency plan. The provisions for frequency allocation 
are unnecessarily restricted and decisions regarding technical control 
need not be closed to the public. The systems of other countries 
suggest possible directions for alternative designs for local radio. 
Some of these systems would be unsuitable to Ireland and Irish needs, 
others offer hope for the potential role local radio could have in 
community and national affairs. The practicalities of these systems 
and the realistic likelihood of their adaptability will be reviewed 
together with a collation of the major arguments put forward will be 
presented in the concluding chapter.
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CHAPTER V
The first chapter opened with the question posed for the 
legislator: "How best to control local radio?" Throughout these 
chapters a Marxist-Elitist argument argument has been supported, 
that true democracy does not exist in this country since society is 
managed by political and economic forces which consistently favours 
a dominant elite. In the context of such a society the only local 
radio system possible is one which is submissive to the system and 
does nothing to threaten the establishment. The proposals for 
community radio which have been put forward, (a non-profit, 
democratically structured station), cannot hope to succeed in offering 
the "radical alternative" necessary to provide for the open choice 
which should be encouraged in a democracy. The NACB proposals which 
structurally coincide with the ideals of community radio fail to 
recognise that the final legislation together with economic conditions 
will force a "non-alternative" broadcasting content. It was put 
forward in the opening chapter that given the dominant societal 
context an "alternative" system to commercial local radio cannot 
possibly succeed.
5.1 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS: The underlying concept behind
community radio is the diffusion of the centralised power contained 
by the social and economic elite, and its redistribution amoung the 
community. Community radio represents community power, community 
control of a means of expression, its structure and its output.
Unlike the ownership of provincial newspapers, community ownership 
and control is fully open to each individual in the community.
Such a redistribution of control of a local radio system would
"CAN LOCAL RADIO SUCCEED?"
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herald demands for community control over other affairs, and would 
eventually result in a threat to the established control of the 
elite which has dominated since the conception of the state. For 
this reason any possible introduction of community radio will be 
surrounded by restrictions and regulations either directly or 
indirectly, to prevent its ever becoming an "alternative" voice 
in local radio broadcasting. Directly, it will be limited by 
legislation imposing the restrictions of Section 31 of the 
Broadcasting Act, and by demands for "financial viability" and 
the "professional" code of conduct which effectively prevents the 
type of critical reportage necessary to a "radical alternative". 
Indirectly, community radio will be pressurised by the influences 
of societal norms and expectations which affect listenership. The 
economic forces which demand high listenership figures and profits 
as a measure of success will eventually erode any controversial 
or provocative material. Through the operation of both direct and 
indirect forms of control, the control of local radio can be seen 
as but an example of the operation of control throughout the 
wider institutions of society to the continual benefit of the 
socio-economic and political elite.
5.1.1 This outlook, of course, necessitates a prior 
acceptance of the Marxist-Elitist theories on the nature of 
control and its role in society. The current argument between 
the Pluralist writings of Dahl and Polsby with that of Stephen 
Lukes, and between Parsons and Giddens, were reviewed in the 
light of the previous work of Bertrand Russell and his belief 
that power is a constant, a fixed-sum. Russell's work on the 
types of power and their manifestations paved the way for 
Bachrach and Baratz's concept of non-decision-making. However,
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as pointed out by Lukes and Stewart Clegg, Bachrach and Baratz 
were trapped in the Behaviourist tradition of direct-observation 
and thus limited in the application of their theory.
5.1.2 John Westergaard becomes useful in the furtherance 
of the study of the indirect forms of control and the use of 
influence. In an attempt to follow his methods, instances of both 
formal and informal control over programme-making were provided 
in the third chapter, drawing from the experiences of Doolan,
Dowling and Quinn in RTE. It was shown that in its very conception 
RTE was an instrument of political expediency and not of conscious 
planning and ideological thinking. The early political scandal in 
the establishment of RTE is echoed in the political ineptitude 
concerning the broadcasting by "pirate" stations. The political 
instability of previous governments partly explains the continuation 
of "pirate" broadcasting but their duration has given them a certain 
legitimacy which strengthens their pressure for licenced commercial 
local radio. Together with many other minority interest groups,
the "pirates" recognise the advantages of legalised local radio 
for those who obtain licences. Instead of assessing the proposals 
and the needs of the communities, the recommendations for the final 
local radio system will most likely again represent the satisfaction 
of as many interests as possible in accordance with political 
expediency. The lack of urgency with which the local radio has 
been treated and the obvious thoughtlessness of the draft legislation 
to date, copied mainly from the British Independent Local Radio 
model, suggests that the potential for community development 
which community radio could initiate has not only been ignored 
by the government, but purposely ignored.
5.1.3 Similarly in Britain, the potential for community
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development has been undermined by the profit motive. The 
introduction of "independent" broadcasting in Britain was 
primarily the result of a well co-ordinated pressure group of 
economic and political interests. H.H. Wilson gives a detailed 
account of the history of Independent Television, ITV. This 
background guide together with Bachrach and Baratz's definition 
of an elite as "those who consistently benefit", provides a 
clear picture of the forces behind the "independent" broadcasting 
services. The same picture emerges from a history of the ILR 
and its "pirate" radio origins. In Britain circumstances 
eventually made local radio legislation a necessity. The 
introduction of the ILR was an easier task for its political 
and economic promoters with the prior establishment of the ITV. 
The degree to which the commercial powers succeeded can be seen 
in an analysis of the failure of the Independent Broadcasting 
Authority, IBA, to fulfil its public responsibilities, and in 
its lack of accountability to its critics. Caroline Heller 
describes instances of the failures of the IBA and questions the 
role of the BBC as a public service. The BBC's own local radio 
system has been seriously threatened by the ILR and the BBC's 
response to provide a "cheap imitation" of the ILR stations 
has only resulted in the quickening decline of the BBC local 
radio service.
Studies from the Local Radio Workshop, LRW, and 
observations from John Westergaard point to the dominance of 
the business interests in local radio over the ideals of public 
service. The early hopes of the potential of local radio as 
outlined by A. Wright are easily recognised as being unfulfilled. 
The response of British community radio supporters has been to
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draw from other countries systems which may be adapted for a trial 
period in Britain. Peter Lewis and Simon Partridge are the key 
writers on community radio in Britain and in his support for 
the COMCOM group, Partridge has called on the British Home 
Secretary to allow for experimental community radio stations.
Among the most effective areas of control wielded by 
the IBA and BBC in collaboration with the Home Office is the 
control over the technical resources necessary to local radio.
The allocation of frequencies, the number and positioning of the 
local radio stations, the ownership of equipment and the 
transmitters is all tightly controlled and information on 
decision-making is difficult to obtain. The decisions taken 
regarding all technical matters are strictly confidential and 
are closed to public discussion. In an attempt to break through 
this technical elitism, a basic introduction to the technical 
issues of local radio could be attempted by the media, although 
more questions would be posed in relation to Irish local radio 
than could possibly be answered since the Irish Department of 
Communications, whilst friendly, is also tightly closed to 
public questions.
5.2 THE ID E A L  MODEL: The potential that community radio
represents for community development is an ideal that is unlikely 
to ever reach fulfillment. Despite this, it is worth detailing 
a possible framework for control, and the worthwhile effects 
that it may have on a community. The co-operative structure of 
ownership, listenership and staff management has been outlined 
previously. The diagram below illustrates how shareholders with 
equal voting rights elect representatives who, together with 
elected representatives from the interested listeners and community
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organisations and the elected representatives from the part-time 
and full-time staff form the Management Committee. Separate from 
the Management Committee is the Programming Committee. Representatives 
from the staff and listener groups are elected to the Programming 
Committee and are responsible for the provision of programmes and 
scheduling.
1, 2 , 3 ------------► A. A & B  1 year duration
2, 3 -------------► B. A & B  mutually exclusive
1 vote / man or organisation
  Diagram 1: Model of Com m unity Radio C o -O p e ra tive  Structure
The Management Committee has no direct involvement with the 
Programming Committee but, indirectly, both may have members from 
the one interest group. However, members from the Management 
Committee may not become members of the Programming Committee, 
and vice versa. Minutes from the meetings of both Committees 
are publically available and meetings are open to the public.
No individual nor organisation can be excluded from membership 
on application. The right of reply and the laws of the state 
pertaining to libel, public order and morality as defined by 
the courts of the state are the sole safeguard and restriction 
on the freedom of speech.
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5.2.1 A network of such community stations acts as 
regulators of the system. Within each region, (or Province), 
the stations nominate members to the Regional Council. The 
nominees need not be members of either the Management or 
Programming Committees. In their nominations the stations 
must ensure that members of the Regional Council have the 
adequate knowledge of technical, social and legal issues 
available to it that are necessary in the planning and 
maintenance of the region's community radio service. At all 
stages elections are open to every community individual and 
all meetings are public. In this way, the structures are open 
to public monitor and are fully accountable. The system depends 
on public involvement and commitment but it is this involvement 
that gives due regard to the responsibilities of membership.
Political influence will be limited to the equal 
opportunity for influence of other pressure groups, economic, 
religious, social and leisure. The dominance of any one group or 
an alliance between groups depends on the willingness of the 
other community interests to oppose any dominance. The burden 
of responsibility rests fully on the community itself. Community 
participation is needed to make the system work and to ensure 
equality between the various community interests. The onus 
is on the community alone, not on any central administrative 
authority appointed by a government in response to political 
pressures and convenience.
5.2.2 The usual criticism of such community models lies 
in the question; "Who provides the finance?" There are only 
five possible primary sources of financial backing: private 
investment, government funding, donations from cultural
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government, (and in particular the present coalition), has
continually refused to provide for local radio. The cultural
institutions in Ireland, including social and leisure
organisations, have not the resources to establish a national
local radio network and while some may assist an individual
station, a local radio system could not depend on this source
for financing. A private investor would surely look for a
return in the initial investment which would not be possible
for a non-profit-making station. Dependence on advertising
revenue leads to the need for high audience levels which
necessitates non-controversial broadcasting material, and
returns eventually to the profit motive. However, community
radio already imposes a large responsibility on the involvement
of the community without also demanding community sponsorship.
Sponsorship provides the necessary funding for some stations in
America and Canada together with larger donations from public
bodies and, in some cases, private industry. In the Netherlands
and Sweden each participating organisation pays a membership fee
which covers initial capital and running costs. Australian community
radio depends on a mixture of sources from the Australia Council
and similar educational and cultural institutions and also from
public sponsoring. Sales of tee-shirts, stickers, badges, booklets
and programming guides also provide minimal funding for community
stations in Australia, Canada and America. Canadian community
radio depends on the National Film Board, and a subsidy from commercial
stations to help pay for the community radio costs. Subsidies from
commercial stations have been proposed in Ireland whenever a two-tiered
system for local radio is suggested. Suggestions for "twinning"
stations also allow for a commercial station to subsidize a smaller
institutions, advertising revenue and public sponsorship. The
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community station. Yet for community radio to remain independent 
it must have an independent source of finance which it can call 
upon with a clear conscience, and which will in no way affect 
broadcast content or the control of the community station. The 
most effective of the five possibilities is public sponsorship.
It is not a satisfactory solution, but seems the only possible 
solution within the confines of the proposed framework. Two points 
should be noted which relate to sponsorship. First, the standard 
of the broadcasting will affect public willingness to fund their 
station. The better the quality of programming, the greater the 
likelihood of sponsorship. This forms a reciprocal relationship. 
Secondly, as Peter Lewis notes in Different Keepers, (1977), 
stations in both America and Australia start with an initial low 
amount of capital from a primary source and only later diversify 
their income sources, spending their increased income on improving 
station equipment and thus improving the service to the public.
This later improved service, in return, improves the public 
sponsorship. Finance need not be a problem, Lewis implies. It is 
only a problem to the bureaucratic administrators because they 
have made it a problem. With the right attitude, Lewis faithfully 
asserts, the finance necessary to the establishment and maintenance 
of a station can be found. Perhaps the financial difficulties and 
collapse of some of the British ILR stations can be attributed 
to the lack of community involvement and commitment to the 
"independent" commercial stations.
5.3 THE REALISTIC MODEL: The reality of the Irish context as
described throughout these chapters recognises that the dominance 
of a political economic elite will control any possible opportunity 
for a "radically alternative" system of local radio. The introduction
of a form of community radio will only result in a minority system 
of local radio with the firm dominance of commercial local radio. 
The dependence on advertising which will be forced on community 
radio will weaken "alternative" programming. Community radio will 
eventually become an accepted, tolerated system which will be 
publicised as an "alternative" but which will not be fulfilling the 
requirements as laid down by Lukes, (1974). Instead community radio 
will be a recognition by the government of the demands of the 
community radio supporters and interest groups but not a commitment 
to those demands.
5.3.1 The latest outline by the Minister Jim Mitchell, 
is for a "two-tiered structure", (22nd-April-85). A number of 
regionally based commercial stations will be complemented by a 
larger number of community based stations controlled by community 
co-operatives. The numbers and locations of these stations will be 
decided by the government appointed Interim Local Radio Commission. 
This twelve member Commission, (CORA), is made up from political 
representatives, (with a predominance of Fine Gael and Labour 
supporters), business interests, an educational correspondent, 
an Irish "pop" singer, a director of the National Youth Council,
(25 years old), and Mr. George Waters a former Director-General of 
RTE with a background in broadcast engineering. The Commission has 
been virtually left with the responsibility of designing the local 
radio system for Ireland within the political confines of the 
legislative outlines for the two-tiered structure described by 
Mr. Mitchell. The Commission meets once a month and its meetings 
are closed to the public. Since the Oireachtas Committee was unable 
to make any recommendations or to publish a report of their 
proceedings, the Commission is unable to call upon any advice from
previous bodies. A member of the Commission confidentially 
complained that the Commission would be unable to study in-depth 
the various arguments since it is expected to complete its task 
by the middle of 1986, (an unlikely deadline).
The Commission has also been "warned against other models" 
from countries with a local radio system and presumably this implies 
that the mistakes and advantages of other systems cannot be applied 
to the Irish situation. However, the failures of the British ILR 
stations and the ownership and content patterns, do carry important 
lessons of which the Commission should be aware. Similarly the 
enthusiasm of the American community radio broadcasters should be 
analysed and compared to the Canadian spirit of community initiative 
and self-help. The Australian venture with the narrowcasting of 
communities of interest should be considered as an alternative to 
the commercial regional stations. Perhaps communities of interest 
could be allocated AM frequencies and could provide a service 
similar to that provided for the Irish language by Radio na 
Gaelteacht. Funding for this type of service could possibly come 
from the interest groups concerned since there would only be a small 
number of these national stations.
5.3.2 Instead the two-tiered system will comprise a few 
well-situated commercial regional stations. In addition, the 
community stations will not be "radically" different except in 
nominal structure. Without community involvement these stations 
will only be a mild alternative to their commercial counterparts. 
Despite the best possible community involvement, dependence on 
advertising and legal controls will restrict provocative 
controversial content and thus effectively mute the potential 
community radio has for development and consciousness-raising.
5.3.3 The biggest loser in the system as outlined by 
Mr. Mitchell will be RTE, the state-sponsored public service 
network. The outlined legislation suggests that RTE will be 
allowed to apply "either alone or in a consortium" for a 
regional-type licence. Irrespective of its application RTE 
"would be entitled to a 25 per cent share", (Irish Times,
13th May, 1985). RTE will not be allowed to apply for a community 
licence, is seems, but will not be restricted from advising and 
assisting community stations whenever asked. With RTE's financial 
cut-backs in services it appears unlikely that the organisation 
could afford involvement in the regional stations. Yet neither 
can RTE afford not to become involved in local radio if it is to 
remain a national enterprise. Unfortunately for RTE, the government 
refusal in 1976 of RTE1s plans for local radio heralded its 
failure in the battle for local radio. The only hope for RTE to 
retain any credibility in this situation is for it to establish 
a close relationship on a professional basis with the regional 
and community stations through the exchange of news and programming 
features and possibly in the provision of technical expertise and 
resources. In this way RTE may salvage some respectability in an 
issue for which it cannot, in full measure, be blamed.
5.4 FINAL IMPLICATIONS: The most realistic model for the
eventual local radio system in Ireland then, is likely to be a 
commercial system closely resembling the British ILR stations 
with a number of smaller community based co-operative controlled 
stations whose content will be hardly indistinguishable from the 
larger commercial stations. The government and the commercial 
hierarchy will retain effective control over this new medium and
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no change in the status quo will result. Thus no community 
development will grow from community radio. The growth of community 
awareness and the re-distribution of power which community radio has 
the potential to foster will be crippled. The Irish government is 
right to fear and suspect community radio with its philosophy for 
radio "of the people, by the people, for the people." Government 
paranoia of what the media may say if uncontrolled and what the 
result of uncontrolled speech may be is wholly justified. If unleashed, 
community radio could threaten the societal hierarchy and lead to 
greater demands for self-control of local resources and an increase 
in governmental accountability. In order for the government to maintain 
the socio-economic status quo, control must be centrally administered 
and democracy must continue to be managed. The public must remain 
ignorant of possible change and views on Marxist-Elitist applications 
to society must be restricted. The economic and financial powers 
profit from this social order and lend support to the "managed" 
political democracy. The hegemonic network teaches that it is best to 
concede to the social structure and work within it, gradually improving 
your position in the social order. "If you can't beat the system, 
then join it." Thus the proposal that suggests itself to those involved 
in "pirate" community radio is to first gain a licence and then slowly 
educate the listeners' taste to tolerate and later want more demanding 
and non-conformative material. "Challenge slowly" is the motto; no 
dramatic revolution of "radical alternatives". The community radio 
members have no alternative but to conform to the commercial model 
and to fight within the system. Through their structure eventual 
content change will evolve. Their hope lies in the future and in the 
development of listeners' desire for change. The greatest fear with 
this argument is that the conformity needed to survive in the commercial 
climate will become irreversable, and the community radio supporters
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themselves will become contaminated by the power structures and 
dominant values they are seeking to change. Secondly, it may be argued 
that this slow process of change from within is too slow and has existed 
in other institutions for many years with little result. Both these 
arguments are used by those familiar with the age-old revolutionary/ 
democratic opponents of early Marxism. There is no overall answer to 
"Which is best?" Again, it depends on personal perspectives and useful 
application. In relation to local radio in Ireland, the argument is 
redundant since there exists only one rational course of action for 
those seeking change. The community radio supporters have only one 
opion open to them and that is to work within the system and hope for 
the growth of community development.
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